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The Use of Force in the United Nations Peace Operations



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The Use of Force in the United Nations Peace Operations

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
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
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
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
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**“to my faithful dog
and dear friend John
Rambo (2013-2020)”**

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**“Tactical victories are
pointless if political
advantage is not achieved”
(NVA General Le Duc Tho,
during the Paris Peace
Accords of 1973)**

ABSTRACT

When and how to use military force has been an issue since the early UN missions and has influenced theory and practice. Authors have categorized UN peace operations broadly in terms of scope, aims, and extent of use of force. “Traditional” or “multidimensional” operations, “Chapter VI” or “Chapter VII” mandates, peacekeeping or peace enforcement are all differentiated in terms of use of force. Despite the existence of some cases of success, to a large degree, failure in the field has been a marker of the use of force in peacekeeping operations. In this sense, the purpose of this study is to understand how military force has been used in UN peace operations and why it has been considered controversial. The hypothesis sustained here is that there is a relationship between the scientific, linear, and tactically focused mindset to employ military power and the use of force in current UN peace operations. With neutralization of enemy forces to protect civilians as the main overriding criteria for success, peacekeepers have pursued results in tactical terms. Moreover, the tactical focus has largely overshadowed the political nature of the United Nations. The research is supported by the conceptual and theoretical discussions of the use of military power, deterrence, and complexity as well as the analysis of a case study. It concludes presenting a recommendation to use force in UN peace operations, titled *Adaptive Use of Force*.

Keywords: 1. Force. 2. Use of Force. 3. Strategy. 4. Deterrence. 5. Complexity. 6. United Nations. 6. Peace Operations. 7. MONUSCO.

RESUMO

O uso da força em operações de paz da Organização das Nações Unidas tem sido questão central de discussão desde as primeiras missões, com impactos para teoria e prática. Diferentes autores categorizaram operações de manutenção da paz em termos de escopo, objetivos e extensão do uso da força. Operações “tradicionais” ou “multidimensionais”, mandatos centrados no “Capítulo VI” ou “Capítulo VII”, manutenção da paz ou imposição da paz, todos esses aspectos podem ser diferenciados, entre outras coisas, em termos de uso da força. Apesar da existência de algumas exceções, em grande medida, o uso da força em operações de manutenção da paz é marcado por casos de insucesso. Nesse sentido, o objetivo deste estudo é compreender como a força militar tem sido utilizada nas operações de paz da ONU e por que esse assunto é considerado controverso. A hipótese sustentada aqui é que há uma relação entre uma mentalidade de enfoque tático-científico-linear e o uso da força nas atuais operações de paz da ONU. Com a neutralização de forças inimigas como o principal critério de sucesso para a proteção de civis, planejadores estratégicos tem buscado vitórias em termos táticos. Adicionalmente, o foco tático tem obscurecido a natureza política das operações de paz da ONU. A pesquisa é apoiada por discussões conceituais e teóricas do uso do poder militar, dissuasão e complexidade, bem como a análise de um estudo de caso. Como conclusão, apresenta-se uma recomendação conceitual para o uso da força em operações de paz da ONU, denominada Uso Adaptativo da Força (*Adaptive Use of Force*).

Palavras-chave: 1. Força. 2. Uso da força. 3. Estratégia. 4. Dissuasão. 5. Complexidade. 6. Nações Unidas. 6. Operações de Paz. 7. MONUSCO.

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ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|--|
| ACLED | Armed Conflict Location and Event Data |
| ADF | Allied Democratic Forces |
| APCLS | The Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (French: <i>Alliance des Patriotes Pour un Congo Libre et Souverain</i>) |
| CNDP | National Congress for the Defense of the People (French: <i>Congrès National Pour la Défense du Peuple</i>) |
| DDR | Disarmament, demobilization, and Reintegration |
| DRC | Democratic Republic of the Congo |
| FARDC | Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: <i>Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo</i>) |
| FDLR | Rwandan Liberation Democratic Forces (French: <i>Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda</i>) |
| FIB | Force Intervention Brigade |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| ICGLR | International Conference on the Great Lakes Region |
| IDMC | Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Persons |
| LRA | Lord's Resistance Army |
| M23 | Movement of 23 March (French: <i>Mouvement du 23 Mars</i>) |
| MAD | Mutually Assured Destruction |
| MINUSCA | Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (French: <i>Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies Pour la Stabilisation en Centrafrique</i>) |
| MINUSMA | Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (French: <i>Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies Pour la Stabilisation au Mali</i>) |
| MONUC | United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: <i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo</i>) |

| | |
|---------|---|
| MONUSCO | United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: <i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies Pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo</i>) |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NFL | The National Force of Liberation |
| ONUC | United Nations Operation in the Congo (French: <i>Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo</i>) |
| PSCF | Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region |
| RDC | Rally for Congolese Democracy |
| SADC | South African Development Community |
| SLBM | Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| USA | United States of America |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

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1. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War changed a well-defined political situation between two ideologically antagonistic blocs into a qualitatively different international environment, marked by the quasi-absence of well-characterized threats and an increasing number of intrastate wars. Although the possibility of a high-intensity East-West conflict was considered improbable, the new world order displayed signs of political instability and internal conflicts in parts of Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Middle East. In the bipolar era, both the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) contained disputes within their areas of influence, making the system more stable. Therefore, the static and vertical global order comprised of more rational and predictable actors changed to a diffused and dynamic one with reshaped alliances and a more active role for non-state actors. The new system has been considered unstable, complex, and multipolar, characterized by intrastate conflicts and the so-called "new threats." The industrial war paradigm between States was gradually replaced by a new paradigm called "war amongst the people."¹ Figure 1 provides an overview of the rising number of intrastate conflicts overtime. Although a decline can be noticed after 1991, the gap between intrastate and interstate wars increases.

The United Nations (UN) acts on the global stage to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, achieve international cooperation and acts as a center for harmonizing the actions of nations.² In this sense, since the deployment of the first labeled UN peacekeeping mission in 1956,

¹ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (New York, NY: Vintage, 2007).

² United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (New York, NY: United Nations, 1945).

peacekeeping operations have been used to maintain peace and stabilize the international system, based on the core principles of neutrality, impartiality, and Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.³ The way peacekeepers have accomplished their tasks has varied over time, given both the end of the Cold War and the failure of some peace operations in the 1990's, remarkably in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, which are considered cornerstones for major changes in their *modus operandi*.




Figure 1. Number of Conflicts after World War II

Source: Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Database, “Number of Armed Conflicts and War”, accessed 26 April 2019, <https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict>.

During the Cold War era, except for the UN Force in Korea (1950) and the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC-1960), the majority of UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to monitor and verify peace agreements, relying on lightly armed troops and unarmed military observers. At the time, the primary role of the military forces was to prevent the escalation of conflicts and then pave the way for diplomatic efforts to solve

³ Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

these conflicts.⁴ Force was authorized only in self-defense. Balance of power among the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), particularly between the two superpowers, prevented the UN from moving towards a more assertive use of force. At the end of the 1980's, as the Cold War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union's power had decreased dramatically and was no longer able to counterbalance western interests. Consequently, the UN and peacekeeping became heavily influenced by values of the liberal democratic order, such as human rights, democracy, and the open market. Between 1988 and 1993, the UN conducted more peace operations than over the previous forty years.⁵ Peacekeeping became the conflict resolution tool of choice. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was broadened to take in the promotion of post-Westphalian conception of stable peace⁶ and to carry out operations qualitatively different from earlier missions, combining a wide spectrum of issues. These issues include not only the disengagement of belligerent troops, but also a broad process to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) former combatants, protection of civilians, improve border demarcation, and projects to reduce sexual violence, improve gender equality, and much more. The dilemma about when and how to use force was still an issue, as peacekeepers became involved in civil wars and nation-building.⁷ Figure 2 displays a brief overview of UN peacekeeping operations

⁴ Alex J. Bellamy, Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ According to Bellamy and Williams, the post Westphalian conception of stable peace holds that states receive their sovereign rights only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens, such as protections and prosperity. In the post-Westphalian perspective, peace operations need to be in the business of protecting human rights where host states proving unwilling or unable to do so; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 38.

⁷ Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, 2002), 65.

by type, between 1973 and 2013. The number of operations considerably increased between 1983 and 1993. Moreover, enforcement mission and multidimensional mission answer for most of the mandates.




Figure 2. UN Peace Operations by Type.

Source: Hegre, Håvard, Lisa Hultman and Håvard Møkleiv Nygård, “Peacekeeping Works An assessment of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations” (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2015).

How to use military force has been a question since the early UN missions and has influenced theory and practice. Authors have categorized peacekeeping broadly in terms of scope, aims, and extent of use of force. “Traditional”⁸ or “multidimensional”⁹ operations, “Chapter VI” or “Chapter VII” mandates, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, are all differentiated in terms of use of force. Because the strengths or weakness of UN peace operations may be amplified depending on how force is handled,

⁸ missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles. United Nations, “Our History”. Accessed 26 April 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our_history.

⁹ Peacekeeping missions in support of the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements that typically includes organizing post-conflict election; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; and supporting national reconciliation process, Cedric De Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud, eds. *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 8.

the concept is central for conducting mission analysis and determining the intended end state. Despite the existence of some cases of success, to a large degree, failure in the field has been a marker of the use of force in peacekeeping operations.¹⁰

The reliance on the use of force as key element in the conflict resolution process is controversial and has divided theorist and practitioners. For instance, Fortna¹¹ argues that if most of the causal mechanisms through which peacekeeping influences the parties to a conflict are nonmilitary, the peacekeeping failures in Rwanda and Bosnia, for example, as well as the role of military intervention for human rights purposes in multidimensional operations do not explain by themselves the main reason why an institution created to promote peace has been increasing the use of force to achieve its goals.

An independent strategic review of The UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), conducted by Dr. Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute (IPI), stated that “the impact of offensive operations on the protection of civilians remains controversial, as these operations seem to have escalated the violence in the country to its highest levels in a decade, caused collateral damage and triggered retaliatory attacks against communities.” In addition, he points out that “the focus on neutralizing armed groups seems to have largely overshadowed the activities of the civilian component of the Mission” and, therefore “most Congolese people identify MONUSCO with its military component.”¹²

¹⁰ Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 351.

¹¹ Virginia P. Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

¹² United Nations, *Letter from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council: Transitioning from Stabilization to Peace: an Independent Strategic Review*

In a paper titled *Improving Security of United Nations : We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business*, also known as “Cruz Report,” former MINUSTAH and MONUSCO’s Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Roberto dos Santos Cruz outlines that two-thirds of all United Nations peacekeepers are deployed in environments experiencing ongoing conflict and often lacks the required supporting skill sets, processes, and mindset for executing operations in modern complex conflict environments. In his opinion, one of the most important initiatives is to identify specific areas where United Nations peace operations can adapt to complex conflict environments.¹³

In this sense, it is relevant for theory and practice to discuss not only the reasons why the UN has built up forces over time, increasing military components in size, strength and lethality but also to understand the challenging environments where peacekeepers are currently deployed and how force has been employed to achieve political objectives. Thus, the purpose of this study is to understand how military force has been used in UN peace operations and why it has not provided significant advantage to the political process. The hypothesis sustained here is that there is a relationship between the scientific, linear, and tactically focused mindset to employ military power and the use of force in current UN peace operations. Consequently, the null hypothesis assumes that there is no meaningful relationship between the scientific, linear, and tactically focused mindset to employ military power and the use of force in current UN peace operations.

of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 29 October 2019), 3, 7, 19-21.

¹³ United Nations, *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business* (New York, NY: Secretary General of the United Nations, 2017), 18.

The primary question is: how does the UN use force in peace operations? The secondary research questions are:

1. What is the relationship between the increasing use of military force and the UN's reputation as a credible conflict-resolution institution?
2. How do concepts of force, strategy and deterrence influence the utility of force in current UN peace operations?
3. How does Complexity Theory impact the use of force in current UN peace operations?

The analysis is based on some assumptions from the English School of international relations theory. In the classic English School, the international system is perceived as a society where members consent to common rules to avoid chaos. War is considered a legitimate way to achieve political goals. However, it is also considered a symptom of disorder. In his seminal book for the English School, *The Anarchical Society*, Hedley Bull emphasizes that in an anarchical society, options to violent disputes have to be constrained by cooperation in the working institutions such as the forms of procedures of international law, the machinery of diplomacy, and international institutions.¹⁴ According to this theory, in the international society, there would be a consensual constraint of national interests on the basis of something understood as beneficial to this society as a whole, such as restraints on the use of force.

The relevance of this study is related to the link between new trends of UN peacekeeping and Brazilian strategic interests. The 2019 National Defense Policy establishes that Brazil should prepare its Armed Forces in order to perform humanitarian actions and peace operations for a greater international insertion

¹⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (London, UK: Macmillan International, 2002), 13.

strategy.¹⁵ That means people, government, and the military must understand how force can be useful in peace operations.

This paper is organized in five chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter II provides the methodological guidance to discuss the research problem and address the primary and secondary research questions. Chapter III is the literature review. It is divided in three parts. The first part discusses the concepts of force and strategy and their influence on the use of force in UN peace operations. It also describes the UN command and control structure, principles, and key vulnerabilities of the institution to deploy and employ military forces. The second part analyses deterrence theory. Key UN doctrinal documents and guidelines presents deterrence as the ultimate aim of the use of force in peace operations. A correct understanding of possibilities and limitations of such strategy is critical for the purpose of this work. Lastly, Part III describes the challenging environments where peacekeepers are currently deployed in the light of the “Complexity Theory.” It argues that traditional military approaches to use force do not work in complex adaptive environment, such as intrastate conflicts. Using MONUSCO as case study, Chapter IV analyzes how the UN employs military forces in complex environments and the strategic results in the light of the mission’s political aim. The conclusion theorizes about an innovative way to use force in current UN peace operation, called *Adaptive Use of Force*. The innovative approach is supported by the conceptual and theoretical discussions of the use of military power, deterrence, and complexity as well as the analysis of a case study.

¹⁵ Federative Republic of Brazil, “National Defense Policy”, (Brasília, BR: Defense Ministry, 2016), 33, accessed 13 September 2018, <https://www.defesa.gov.br/estado-e-defesa/politica-nacional-de-defesa>.

The study presents five critical findings. First, strategy aims to deliver continuous advantage to the political process. Thus, the concept of victory in terms of destruction or neutralization of the enemy forces may be pointless if political advantage to the peace process is not provided. A ‘good solution’ in the form of a zone of tolerance or possible outcome is preferable to an ‘optimal solution’ that becomes unachievable in the long run. Second, in environments where peacekeepers are currently deployed, such as intrastate conflicts, unstable peace may quickly evolve into an environment where insurgencies thrive, leading to a more general conflict. Therefore, military resources need to be flexible enough to operate across a range of military operations, which encompass military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; and large-scale combat operations. All operations across this range share a common fundamental purpose—to change, influence, or control aiming political advantage to the peace process. Third, several limitations exist in terms of doctrine, resources, and purpose for the UN to use force in its peace operations. Thus, the institution must rethink the aim of its operations when deploying peacekeepers in ongoing conflicts. Incapacity, inability or unwillingness to carry out a threat may affect UN credibility as a conflict resolution institution and result in failure to deter spoilers to the peace process. Fourth, the use of military forces in UN peace operations has been heavily influenced by the scientific, linear, tactically focused, and top-down detailed planning process from war experiences of the past two centuries. This approach is quantitative in nature, isolates system components and uses linear approximations to describe the environment. The obvious limitation of this framework is that the operational environment of civil wars cannot be quantified, isolated, or precisely measured. The result is unpredictability in accurately assessing force ratios, inexplicable reactions, and the collapse of strategies. Fifth, in complex adaptive

environments, military force is only useful in a multidimensional effort to learn, adapt and orient in an environment of continuous change. Power is an indivisible whole. The instruments of power are closely interdependent, and it is difficult to imagine the application of one instrument in isolation from the others. This multidimensional effort has to focus on decentralized control and execution, as it is critical to identify emerging local opportunities and act on them preemptively.

2. METHODOLOGY

This chapter explains the research methodology used to collect and organize relevant data as well as to analyze and interpret results. Section 2 also clarifies the impact of the chosen methodology to addresses the research problem and outline the researcher's steps in obtaining the information needed to address the primary and secondary research questions.

2.1 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to understand how military force has been used in UN peace operations and why it has not provided significant advantage to the political process; and second, to design a theory for the potential application of force for UN peace operations. In doing so, this research would contribute to the exploration of possibilities and limitations of UN peace operations, while expanding the potential application of deterrence and complexity theories to other institutional fields in addition to the operational arena. The primary question is: how does the UN use force in peace operations? The secondary research questions are: what is the relationship between the increasing use of military force and the UN's reputation as a credible conflict-resolution institution? How do the concepts of force, strategy and deterrence influence the utility of force in current UN peace operations? How does Complexity Theory impact the use of force in current UN peace operations?

2.2 TYPE OF RESEARCH

In order to answer the research questions, a quali-quantitative methodology based on a case study approach was chosen because qualitative methodologies help to understand intangibles such as meanings, values, biases, and beliefs. Additionally, a qualitative approach to research methodology is necessary, as the nature of the sources

and the sort of processes to analyze them are essentially non-quantitative. However, quantitative data will help to mitigate the impact of subjective analysis. The case study approach is beneficial because it helps to understand complex issues and can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through previous research.¹⁶

This project looks at the use of force in the UN peace operations based on deterrence and complexity theories and uses an inductive reasoning method to tease out broad concepts that may be universally applicable in a general theory. In *Qualitative Methods in Research on Teaching*, Frederick Erickson argues that since the general lies in the particular, continuities and contingencies from a particular case may help to understand similar situations. However, according to the author, it is the reader, not the researcher, who determines what can be applied to other contexts.¹⁷ While the specifics differ from case to case, the goal is to highlight generalities to make qualified assumptions for future analysis. Thus, if deterrence-based and complexity theories provide insights on the use of military power in UN peace operations, they may influence theory and practice for future cases. In this sense, the study will be looked at to understand the evolution of the use of force in UN peace operations after the end of the Cold War; to what degree the UN force succeed in deterring non-state actors; and what are the implications of complexity theory to understand the utility of force in current UN peace operations.

¹⁶ Susan K. Soy. “The Case Study as a Research Method” (unpublished paper, University of Texas, Austin, TX, 11 November 1998).

¹⁷ Frederick Erickson, *Qualitative Methods in Research on Teaching* (East Lansing, MI: Institute for Research on Teaching, 1985).

2.3 CASE SELECTION

MONUSCO was chosen for analysis because it was the first time in the United Nations history a UN force was assigned to execute offensive operations to neutralize non-state actors. It is both a unique case and a test of theory.¹⁸ The mission has been used as a laboratory for new approaches including the use of force. Its outcomes have influenced other ongoing UN peace operations, such as MINUSMA, MINUSCA, and UNMISS.

2.4 CRITERIA AND METRICS

Using MONUSCO as a case study, Chapter IV uses both quantitative and qualitative approaches to discuss the influences of deterrence and complexity theories on how the UN employs military forces to achieve its political objectives. Deterrence is based on credibility. Aspects such as reputation, strength, the ability to carry out a threat, and to defend against other's actions influence how a military force is perceived as credible.¹⁹ In this fashion, credibility is going to be evaluated based on two criteria. The first is defined by Freedman (2005) and adapted to the MONUSCO's case study context: the capability to use force in order to stop others acting in harmful way. Particularly, the MONUSCO's ability to deter violence against civilians, the overall goal of every UN peace operation.

The second criterion is the implementation of the MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade mandated key task: to carry out targeted offensive operations to neutralize armed groups in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat

¹⁸ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research Design and Methods*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 40-41.

¹⁹ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and perception," *International security*, vol 7, no. 3 (1982): 9.

posed by them on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities.²⁰ Mandate implementation is the most widely used measure of effectiveness for UN peace operations. It examines standards that the UN has set itself.²¹ Therefore, the Force Intervention Brigade's mandated key task is a valid evaluation criterion.

The use of force in complex environments is evaluated based on a third criterion, that is the capability to adapt. Adaptation is going to be evaluated based on two aspects: first, ability to understand the changing dynamic of the environment and to recognize emergent opportunities to be exploited; second, the capability to reframe approaches, and adapt operations and tactics to achieve a position of continuous advantage to the political process.

2.5 ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH PROCESS

The first step in this research process was to identify informational resources to study and gain understanding of theories regarding force, deterrence, and complexity. Reviewing multiple data sources, which included reports, news articles, scholarly journal articles, books, student papers and in-depth peer-reviewed academic studies increased the credibility and validity of the research.²² The second step was to categorize information resources and distinct relations of primary and secondary research questions. The final step in this research process was to assess and analyze all related information and data aiming to formulate a clear and concise conclusion.

²⁰ United Nations, *Resolution 2098* (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 2013), 7.

²¹ Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, 7.

²² Yin, *Qualitative Research from Start to Finish*.

2.6 DATA COLLECTION

In order to assess the violence against civilians in the DRC, this work collected data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project. The data includes the number of attacks against civilians in the DRC carried out by the March 23 Movement (French: *Mouvement du 23 Mars*, M-23), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (French: *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda*, FDLR), the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), and the Allied Democratic Forces (French: *Forces Démocratiques Alliées*, ADF) as well as the number of fatalities caused by these attacks. The ACLED project considers violence against civilians the following events: armed attacks, abduction, sexual violence, and forced disappearance. However, because the numbers of violence acts against civilians in conflict zones tend to be imprecise due to a lack of resources and a poor security for data gathering activities, this work uses, in addition to violence against civilians, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP). IDP's numbers are used to illustrate the intensity and impact of violence towards the populace. People only leave their homes when violence reaches extremely critical levels.²³ The data on IDPs in the DRC was collected from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). It is the world's authoritative source of data and analysis on internal displacement. By cross referencing the data of violence against civilians and the number of IDPs, it is possible to have a more accurate picture of the security situation in the DRC.

Additional was collected based on resources in English, Spanish, and Portuguese available at both the Brazilian Army and the U.S. Army command and

²³ Jessica Di Salvatore and Andrea Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.

general staff college libraries; the United Nations website; online databases such as EBSCOhost, JSTOR, ProQuest, Taylor and Francis and Google Scholar; journals, magazines and newspapers on the international security subject area; military field manuals (Brazil and United States); and NGOs-led studies on peace operations such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This research does not contain human interviews.

2.7 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD

The analysis adopts the “step” approach for the methodology. The first step is the literature review from chapter III. It provides a comprehensive review of the scholarship and debate regarding deterrence, peace operations, and complexity. It specifically looks at definitions, types and main assumptions, criticism, and finally how they influence current deployments. This provides the theoretical basis for the analysis. The second step is the development of a hypothesis and evaluation criteria necessary to evaluate the primary and secondary research questions. Steps three and four are to analyze the primary and then secondary questions using the evaluation criteria against the data provided by the case of two MONUSCO time periods, specifically, the relationship between scientific, linear, and tactically focused mindset to employ military power and the use of force in current UN peace operations. In step five, the study aggregates the findings to answer the primary research question. Finally, in step six, this work presents a recommendation to use force in current UN peace operations as well as considerations for future research.

2.8 VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS

There are more than 100 armed groups currently operation in the DRC. It would not be possible to analyze them all. Thus, this work restricted the number of armed

groups studied, focusing on the four groups most cited in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098. The M-23 seems to be the main concern of the UNSC at the time. It is cited nine times in the document, followed by the LRA (seven times), the FDLR (three times), and the ADF (two times).²⁴

Due to the temporal proximity of facts, deterrent credibility will be evaluated based on its short and medium terms impact. Since the Force Intervention Brigade was created in 2013, it is not possible to fully assess its long-term effects on peace process. Short-term analysis will focus on the developments in 2013, while medium-term will examine the six years following the creation of the FIB. Specifically, as security is considerably the most important step to achieve stable peace,²⁵ the study will also look at the immediate conflict-reducing capacity of the use of force in the MONUSCO and its capability to enable and strengthen the peace process.²⁶ The will also elaborate on how transferable the findings from the DRC case study to other UN-led stabilization peace operations are.

Additionally, limitations of this research are related to the decision to use a case study approach to analyze the problem and the unique nature of the UN peace operations. Because case studies focus on single cases, the issue of generalizability looms larger than with other types of qualitative research. Although a rich and deep analysis of MONUSCO may be desired, there are limitations regarding the time and resources available to devote to such an undertaking. Case study findings and

²⁴ United Nations, *Resolution 2098*.

²⁵ Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," 11.

²⁶ Paul F Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010).

conclusions may also be influenced by the researcher's perspectives, background, and biases.

Finally, since 2004, the UN has renamed some of its peace operations as stabilization operations. There is no definition or doctrine in the UN handbooks, manuals, or documents for "stabilization." In 2015, the Report on High-Level Panel on Peace Operations noted that the usage of the term "stabilization" by the UN requires clarification.²⁷ In this fashion, this work will adopt the US Army definition whenever omissions are found on the UN doctrine and documents.

2.9 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

2.9.1 Force

Force is defined as a power that cause an object to move or that changes movement; a strong influence and energy; or to make someone do something without offering the possibility of choice.²⁸ Force can be related to the ideas of physical power, influence, or power to control. Force is also the basis for military activity.²⁹ In this sense, the military uses physical power – or the threat of physical power – to change, influence, and control.

²⁷ United Nations, *Report on High-Level Panel on Peace Operations* (New York, NY: The General Assembly, 17 June 2015), accessed 25 March 2019, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/446.

²⁸ Cambridge Dictionary, "Force," accessed 10 December 2019, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/force>.

²⁹ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 46.

2.9.2 UN Peace Operations

For this work, definition of key terms regarding peace operations are adopted from the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, “the Capstone Doctrine.” The following terms from the UN documents are repeatedly used:

Conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict.

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. Peacemakers may be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations.

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.³⁰

³⁰ United Nation, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York, NY: Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 2010), 18-19.

2.9.3 Deterrence and Dissuasion

It is important to highlight the distinction between dissuasion and deterrence. Dissuasion targets those identified as posing a threat to one's interests prior to such potential adversaries having the actual capability to pose a danger. Deterrence, however, is aimed at those identified as posing a threat to one's interests once such potential adversaries have the actual capability to pose a danger.³¹ Deterrence is based on credibility. Aspects such as reputation, strength, the ability to carry out a threat, and to defend against other's actions influence credibility.³² In this fashion, the credibility of deterrence is related to its capability and commitment to hurt.

2.9.4 Complexity

Even though complexity is widely mentioned in the UN peace operations literature, there is no official documents within the organization that defines its meaning or presents guidelines of how to deal with complex environments. The Cambridge Dictionary of English defines complexity as "the state of having many parts and being difficult to understand or find an answer to."³³ In *Harnessing Complexity*, Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen explain the term as a system that "consists of parts which later interact in ways that heavily influence the probabilities of later events." According to them, complexity creates new and emergent properties resulting in an

³¹ Geln M. Segel, "Thoughts on Dissuasion", *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, vol. 10, Issue 4 (Summer 2008), 1.

³² Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and perception," *International security* vol 7, no. 3 (1982), 9.

³³Cambridge Dictionary of English. Complexity, available at <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/complexity>, accessed 10 September 2020.

unpredictable outcome.³⁴ The *US Army Operating Concept* defines complexity as “an environment that is not only unknown but unknowable and constantly changing.”³⁵

2.9.5 Ambiguity and Uncertainty

For the purpose of this work, it is worth noting the difference between ambiguity and uncertainty, as these terms are often misleading. They are complementary but distinct concepts. In essence, ambiguity refers to “lack of clarity or consistency,” while uncertainty relates to “lack of understanding.”³⁶ Thus, addressing uncertainty through enabling a better understanding does not necessarily reduce ambiguity. Technological and procedural approaches to cope with uncertainty by improving understanding do not correlate with improvements in clarity or consistency. Moreover, this fact relates to the increased critiques to the Network Centric Warfare (NCW)³⁷ concept regarding its real capabilities to even create a better understanding that might reduce uncertainty. Some authors posit that the NCW thesis is a manifestation of a “discredited epistemological position known as naïve inductivism” that needs to be countered with “an alternative

³⁴ Robert M. Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 15.

³⁵ US Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The Army Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), iii.

³⁶ James G. March and Chip Heath, *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 178.

³⁷ One of the first persons to use the term network-centric warfare was Admiral Jay L. Johnson, United States Chief of Naval Operations from August 1996 to July 2000. He presented a concept of offensive distributed firepower, using complementary air, surface and subsurface platforms bound together with the landward force component command in a network-centric architecture. The idea was to develop a network of sensors, commanders, and shooters to flatten the hierarchy, reduce the operational pause, enhance precision, and increase speed of command. John J. Johnson, Chief of Naval Operations, speech during the U.S. Naval Institute Annapolis Seminar and 123d Annual Meeting, Annapolis, MD, 23 April 1997.

outlook called critical rationalism” based on human creativity rather than on data and massive amounts of information.³⁸

2.10 SUMMARY

Chapter II provided a description of the methodology used for this research. The chapter addressed how the data was gathered, outlined the methodology, and explained how the data will be analyzed.

³⁸ Darryn J. Reid and Ralph E. Giffin, “A Woven Web of Guesses, Canto Three: Network Centric Warfare and the Virtuous Revolution,” 8th International Command and Control Research & Technology Symposium (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2003), 2.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

The first part of this chapter begins with a theoretical discussion of force and strategy. It defines force and military power and how the ideas of decisive victory and last resorts are related to the use of military power. It also discusses force and strategy and defends that tactical outcomes may not result in strategic advantages to the political process. Additionally, the first part describes some general ideas of the use of force in UN peace operations.

The second part of this chapter analyzes how the UN understands the use of military force in peace operations by examining the theory of deterrence. The *Guidelines for the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* asserts that the ultimate aim of the use of force in peace operations is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat.³⁹ Thus, the understanding of deterrence theory is central for the purpose of this work.

Finally, the third and last part of the chapter explores the theory of complexity. The analysis of the use of force in UN peace operations in this research hinges on some principles of complex systems theory. It argues that complexity dominates the operational environment where peacekeepers are currently deployed. In this sense, the third part elaborates on principles deemed relevant to understand the relationship of complexity and operational environment. First, it provides a background linking the idea of complexity and modern UN peace operations. In section two, the theory of complex systems is described, highlighting its features, critical aspects, and limitations.

³⁹ United Nations, *Guidelines for the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (New York, NY: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2017), 3-4.

The third and last section presents ideas of how military force can be useful in complex adaptive systems.

3.1 PART I: UNDERSTANDING FORCE AND MILITARY POWER

The *Cambridge Dictionary of English* identifies three different meanings for the word “force”. According to the dictionary, force, as a noun, can be related to the ideas of physical power, influence, or power to control. Force is a power that cause an object to move or that changes movement; a strong influence and energy; or to make someone do something without offering the possibility of choice.⁴⁰ Force is also the basis for military activity.⁴¹ In this sense, the military uses physical power – or the threat of physical power – to change, influence, and control. Killing and destruction are not the objectives of military resources when employed. Rather, they are two possible actions through which military power changes, influences, and controls. IN his book, *The Future of Power*, Joseph Nye identifies four types of actions that militaries can implement: They can physically fight and destroy; back up threats in coercive diplomacy; promise protection, including peacekeeping; and provide many forms of assistance.⁴² On the international scene, Raymond Aron defines power as the capability of a political unit to impose its will upon other units.⁴³

The concepts of a “range of military operations” and “conflict continuum” are critical in understanding the use of force by the military. When employed, military resources face a variety of challenges along a conflict continuum that spans from peace

⁴⁰ Cambridge Dictionary, “Force,” accessed 10 December 2019, <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/force>.

⁴¹ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 8.

⁴² Joseph Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2011), 41.

⁴³ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (News Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 47.

to war. The conflict continuum, however, does not escalate smoothly from one end to the other. Rather, in complex environments unstable peace may quickly evolve to insurgency throughout a given region, leading to general conflict.⁴⁴ Therefore, when military resources are deployed they have to be flexible enough to operate across a range of military operations, encompassing military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency operations; and large scale combat operations.⁴⁵ The concept of a range of military operations concept helps relate military operations in scope and purpose. Operations across this range share a common fundamental purpose—to change, influence, or control to achieve a political objective.⁴⁶

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence are performed by military forces to develop situational awareness, build networks and relationships with partners, shape the environment, and keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are conducted to achieve a specific strategic or operational-level objective in an operational area. Many missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), may not require combat. But others, such as stabilization in weak or failed states, can be dangerous and may require combat operations. Finally, large-scale combat operations occur in the

⁴⁴ United States Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0 *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 1-1.

⁴⁵ United States Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 1-12.

⁴⁶ United States Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), V-4.

form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy’s armed forces and military capabilities.⁴⁷




Figure 3. Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

Source: US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 3-0 “Operations” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), V-4.

3.1.1 Last Resort and Decisive Victory

For more than three hundred years, the application of military power has been heavily influenced by scientific reasoning. Across the globe, armed forces structures, organization, and doctrine are still impacted by ideas from the French Enlightenment.⁴⁸ Enlightenment thinkers focused on what they considered to be suitable to intellectual formulation.⁴⁹ Regarding military power and conflict, the battlefield was perceived as a secular space within which measurable dynamics can be examined, quantified, and manipulated.⁵⁰ Equations, concepts, principles, and rules are the main visible influences

⁴⁷ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 3-0, V-4; US Army, FM 3-0, 1-1.

⁴⁸ According to Christy L. Pichichero, the French Enlightenment movement spread to the educated classes, institutions of learning, and even parts of the government the philosophical ideas of the scientific revolution. In this sense, the enlightenment sees the battlefield as a secular space within which measurable dynamics can be examined, quantified, and manipulated. Christy L Pichichero, *The Military Enlightenment; War and Culture in the French Empire from Louis XIV to Napoleon* (Cornell University Press, 2017), 2-3.

⁴⁹ Azar Gat, *The History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 187.

⁵⁰ Andrew S. Meyer, *The Dao of the Military: Liu An’s Art of War* (New York: NY, Columbia University Press, 2012), 25

of the Enlightenment in the current military doctrine and mindset. Two of them are relevant to understand the current mindset of the utility of military power: the concepts of decisive victory and use of force as last resort.

In *the History of Military Thought*, Azar Gat explores the evolution of the concept of victory over time. Except for few theorists, such as Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart, victory has been related to the idea of the destruction of the enemy forces in deceive tactical engagements. Classical theorist such as Thucydides, Flavius Vegetius and Livy argued that victory comes from the battle, the tactical engagement.⁵¹ The French Enlightenment recovered this idea of tactical supremacy. Vauban, Frederick the Great, Comte de Guibert, and Bulow defined victory in tactical terms. Baron Antoine Jomini is considered the most influential military theorist of the Enlightenment. From his experience as staff officer in the Napoleonic campaigns, Jomini adopted mathematical formulation, geometry, and rational reasoning to develop several rules and principles that, according to him, are keys for success in war. The author advocated to have discovered the “Fundamental Principle of War,” that is “to throw by strategic movements the mass of an army upon the decisive points of a theater of war.”⁵² In doing so, commanders achieve enormous advantage over enemy forces and will eventually deliver a final and decisive blow. Although this idea was formulated for the great campaigns of the nineteenth century, it still permeates the western military mindset.⁵³ It has shaped the perception that the utility of military power is to deliver a final and decisive victory. In other words, force, if applied in a rational and methodical way, wins

⁵¹ Gat, *The History of Military Thought*, 201.

⁵² Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War*, translated by Capt. G.H. Mendell and Lt. W. P. Craighill (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2007), 60.

⁵³ Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 240.

conflicts. For instance, US Army Field Manual FM3-0 “Operations” asserts that “the Army wins when an enemy is defeated to such a degree that it can no longer effectively resist.”⁵⁴ Thus, tactical and operational defeat of the enemy is still understood as the aim of force. And military power, when employed, must win.

The second concept is the idea that military power must be used as last resort. This belief comes from the Just War Theory, more specifically from the *Jus ad bellum* principle.⁵⁵ According to it, the use of military power is just only if undertaken with competent authority, for a just cause, with right intention, as a last resort, and if the harm judged likely to result is not disproportionate to the good to be achieved. The requirement that war should be undertaken only as a last resort recognizes the immense suffering that war may cause. Thus, it stimulates the peaceful settlement of disputes and conceive the use of military power only if other options are judged unlikely to succeed.⁵⁶ In addition, the Just War Theory assumes that there will be an orderly escalation process in which military power is an alternative solution of last resort, after the failure of the other instruments of power, such as diplomacy, economic, and informational.⁵⁷ In short, the principle state that when dialogue fails, force is employed.

This paper seeks to offer an alternative perspective. First, the understanding that military power should be undertaken only as last resort creates the idea that power is divisible and can be used separately. Thus, force is best used when all other instruments of power failed. In *Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, however, Edward H. Carr defends that power may be divided for purpose of discussion only. In the real world, he says,

⁵⁴ US Army, FM 3-0, 1-16.

⁵⁵ David Fisher, *Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty Forst Century?* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 67

⁵⁶ Fisher, *Morality and War*, 235.

⁵⁷ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 312.

the instruments of power are closely interdependent, and it is difficult to imagine the application of one instrument in isolation from the others. In essence, Carr affirms, power is an indivisible whole.⁵⁸ Robert D. Worley has similar understanding. He argues that one instrument of power cannot exist for long in the absence of the others. In his point of view, military power serves diplomacy, defined as the art of politics. Therefore, the use of force – or the threat to use it – serves to achieve a fluid and continuous political process.⁵⁹ Joseph Nye corroborates this view. Although he divides power into two major groups, soft and hard, Nye states that power is better used by the intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defense, development, and other available tools. He also believes that players who focus on only one aspect of power are bound to lose in the long run.⁶⁰

The second concept under criticism is the idea that military power is decisive, in the sense of being able to deliver final victory. Everett C Doman disagrees with this idea. He claims that the purpose of military power is to provide an option for political decision-makers to achieve a continuous situation of advantage.⁶¹ Thomas C. Shelling goes in the same direction. He affirms that military power is used to influence an adversary by the harm it could do to them. In his opinion, the power to hurt does not deliver decisive outcomes but collaborates to set the conditions for an advantageous position. Force is therefore a bargaining power to be exploited by politics.⁶² In his analysis of the

⁵⁸ Edward H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction of the Study of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 225.

⁵⁹ Robert D. Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 225.

⁶⁰ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 21.

⁶¹ Everett Carl Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 33

⁶² Thomas C Shelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2008), 2.

utility of force in the twenty-first century, Rupert Smith sees decisive victories as the hallmark of the interstate industrial war, but not related to intrastate conflicts, such as civil wars. According to him, the twenty-first century is an era of confrontations and conflicts rather than of war and peace. In this new scenario, he argues that the use of force cannot deliver a definitive victory.⁶³ In his book *On Strategy*, Harry Summers Jr. describes a conversation he had with a North-Vietnamize Army (NVA) officer during the Paris Peace Accords of 1973. Summers told the Vietnamize officer that the NVA never defeated American forces in a tactical fight. The Vietnamize officer agreed but said that those tactical victories were irrelevant because they did not provide any strategical advantage to the United States.⁶⁴ In sum, tactical victories are pointless if political strategical advantage is not provided.

Finally, there are limitations on the use of force. The relative ease of humanitarian interventions in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War may have obscured the limits of military power in conducting them. The stabilization missions, for example, requires skills and capabilities that are only partly found in the military.⁶⁵ The very size and complexity of the task of restoring a society devastated by abuses of fundamental rights is a much larger matter than the use of military force in itself.⁶⁶

⁶³ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 374-375.

⁶⁴ Harry G. Summers Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), 1.

⁶⁵ Eliot A. Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2017), 176, 180.

⁶⁶ James Turner Johnson, "Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq: Just War and International Law Perspectives," *Journal of Military Ethics* (2006), 126.

3.1.2 Strategy and Force

The previous section discussed the concepts of force and military power and their utility as a bargaining power, exploited by diplomacy, to facilitate a fluid and continuous political process. The pattern of action by which this exploitation is sought is called strategy.⁶⁷ Thus, this section will briefly discuss the definition of strategy; the arrangement of ways, ends, and means; and why strategy should not be formulated to achieve a desired “end state.”

3.1.2.1 Strategy in time, space, purpose

There is no consensual definition of strategy. Strategy has different meanings in time, purpose, and space. Regarding time, the idea of strategy has evolved over the years and does not have the same significance if analyzed in different eras. For example, in the nineteenth century, Carl von Clausewitz defined strategy as “the study of the employment of battles for the object of the war.”⁶⁸ During the same period of time, Jomini stated that “strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations.” In addition, Jomini asserted that strategy is comprised of “selection of the theater of war, determination of the decisive points, field bases, objective points, choice of lines of operations, the best strategic line, strategic reserves, maneuvers, diversions.”⁶⁹ Today, both definitions are something in between what the

⁶⁷ J. C Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 138.

⁶⁸ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128, 177.

⁶⁹ Jomini, *The Art of War*, 59.

military literature defines as the operational level of war,⁷⁰ but not strategy. When defining strategy, historical examples may lead to contradictory conclusions.

In purpose, strategy finds distinct interpretations. The original purpose of strategy was to comprehend and direct war.⁷¹ Today, the term is used in a variety of areas and it is not hard to find expression such as “marital strategy,” “business strategy,” or “strategy to raise children.” Even in the fields of strategic studies or military arts and science there is no common agreed definition for the term. The US Army War College provides eight definitions of strategy.⁷² Moreover, additional concepts have been aggregated to strategy. For instance, in order to explain the planning process to develop a strategy for large organizations, Henri Mintzberg presented five subcategories for strategy: intended strategy, deliberate strategy, realized strategy, unrealized strategy, and emergent strategy.⁷³ The broader application of the term causes confusion about its meaning and sometimes creates the perception that strategy means everything. In meaning everything, however, strategy risks meaning nothing.

In space, strategy is sometimes confused with a level of war. Levels of war link tactical actions to achievement of political goals. They help decision-makers to design and synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks. Lawrence Freedman

⁷⁰ JP 5-0 defines operational design as “the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or operation and its subsequent execution. The framework is built upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of the OE; identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops approaches, through the application of operational art, to resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and/or policy.” US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), I-2.

⁷¹ Lukas Milevsky, “Western Strategy’s Two Logics: Diverging Interpretations,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2019), 1.

⁷² Arthur F. Lykke Jr., “Defining Military Strategy,” *Military Review* (May 2019), 3.

⁷³ Henri Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1994), 24-25.

identifies four levels of warfare: grand strategy, strategy (sometimes called military strategy), grand tactics (or operational), and tactics. At the level of grand strategy, conflicts are anticipated, alliances built, national human and material resources allocated, and military roles defined. At the level of strategy, the political objectives are translated in military objectives; priorities are agreed upon and allocations of resources are made accordingly. At the operational level, necessary judgments and arrangements are made across services and domains to achieve the goals established by the level of strategy. Finally, at the level of tactics, military formations push forward the objectives defined by the operational level.⁷⁴ Yet strategy is not confined to the strategic level. Edward N. Luttwak explains that strategy has two dimensions: the vertical dimension of the levels of war that interact with one another; and the horizontal dimension in which the dynamic logic of action and reaction unfolds within each level.⁷⁵ Strategy may be designed at the strategic level but travels across the vertical and horizontal dimensions. In this sense, a tactical action not connected to the strategic guidance is useless.

3.1.2.2 The problem of ends, ways, and means

NATO Allied Defense Doctrine defines strategy as the “component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.” The publication also states that a successful military strategy is one able to balance the

⁷⁴ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 206

⁷⁵ Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 90.

application of ends, ways, and means.⁷⁶ It is hard to define when strategy began to be defined in terms of ends, ways, and means. However, the combination of these three concepts in an organized formulation is attributed to Arthur F. Lykke Jr. In an article for the *Military Review*, in 1989, Lykke Jr. presented his conceptual approach in a formulation in which strategy equals ends (military objectives) plus *ways* (methods of applying force) plus *means* (manpower, materiel, money, forces, etc.).⁷⁷ The author emphasizes that the three elements must be balanced. If military resources are not compatible with strategic concepts, for example, strategy may not succeed.⁷⁸ The Lykke definition became very influential in the western military culture, his formula being as common to modern strategists as Einstein's equation $E=mc^2$ is to physicists.⁷⁹ Figure 4 displays the Lykke formulation.

$$S = E + W + M$$

Figure 4. Lykke Formulation.

Source: Arthur F. Lykke Jr., "Defining Military Strategy." *Military Review* (May 2019), 2.

The problem with this definition is that it overemphasizes the quantitative value of addends. In *Strategy and Organizations*, Henry A. Kissinger states that because the United States has won two world wars by outproducing their opponent, they tended to equate military superiority with superiority in resources and technology. Yet, history demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine has at least as often been the cause

⁷⁶ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication (AJP-01(E)) *Allied Joint Doctrine* (Brussels, BB: NATO Standardization Office, 2017), 3-2.

⁷⁷ Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," 2.

⁷⁸ Lykke, "Defining Military Strategy," 8.

⁷⁹ Antulio J. Echevarria II, "Op-Ed: Is Strategy Really a Lost Art?" SSI, September 13, 2013, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.Army.mil/index.cfm/articles//Is-Strategy-Really-A-Lost-Art/2013/09/13>.

of victory as has superiority in resources. In fact, superior doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an Allied army superior in numbers and at least equal in equipment but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare.⁸⁰

Moreover, as the formulation is expressed in terms of an addition, the greater the addends, the greater the sum. In practical terms, the greater the resources, the better the strategy. Jeffrey W. Meiser endorses this view. He explains that this formula creates a situation where strategy is reduced to a perfunctory exercise of allocating means.⁸¹ Furthermore, the model prioritizes instrumental logic over adversarial logic. The opposing will against which force – or the threat of force – is going to be applied is not considered in the formulation. If the ends are defined, ways decided, and resources allocated, the strategy is completed. The adversary will have no impact on it. Finally, the attempt to develop scientific formulations and rules to strategy is obscured by the unpredictability of military and political affairs.⁸²

3.1.2.3 Continuation rather than culmination, the utility of force

Since World War II, in very few conflicts strategy has been able to translate use of force into political advantage. With destruction of enemy forces as the main overriding criteria, strategic planners have pursued victory in tactical terms.⁸³ The concept of a decisive battle retained its powerful hold over the military profession.⁸⁴ Particularly in limited-contingency operations, tactical victory does not infer strategic

⁸⁰ Henry A. Kissinger, *Strategy and Organizations*, *Foreign Affairs*, April 1957, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1957-04-01/strategy-and-organization>, accessed 24 October 2020.

⁸¹ Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Ends+Ways+Means = (Bad) Strategy,” *Parameters* 46 (Winter 2016-17), 82.

⁸² Freeman, *Strategy: A History*, 242.

⁸³ Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 37.

⁸⁴ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 240.

success.⁸⁵ The great allocation of resources and continuous tactical superiority did not deliver strategic advantages to American political decision-makers during the interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq. Given its lackluster performance in these events, it has become a common refrain that strategy is increasingly becoming a lost art.⁸⁶

Yet, this paper sustains that strategy is still relevant, but not as it is currently being used by mainstream military thought. Here, it is argued that strategy does not seek victory. Instead, strategy translates power into policy.⁸⁷ And because politics has no end, strategy is a continuous and unending process that can never lead to a conclusion. While a victorious military leader celebrates his victory; the head of state faces the new situation born of that very victory itself.⁸⁸ Politics is fluid, continuous and sometimes deliberately contradictory. To better serve politics, continuation must be the goal of strategy, not culmination. In the world of the strategist, victory is only a moment in time.⁸⁹ Time, purpose, and scale of the use of force are political decisions. The strategist, then, needs to find options to provide advantage to the next political decision.

3.1.3 The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations

This section discusses the evolution of the use of force in UN peace operations; presents an overview of UN stabilization operations; and describes the structure of the

⁸⁵ Stian Kjeksrud and Lotte Vermeij, "Protecting Governments from Insurgencies," in Cedric de Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud, *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 240.

⁸⁶ Milevsky, "Western Strategy's Two Logics: Diverging interpretations," 1.

⁸⁷ Kissinger, *Strategy and Organizations*.

⁸⁸ Eliot A. Cohen, *The Big Stick*, 202

⁸⁹ Everett C Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 2, 4, 9.

UN to use force, highlighting the organization's limitations to execute combat operations.

3.1.3.1 The Evolution of the use of force in UN peace operations: theory and practice

The term peacekeeping is not found in the UN Charter. The Charter neither explicitly mentions it, nor contains provisions for peacekeeping.⁹⁰ The term was invented in the 1950s.⁹¹ The idea behind it comes from the Article 1 of the UN Charter. The article describes the UN as an institution created to maintaining international peace and security able to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace.⁹² The definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace, however, has been influenced by perception as well as by changes in the global strategic environment over time. In this sense, peacekeeping has evolved as ad hoc responses to counter threats to international peace and its key concepts were developed through practice.⁹³

When the UN Charter was signed, in 1945, threats to international peace and security were identified as an aggression by one state against another.⁹⁴ After World War II, the fall of the last empires and the decolonization process spread the Westphalian nation-state order throughout the globe. Between 1945 and 1960, the number of sovereign nation-states expanded from around fifty to more than 160.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 49.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁹² United Nation, *Charter of the United Nations* (New York, NY: United Nations, 1945), 3.

⁹³ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 50.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 49.

⁹⁵ Robert H. Jackson, "The evolution of international society," in John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, eds., *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: UK, Oxford University Press, 2001), 46.

Along with a possible nuclear war, threats to self-determination and sovereignty were the major concerns among the UN members. In 1970, for instance, the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations gave voice to those concerns stating that the strict observance by states of the obligation not to intervene in the affairs of any other state is an essential condition to ensure peace.⁹⁶ That is the reason why the majority of peace operations between 1948 and 1989 were deployed only to assist the peaceful settlement of disputes between states and with the consent of the belligerent states. Labelled as "traditional peacekeeping," these military operations were built on the model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, relying on lightly armed troops and unarmed military observers. At that time, the primary role of military forces was to prevent the escalation of conflicts and pave the way for diplomatic efforts to solve the conflicts.⁹⁷ Force was authorized only in self-defense. Balance of power among the five permanent members of the UNSC, particularly between the two superpowers, prevented the UN from moving towards a more assertive use of force. Internal national affairs issues such as human suffering within borders were not addressed by peacekeeping unless these issues would have threatened the security between states.⁹⁸

At the end of the 1980's, as the Cold War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union's power decreased dramatically and was no longer able to counterbalance western interests. Consequently, the UN and peacekeeping became heavily influenced

⁹⁶ United Nations. "Declaration on Principles of International Law Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." accessed 28 March 2019, <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/3dda1f104.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 5.

⁹⁸ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18.

by assumptions of the liberal peace theory and Westphalian conception of stable peace. The liberal peace theory affirms that liberal democratic states are the least likely to descend into civil war and anarchy. According to this line of thought, democracies, in general, assure basic human rights and offer non-violent approaches for the resolution of disputes. The post Westphalian conception of stable peace holds that states receive their sovereign rights only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens, such as protection and prosperity. In the post-Westphalian perspective, peace operations need to be in the business of protecting human rights where host states prove unwilling or unable to do so as well as promoting democracy.⁹⁹ Together, these two concepts reframed the understanding of international relations, particularly the concept of state sovereignty.¹⁰⁰ Accountability became the corollary for sovereignty.¹⁰¹ States enjoy sovereign rights only if they fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens, especially the protection of civilians.¹⁰²

In his book *The Utility of Force*, British General Sir Rupert Smith argues that the old paradigm¹⁰³ of large-scale interstate industrial war as seen in World Wars I and II no longer exists. Based on historical analysis and drawing on his experiences as field commander in the 1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland as well as force

⁹⁹ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 29, 38.

¹⁰⁰ Oliver P. Richmond, "Introduction: NGOs, peace and human security." *International Peacekeeping*, vol 11, no 1, (2003): 2.

¹⁰¹ Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman, *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1.

¹⁰² Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 38.

¹⁰³ Smith uses Thomas S. Kuhn's definition of paradigm. Kuhn explains that a paradigm is an achievement that is sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. To be accepted as a paradigm a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not explain all facts with which it can be confirmed, Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, US: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 7-10.

commander in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),¹⁰⁴ he portrays the modern conflict in terms of a new paradigm called “war amongst the people.” War amongst the people is defined as an intrastate population-centric political conflict in which the people are the battlefield. Civilians are the targets, the objectives, as much as an opposing force. Smith defends that war amongst the people became the dominant form of conflict after the end of the Cold War.¹⁰⁵ Since then, war has changed from large national armies with comparable forces doing battle on a field to strategic confrontation between a range of combatants, not all of which are nations or even armies, and using different types of weapons, often improvised. Figure 5 displays conflicts by type from 1946 to 2017. Between 1991 and 2017, the figure presents a decreasing number of interstate conflicts as well as a raise in both intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts.

In an international environment marked by the prevalence of intrastate conflicts – such as civil wars – UN peace operations became the conflict management tool of choice. Figure 6 displays the number of UN peace operations between 1947 and 2014.

¹⁰⁴ The UNPROFOR was a peace operation established to create conditions for peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslavian crisis, accessed on October 30, 2019, at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unprof-p.htm>.

¹⁰⁵ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 3, 6, 269.




Figure 5. Armed Conflict by Type 1946-2017.

Source: Therese Pettersson, Stina Högladh & Magnus Öberg, “Organized violence, 1989-2018 and Peace Agreements,” *Journal of Peace Research*. 56(2019), 589-603, <https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts-graphs-and-maps/>, accessed on November 5, 2019.




Figure 6. UN Peace Operations Between 1947 and 2014.

Source: University of Oxford. Global Change Data Lab, “UN Peace Operations Between 1947 and 2014,” accessed 13 March 2019, <https://ourworldindata.org/peacekeeping>.

Between 1988 and 1993, for instance, the UN conducted more peacekeeping operations than over the previous forty years. Peacekeeping was broadened to carry out

complex operations qualitatively different from earlier missions, combining a wide spectrum of issues which includes not only disengagement of belligerent troops, but also a broad process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, protection of civilians, border demarcation, free elections, sexual violence, gender equality, human rights and much more. The dilemma about when and how to use force was still an issue, as peacekeepers became involved in civil wars and nation-building.¹⁰⁶

In fact, how to use military force has been an issue since the early UN missions and has influenced theory and practice. Authors have categorized different kinds of peacekeeping in terms of scope, aims, and extent of use of force. Traditional¹⁰⁷ or “multidimensional”¹⁰⁸ operations, “Chapter VI”, “Chapter VII” or “Chapter VIII” mandates, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, all of them can be differentiated, among other things, in terms of use of force. Since 2004, the UN has named some of its missions as “stabilization operations.” These operations have deployed peacekeepers in environments where there are no clear parties to the conflict from whom mediation, negotiation and especially consent can be sought. Moreover, in these environments, peacekeepers have used more military force, including the execution of offensive operations, engagement in intelligence, and deployment of special weapons and tactics, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, snipers, and special forces. Peace operations,

¹⁰⁶ Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 124.

¹⁰⁷ Missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles. United Nation, “Our History”, accessed 29 April 2019, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our_history.

¹⁰⁸ Peacekeeping missions in support of the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements that typically includes organizing post-conflict election; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; and supporting national reconciliation process. Cedric De Coning, Chiyuki Aoi, and John Karlsrud, eds., *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in A New Era: Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 8.

therefore, has been pushed to the limit of the definition of peacekeeping.¹⁰⁹ However, despite the existence of some cases of relative short-term success, to a large degree, failure in the field has marked the use of force in peacekeeping operations.¹¹⁰

3.1.3.2 The UN stability operations

The term stabilization is not formally defined in the United Nations documents at the time of this work. Nor is there doctrine covering this type of operation. The definition of stabilization used in this work is adopted from the United States Joint Publication 3-0 “Joint Operations.” According to the manual, stability is one of 16 different operations military forces need to be ready to perform. The term “stability” encompasses the various military missions and tasks conducted in coordination with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential activities such as governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The manual also defines what stabilization or stabilize phase of a conflict is. A phase is defined as a period in which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose.¹¹¹ The stabilization phase involves potentially long-term operations to perform stability tasks. Combat operations involving offensive and defensive mission are likely to occur during the stability phase. The desired end state for this phase is to create a favorable environment to transitioning to full civilian authority and enabling civil authority as the

¹⁰⁹ De Coning, Aoi, and Karlsrud, *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in A New Era: Adapting to Stabilization, Protection and New Threats*, 1.

¹¹⁰ Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 351.

¹¹¹ US Department of Defense, JP 3-0, V-12.

threat wanes and civil infrastructures are minimally reestablished.¹¹² Therefore, it is possible to say that UN forces deployed to stabilize a country need to have capabilities and political will to carry out combat operations.

As discussed before, the previous reason why is that Findlay argues that the more willing and able UN operations are to use force, the less likely they are to have to use it. In the case of the new peacekeeping missions, however, a more likely use of force has been observed. It seems that the current approach has not been powerful or integrated enough to dissuade spoilers to the peace process. Thus, the use of force on a regular basis may be assessed as a proof of dissuasive weakness, i.e. the failure of the UN's capacity to deal with the utility of force.

3.1.3.3 The UN structure to use force

This section will discuss specific issues regarding the use of force by the UN. To provide a broader picture of the many vulnerabilities and constraints the UN has when employing and deploying military assets, it will address its nature as an international organization, its command and control structure, the peculiarities of the UN troops, and theoretical influences involved in the utility of force.

3.1.3.3.1 Authority, command and control (AC2)

The UN is not a singular body such as a sovereign nation-state. It is an international organization, a forum comprised of several independent members with different objectives, perspectives, and interests. Nor is it a military alliance. The use of force was not a deliberate objective when the UN was conceived, and the idea of peacekeeping developed later in the 1950s. Since then, the institution has adapted to

¹¹² Ibid., VIII-25.

perform military operations based on real-world developments and perceptions of threat to the international community. In 2019, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) renewed its 2008 policy in *Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*. The document describes the strategic, operational, and tactical structures; the responsibilities of the senior mission leadership; and mission integration and control arrangements. In terms of decision-making levels, the policy asserts that peacekeeping missions decentralize significant decision-making authority and responsibility and are characterized by a relatively “flat” command structure.

The document distinguishes two different levels of AC² in UN peace operations: the UN headquarters level (UNHQ), located in New York, and the mission level. The UNHQ level performs grand-strategic and strategic roles. At this level, for instance, the UNSC establishes peace operations, provides their mandates, and specifies political objectives. The UN Secretary-General (UNSG) has the responsibility for implementing mission mandates. At the mission level, the Head of Mission (HOM) sets its political and strategic direction. The Head of the Military Component (HOMC) exercises operational AC² over all UN military personnel and units in the theater. Finally, brigades, battalions, and subunits’ commanders execute tactical tasks. Figure 7 provides a simplified overview of the AC² framework for UN operations.

There are some issues with this structure. First, as an international institution, the UN represents a variety of agendas and interests that sometimes create significant obstacles to develop coherent strategic objectives and guidelines. Patrick Morgan highlights that the main problem of military operations led by collective actors such as the UN is that they are likely to use force unevenly, because of the different interests

between members.¹¹³ In terms of international peace and security, finding common ground between the USA, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom (the five permanent members of the Security Council) is not an easy task.




Figure 7. Simplified Structure for the AC2 in UN Peace Operations.

Source: Created by the author using data from United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019).

The second issue reflects the organization of peace operations at the mission level. In multidimensional and stabilization operations, the HOM is normally a civilian invested with the responsibility for the implementation of the mission mandate and authority for managing all UN assets on the ground. This arrangement ensures unity of effort at the strategic and operational levels, and between the uniformed components and UN civilian agencies.¹¹⁴ Similar authority does not exist at the tactical level. At the lower levels, each component reports through its own chain of command. Some

¹¹³ Patrick M. Morgan, “The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today,” *Contemporary Security Policy* 33, no. 1 (2012): 92.

¹¹⁴ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), *Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2019), 5.

exceptions exist during crises or critical incidents in which one component may be placed temporarily under the operational control of another uniformed component. However, the lack of a permanent authority to unify actions across the tactical level weakens the mission capability to learn locally and to develop flexible bottom-up strategies tailored for specific contexts. For instance, In *the Responsibility to Protect in Congo: The Failure of Grassroots Prevention*, Séverine Autesserre states that in UN peace operations strategies focus on assuaging national and regional tensions in order to prevent conflict renewal at the macro level, and they overlooked the local causes of violence. By local, she refers to the level of the individual, the family, the clan, the district, the community and sometimes the ethnic group. The author believes that grassroots political issues in some intrastate conflicts, such as in the DRC, are local. In these environments, there is significant competition at the local level and the interactions between local with national and regional dynamics led to recurrent large-scale violence.¹¹⁵

3.1.3.3.2 The UN troops

The UN does not possess permanent military formations. The institution relies on its member states, the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), to provide it with the military assets for every single operation. But contribution of troops is not mandatory, it is based on the TCCs willingness to join any given peace operation. Many problems arise from this arrangement. First, the provision of military assets is closely related to TCCs' national interests, financial compensation, and risks on the ground. High-risk missions that offer few political and economic attractions are unlikely to find countries

¹¹⁵ Severine Autesserre, "The Responsibility to Protect in Congo: The Failure of Grassroots Prevention," *International Peacekeeping* vol 23, no. 1 (2016), 40.

interested in participating. Moreover, when third actors are deployed in someone else's war, force preservation tends to become the main condition behind the decision-making process at the tactical level. Also, lessons from the past show that TCC's troops, once deployed, develop a second and informal chain of command with their own countries.¹¹⁶ As a result, orders coming from the Head of the Military Component tend to be submitted for TCCs countries' prior approval. In short, TCC commanders are very unlikely to execute any order that are not approved by their countries.

Second, the diversity of deployed TCCs challenge unified tactical and operational command and control. In UN peace operations, TCCs normally deploy forces up to the battalion level, due to the logistical challenges to sustain higher military formations abroad. Therefore, several barriers exist at higher levels in terms of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel. For instance, a brigade may have command and control problems because of incompatibility of radio equipment and diversity of languages spoken. Sustainment is also challenging, as each battalion relies on its own country for key logistics, such as supply of ammunition and repair of military vehicles. Although the UN has made progress over the years to develop standard operational procedures, rules of engagement, military training, and to support TCC with financial compensation, problems of diverse military formations persist.

3.1.3.3.3 Principles of peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations are based on three inter-related and mutually reinforcing principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except

¹¹⁶ Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 13; Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2003), 273.

in self-defense and defense of the mandate.¹¹⁷ According to these principles, peace operations are likely to succeed when all the parties are committed to the peace process, the UN is perceived by them as a neutral third actor, and when force is used only when the other instruments of power fail. However, in the new UN peace operations such as stabilization, following these principles has become increasingly challenging.

First, the multitude of parties involved in these conflicts, and the variety of their political agendas, have made broad consent unrealistic. Moreover, because of volatile political environments, governments often change, new armed groups form, and many others split or disappear. Second, in the specific case of the stabilization operations, the UN must side with the government to achieve stability, executing combined joint military operations with national armies which impacts the way local populations perceive the UN and affect the institution's capability to achieve its political aims. Section IV will explore the UN mission in the DRC and the implications of its association with the government.

Regarding the non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate, the principles reflect two ideas. First, the primacy of diplomacy: In its first missions, UN forces were basically an interposing force invited by adversarial parties with the task to facilitate a peace agreement; non-use of force was a requirement to preserve the negotiation process. The second idea comes from Just War Theory, more specifically from *jus ad bellum* principles.¹¹⁸ The requirement that military power should be employed only as a last resort recognizes the immense suffering that military operations may cause. Thus, it encourages the peaceful settlement of disputes and

¹¹⁷ UN, "Principles of Peacekeeping," accessed 23 March 2020, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

¹¹⁸ Fisher, *Morality and War*, 65.

accepts the use of military power only if other options are judged unlikely to succeed.¹¹⁹ However, it assumes an orderly process of escalation in which military force becomes an alternative after the failure of other instruments of power, such as diplomacy, to provide a peaceful solution.¹²⁰ In this sense, force remains passive, waiting backstage for the failure of the other instruments of power.

This paper offers an alternative perspective. The understanding that military power should be undertaken only as last resort reflects the idea that power is divisible and can be used separately. In *the Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, Edward H. Carr asserts that power may be divided for purpose of discussion only. In the real world, he says, the instruments of power are closely interdependent, and it is difficult to imagine the application of one instrument in isolation from the others; in essence, power is an indivisible whole.¹²¹ Similarly, Robert D. Worley argues that one instrument of power cannot exist for long in the absence of the others. In his point of view, military power serves diplomacy, defined as the art of politics. Therefore, the use of force – or the threat to use it – does serve to achieve a fluid and continuous political process.¹²²

Finally, the idea of force as last resort creates the perception that it must be decisive. Because all other instruments have failed, force, as the last means, must prevail. However, military power may not be decisive. Particularly in limited-contingency operations, tactical victory does not infer strategic success.¹²³ Thomas C. Shelling claims that military power is used to influence an adversary by the harm it

¹¹⁹ Fisher, *Morality and War*, 67, 235.

¹²⁰ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 312.

¹²¹ Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, 225.

¹²² Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power*, 239.

¹²³ Stian Kjeksrud and Lotte Vermeij, "Protecting Governments from Insurgencies," 240.

could to them. In his opinion, the power to hurt does not deliver decisive outcomes in itself, but in how it sets conditions for advantageous position. Force is therefore a bargaining power to be exploited by politics.¹²⁴ In his analysis of the utility of force in the twenty-first century, Rupert Smith sees decisive victories as the hallmark of the interstate industrial war, but not relevant to intrastate conflicts such as civil wars. According to him, the twenty-first century is an era of continual confrontations and conflicts, rather than of distinct periods of war and peace. In these circumstances, he argues, the use of force cannot deliver a definitive victory.¹²⁵

3.1.5 Summary

The first part of this chapter argued that the use – or the threat of use – of military power should happen during the whole continuum of conflict, across the range of military operations, to change, influence or control. Also, two ideas seem to be critical for the understanding of the utility of force in limited-contingency operations, such as stability operations. First, force is never last resort. In coordination with the other instruments of power, military power needs to be available to change, influence, and control since the early stages of crisis. It seems much more plausible to contend not that force be the literal last resort but, rather, that one should not be hasty in its resort to force.¹²⁶ Second, military power may not be decisive. The destruction of the enemy forces may not provide any strategic advantage. Force, in this sense, should be understood as a bargaining power to be exploit by politics. The continuum use – or the

¹²⁴ Shelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2.

¹²⁵ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 374-375.

¹²⁶ Brian Ored, *The Morality of War* (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2006), 60.

threat of use – of military power has to provide position of advantage to future negotiations.

There is no common agreement or universal definition of strategy. The definition of strategy varies in time, space, and purpose. Given the differences, when talking about strategy, a definition of terms, context, and position are relevant. Some common aspects related to strategy have survived over time though. First, ancient and modern theorist and practitioners have believed that strategy should focus on the destruction of the enemy forces. In combination with the idea of decisive role of the military, it has driven strategic planers, particularly in the West, to emphasize tactical engagements and overestimate the relevance of means to strategy. The more means, the easier the victory. This paper does not support such view. Tactical victories may be not relevant to achieve political advantage. Because politics is fluid and dynamic, strategist must seek continuation rather than culmination. In this way, a good strategy should provide options for continuous political advantage.

Finally, this part described the evolution of the use of force in the UN peace operations over time. It asserted that changes in the international balance of power and perception of common values within the international society led the UN to the business of stabilization operations. Since the end of the Cold War, the organization has been required to deploy peacekeepers in environments where there are no clear parties to the conflict from whom mediation, negotiation and especially consent can be sought. However, despite the existence of some cases of relative short-term success, to a large degree, failure in the field has marked the use of force in peacekeeping operations.

3.2 PART II - DETERRENCE: THE UN STRATEGY TO USE FORCE

The *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines* describes the environments where peacekeepers are deployed as characterized by the presence of many asymmetrical threats who may seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the population.¹²⁷ Also, *the Guidelines for the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* asserts that the ultimate aim of the use of force in peace operations is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat.¹²⁸ The 2015 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) explains that military force must be used by peacekeepers to deal with the different threats they may face. Options can range from containment via deterrence to direct confrontation. Force, however, may not be necessary if the potential attackers perceive the United Nations has the capabilities and political will to respond in case of attack.¹²⁹ Findlay supports this last argument. He says that the more willing and able UN operations are to use force, the less likely they are to have to use it.¹³⁰ Therefore, both Findlay and the UN documents converge that the utility of force in UN peace operations is linked to the ability to deter. Deterrence is the strategy to influence adversaries. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the meaning, the reach, as well as the limitations of deterrence, as a strategy, in the United Nations peace operations.

¹²⁷ United Nations, *Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines*, 34-35.

¹²⁸ United Nations, *Guidelines for the Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 3-4.

¹²⁹ Jose Ramos-Horta, “Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People” (New York, NY: United Nations, 2015), 47.

¹³⁰ Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 376-377.

3.2.1 Deterrence Theory and Strategy: The Nuclear Era

International crises and war have been a central topic in the field of international relations. The ability to prevent war and crises through deterrence has developed substantial theory in order to deal with some key questions of international politics such as how force is manipulated to achieve political goals and how wars can be avoided.¹³¹ According to Michael Howard and Raymond Aron, deterrence aims to convince an adversary that the cost of using military force to solve political conflicts will outweigh its benefits.¹³² Lawrence Freedman defines deterrence in terms of the role of threat in international affairs. In particular, he looks at the threat to use force in order to stop others acting in harmful way. Freedman further suggests that deterrence is comprised of three inter-related elements: an underlying power relationship, the interests and norms at stake, and the narrative that links the two first elements.¹³³ Deterrence has a paradoxical nature because each side pursues security, not by protecting itself, but by threatening to cause unacceptable damage on the other.¹³⁴

Deterrence is also based on credibility. Aspects such as strength, the ability to carry out a threat and to defend against other's actions, as well as reputation influence credibility.¹³⁵ In this fashion, the credibility of deterrence is related to its capacity to hurt. Freedman affirms that a threat is credible if either it is not matched by a

¹³¹ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence theory revisited," *World Politics*, vol 31, no. 2 (1979): 290.

¹³² Michael Howard. "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," *Foreign Affairs*, (29 November 2018), accessed 28 November 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1982-12-01/reassurance_and_deterrence_western_defense_1980s; Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (News Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 509.

¹³³ Freedman, "Deterrence: A reply," 789.

¹³⁴ Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 292.

¹³⁵ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," *International Security*, vol 7, no. 3 (1982): 9.

counterattack or it is automatically implemented by the adversary misbehavior.¹³⁶ Patrick Morgan states that deterrence is not new. The classic balance of power system was based on deterrence. In that system deterrence was applied by actors not only to prevent wars but via wars.¹³⁷ Additionally, ideas of how to use threats and rewards to influence behavior can be found in ancient accounts, such as the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.¹³⁸

Although deterrence is popularly associated with the use of the military force, it is possible to achieve deterrence effects employing all other instruments of national power, such as Diplomatic, Informational and Economic (DIME). In fact, Paul K. Huth broadens Howard's and Freedman's definition affirming that deterrence is the use of any threat to refrain another party from initiating a course of action. According to him, policies of deterrence can include both military and non-military threats that are intended to prevent undesirable courses of actions from other states.¹³⁹ Deterrence, therefore, is maximized not only with the availability of military power but also when all instruments of national power are synchronously applied in pursuing a given national goal.

More than a theoretical approach, deterrence can also be a strategy. When A tries to influence B's behavior through warning about the consequences of the acts that

¹³⁶ Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 765.

¹³⁷ Patrick M. Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol 33, no. 1 (2012): 86.

¹³⁸ Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, edited by Robert B. Strassler (New York, NY: Free Press, 1996), 351-355.

¹³⁹ Paul K. Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol 2, no. 1 (1999): 26.

B might be considering, then deterrence becomes a strategy.¹⁴⁰ Although this kind of strategy is criticized for not aiming to create harmonious relationship between actors, the stability it creates may set conditions for further developments in term of diplomatic engagements.¹⁴¹ It is important to highlight, therefore, that failures in the use of deterrence as strategy are normally connected to the focus in the use of military resources only.

Morgan identifies two cases of deterrence. According to him, direct deterrence is concerned with the protection of one's own territory while extended deterrence aims to protect another state territory. Direct and extended deterrence are subdivided in two categories: immediate and general deterrence. The former is reactive and aims to deter a short-term threat of attack. The latter is preventive and aims to avoid the rise of such short-term threats. Huth explains that major powers have been the primary states to practice extended deterrence. Situations of direct deterrence, on the other hand, are centered in territorial conflicts between neighboring states in which the major powers are not directly involved.¹⁴² The author further sustains that the ability to prevent war may not indicate the existence of a successful deterrence policy. In his point of view, if a state accepts extremely high diplomatic demands from a potential attacker to avoid conflict, deterrence has failed. Thus, general deterrence fails when short-term crises arise; immediate deterrence when war begins; and both general and immediate deterrence fail when the avoidance of conflict results in maximum diplomatic concessions.¹⁴³ Freedman believes that deterrence works better in a general rather than

¹⁴⁰ Freedman, "Deterrence: A reply," 790.

¹⁴¹ Patrick M. Morgan, "Taking the Long View of Deterrence," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol 28, no. 5 (2005), 751-763.

¹⁴² Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict," 27.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

an immediate sense, by cautioning both parties of the risks in raising the tensions too far.¹⁴⁴ Robert Jervis identifies a third kind of deterrence, called “self-deterrence.” “Self-deterrence” happens when actors are deterred by their own imagination. They identify threats or risks that do not exist. Finally, theorists use four sets of variables when analyzing deterrence: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interest at stake.¹⁴⁵

The literature for deterrence theory is identified in four different periods of time, called “waves.” The first wave appeared immediately after World War II. That time, nuclear superiority was seen as a key counter to USSR advantages in manpower and geography.¹⁴⁶ Bernard Brodie, Jacob Viner, and Arnold Wolfers are among the key theorists from this period. They concentrated their studies on the implications of nuclear weapons. The work they developed was strongly influenced by the realist school of international relations theory and centered on assumptions such as the rational actor.¹⁴⁷ The atomic bomb changed the calculations of engagements between great powers. The possibility of nuclear destruction made states consider their actions differently. Therefore, the role of the military within nuclear powers changed from waging wars to preventing them. According to this line of thought, nuclear weapons must be ready, yet they might never be used.¹⁴⁸ The sole long-term role of nuclear weapons was to deter

¹⁴⁴ Freedman, "Deterrence: A reply," 792.

¹⁴⁵ Huth, "Deterrence and international conflict: Empirical findings and theoretical debates," 25; Michael J Mazarr, *Understanding Deterrence* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 9.

¹⁴⁶ Freedman, "The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists," 739.

¹⁴⁷ William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence." In Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *US Nuclear Strategy*, (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1989), 12.

¹⁴⁸ Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," *World Politics*, vol 11, no. 2 (1959): 173.

their use by the enemy.¹⁴⁹ In the first wave, deterrence became associated with preventive strategies and with the concepts known as “massive retaliation”¹⁵⁰ and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). During the first wave, there were discussions about the possibility of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to obtain advantages in a conventional confrontation without causing exceptional damage to the local communities. It soon became clear, however, that their radius of destruction was too large and their effects too pervasive to employ them in such a way. According to Brodie, people saved by the use of tactical nuclear weapons over their territories would be the last to ask for help again.¹⁵¹

First Wave theorists are responsible for the development of the critical concept of “first strike and second strike.” According to Albert Wohlstetter, first-strike capability is not simply related to the initial shots, but also with the destruction of all the enemy’s means of retaliation. On the other hand, a second-strike capability is represented by the ability to survive the first strike and still carry out a devastating retaliation on the aggressor.¹⁵² Finally, another feature of the period covered by the first wave was the role of the United Nations. As an international institution created in part to practice deterrence through the five nuclear powers of its Security Council, Morgan sustains that the UN made deterrence protection available to numerous additional states, and sometimes to actors within states.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Freedman, "The first two generations of nuclear strategists," 738.

¹⁵⁰ John Slessor, "The place of the bomber in British policy." *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944) *vol 29, no. 3* (1953): 303.

¹⁵¹ Bernard Brodie, "More About Limited War," *World Politics vol 10, no. 1* (1957): 117.

¹⁵² Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Survival, vol 1, no. 1* (1959): 8-17.

¹⁵³ Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," 87.

The second wave arose in the 1950s and 1960s. It is marked by the use of rational choice and game-theoretic models to develop a nuclear strategy in situations in which the first choice of both parties is to stand firm, but in which both prefer retreating and letting the other side win to a mutually disastrous confrontation. Rational deterrence theory focused on how military threats can persuade an aggressor that the outcome of military aggression may be costly and unsuccessful.¹⁵⁴ Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder and Thomas Schelling are main names of the second wave.

Kahn coined the term “escalation dominance.”¹⁵⁵ The idea explains the process of escalation in terms of a metaphorical ladder, with each of the 44 rungs representing a different level of intensity in the crisis or confrontation. The lowest rung represents normal peacetime conditions, with higher rungs full-blown conventional war, limited nuclear warfare, and, all-out strategic nuclear exchange. According to Khan, the ideal aspiration is to achieve a position of “escalation dominance,” a condition in which an actor has the ability to escalate a conflict in ways that will be disadvantageous to the adversary while he cannot retaliate, either because it has no escalation options or because the options would not improve his situation.¹⁵⁶ Khan believed that the key aspect of the deterrence strategy was the second-strike capability. In his point of view, it does not matter how successful the first-strike was if the other side still had the capability to retaliate.¹⁵⁷ For instance, the importance given to the capability to retaliate

¹⁵⁴ Huth, "Deterrence and international conflict," 29.

¹⁵⁵ Herman Kahn, *On escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (London, UK: Routledge, 2017).

¹⁵⁶ Forrest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, Evan S. Medeiros, Kevin L. Pollpeter, and Roger Cliff, *Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2008), 14.

¹⁵⁷ Herman Kahn and Evan Jones, *On Thermonuclear War* (London, UK: Routledge, 2017), 557.

is responsible for the development of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Given the antisubmarine warfare was not developed enough to challenge the survivability of a submarine force, a full first-strike success became very unlikely. That meant the other side would still have the capacity to retaliate after a first strike on its land-based nuclear assets. According to Schelling, the SLBMs were celebrated as being positively stabilizing in a world where both superpowers believed in the critical role of the offensive advantages of the first strike to win.¹⁵⁸

In *Arms and Influence*, Schelling further elaborates on this concept sustaining that military strategy must include the art of coercion. His thoughts were centered in the deterrence capability of punishment, particularly the capacity to hurt another state to avoid an undesirable action.¹⁵⁹ Snyder presented the distinction between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. The first influences the state's decision to achieve his objective while the second increases the costs of doing so.¹⁶⁰ Thus, if "A" is able to reduce the chances of "B" success by denning capabilities, the probability of conflict decreases, and stability increases. By increasing the cost of "B" actions, although the probability of conflict decreases the instability may increase.

Emerging in the late 1960s, the third wave challenged the rational actor assumption created by the second wave theorists by using statistical and case-study methods to test the deterrence theory, particularly in cases of conventional deterrence.¹⁶¹ Third wave theorists also tried to distinguish their work by addressing

¹⁵⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1980), 288.

¹⁵⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*.

¹⁶⁰ Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Power", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol 4, no.2 (1960): 163-178.

¹⁶¹ Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1974), 534.

some major difficulties not yet developed by earlier theorists. These difficulties are related to the lack of systematization of deterrence as theory. Deterrence, in their opinion, could be better analyzed by through its implications, particularly looking at which elements of the theory are essential, which contradict each other, and those that need modification. According to this line of thought, deterrence relies too much on deduction and more empirical data would be necessary to investigate whether decision makers behave as the theory says they would or if the actions taken achieve the desired effects. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein are considered some of the main writers of this period. They argue that some of the main assumptions of deterrence theory such as rationality are contradicted by empirical evidence.¹⁶²

One of the main determinants of deterrence theory is what a state is going to win or lose if it stands firm. Different than the previous generations of theorists, the third wave stresses the costs of retreating. Among the interests a state would have to sacrifice are the values that it places on the issue at stake (intrinsic interest), the degree to which a retreat would compromise its position on other issues (strategic interest), and the ability to manipulate the costs of retreating by enhancing its bargaining position (commitment). Between these three values, third-wave theorists believe that intrinsic interest is determinant in most cases. In this sense, the greater the intrinsic interest the greater the possibility for an actor to prevail, because the cost of retreating would be higher than those of the opponent. Furthermore, intrinsic interest is key for strategic interest. If a state retreats on an issue that other actors know is central for it, others will

¹⁶² Richard N. Lebow and Janice G, Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, vol 18 (1988): 626.

assume that the state has no power to stand firm and will do the same when facing future issues.¹⁶³

3.2.2 Detering Non-State Actors: The Fourth Wave

The end of the Cold War and the rise of concerns about asymmetrical threats, most notably the terrorist attacks of September 11th, are responsible for the emergence of the fourth wave. Because it was developed to present answers to a real-life problem, the fourth wave is more oriented to the development of a strategy than a theory.¹⁶⁴ All efforts and theory developed by the previous waves were focused on states and nuclear weapons and aimed to reach a common outcome: non-aggression. The challenge in the post-Cold War era was to match a theory designed for relationship between nuclear powers to asymmetrical threats,¹⁶⁵ such as rogue states, weak states and non-state actors, in an international environment of expanded normative constraints on using force.¹⁶⁶ How to deter an asymmetrical threat has mixed implications, however. During the Cold War, deterrence failure might have meant an unacceptable outcome such as mutual destruction. In an asymmetric environment, although deterrence failure may result in the suffering of many, different calculations are possible because national survival may be not at stake. All the literature in the fourth wave agrees on a key point:

¹⁶³ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited, 315.

¹⁶⁴ Jeffrey W. Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol 31, no. 1 (2010): 2.

¹⁶⁵ U.S. President John F. Kennedy, addressing the West Point Class of 1962, defined asymmetrical threat as 'another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts,' accessed 26 April 2019, <https://www.ausa.org/publications/defining-asymmetric-warfare.>,

¹⁶⁶ Freedman, "Deterrence: A reply," 795; Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," 89.

deterrence remains relevant and useful against the new threats, though diminished in significance.¹⁶⁷

The fourth wave has some ideas in common with the second and third waves, such as the role of assurances in making deterrence effective and the importance of integrating deterrence into a larger framework. The main difference is its empirical focus. Fourth wave theorists are concerned about how deterrence would operate in situations different than nuclear power relationships. In sum, they stress more on the reach of deterrence rather than its limitations.¹⁶⁸ The main assumption of the fourth wave is the state's willingness to use not only military assets to deter, but also all available instruments of national power. Based on this assumption, in an asymmetric environment, deterrence works because the weaker opponent believes that the deterrent state will use all necessary means to achieve or defend its interests.¹⁶⁹ Thus, deterrence theory has been used in the fourth wave to develop strategic concepts such as preemption attack and active defense.¹⁷⁰

In addition to strategies already stated within this work, such as deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, new approaches developed in the fourth wave include indirect deterrence, deterrence by counter-narrative, and deterrence by concession. Because of the difficulties in directly targeting non-states actors, indirect deterrence goes after the facilitating network that supports them. Normally, facilitators are business-driven opportunists and have no connections with the political motivation

¹⁶⁷ Colin S Gray, "Maintaining Effective Deterrence," *Strategic Studies Institute* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, August 2003).

¹⁶⁸ Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," 5.

¹⁶⁹ Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 29.

¹⁷⁰ A.R. Knott, "Does 9/11 Mark the End of Deterrence and the Birth of 'Detercion'?" *Defence Studies vol 4, no. 1* (2004): 40-63.

of the non-state actors. By threatening facilitators, the desired outcome is to reduce the non-state actors' access to vital resources to conduct their operations.¹⁷¹ Deterrence by counter-narrative challenges the political justification to fight. When the armed group's narrative is discredited, the group's legitimacy erodes. Therefore, the group's ability to recruit and raise funds for its cause is severely damaged.¹⁷² On the other hand, deterrence by concession moves in the opposite direction when aiming to address grievances and grant concessions to non-state actors. Some armed groups emerge in regions where the national state has failed to provide the basic needs to its population. Thus, is it possible to identify some legitimate grievances among the group's objectives. By accommodating these objectives (and then holding that accommodation at risk) the deterrent actor may prevent the armed groups from conducting undesirable actions or even cooperating with other groups.¹⁷³ Moreover, Freeman argues that once non-state actors are considered rational parties and follow some sort of strategic logic, then this logic can be challenged.¹⁷⁴

One of the problems addressed by the fourth wave is how to deal with insurgency and conflict within failed states. After the Cold War, the lack of support from the Soviet Union and the effects of globalization on underdeveloped countries have contributed to the collapse of internal political order in some states, particularly in the African continent. The possibility to use military force to protect human lives

¹⁷¹ Knopf, "The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research," 4.

¹⁷² Scott Helfstein, Michael J. Meese, Don Ressler, Reid Sawyer, Troy Schnack, Mathew Sheiffer, Scott Silverstone, and Scott Taylor, "White Paper on Terrorism, Deterrence and Nuclear Weapons," prepared for the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, vol 31 (2008): 30

¹⁷³ Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security*, vol 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005/2006): 89.

¹⁷⁴ Freedman. "Deterrence: A Reply," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol 28, no. 5 (2005): 797.

under threat and promote regional stability has increased the role of multinational organizations such as NATO and the United Nations and has risen deterrence to a central position in their political considerations.¹⁷⁵ According to Morgan, extended deterrence is at the heart of liberal peace theory as now applied. In this fashion, international institutions and alliances promote deterrence when helping states to avoid disruptive internal political struggles on security issues and to keep them from being security threats to each other. Morgan, however, highlights that the main problem of extended deterrence promoted by collective actors is that they are likely to implement their deterrence threat unevenly because of the different interests between members. In his opinion, collective actors perform better when combining threats with the use of incentives.¹⁷⁶ One useful concept to adjust deterrence theory to collective actors is Timothy W. Crawford's 'pivotal deterrence'. In pivotal deterrence a third party seeks to keep two or more associates (or members) from fighting. The pivotal deterrer must have the capabilities to intervene and determine the outcome for the theory to be successful.¹⁷⁷

Recently, because of the developments in several new domains from space to cyberspace, and the increasing tension between the United States and other major powers, such as Russia and China, there have been new discussions on how deterrence should work in a multipolar world. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. believes that in such scenarios it is hard to accurately identify a military balance of power. In a world of three nuclear rival great powers, none can maintain military parity with the other two.

¹⁷⁵ Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," 44.

¹⁷⁶ Morgan, "The State of Deterrence in International Politics Today," 92.

¹⁷⁷ Timothy W. Crawford, *Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and The Pursuit of Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).

In addition to this situation, the author states that the deterrence provided by nuclear weapons has been questioned in Russia and China where key leaders believe that some kinds of nuclear weapons are acceptable for use in conventional warfare, such as those used to create an electromagnetic pulse. The result, in the Krepinevich's point of view, is that the firebreak between conventional and nuclear war is slowly disappearing. Thus, Moscow and Beijing may find conventional aggression not too risky, if they can use nuclear weapons if things go wrong.¹⁷⁸ Michael J. Mazarr believes that the multipolar rivalry requires more effective deterrence. In his opinion, deterrence and dissuasion must be conceived to shape the thinking of the target, considering its interests, motive, imperatives as well as its view on deterrence.¹⁷⁹ It is the perception of the potential aggressor that matters. Deterrence will succeed by creating a subjective perception in the minds of the decision-makers of the target.¹⁸⁰

3.2.3 The Criticism of Deterrence

There are many criticisms of deterrence. The literature on deterrence does not reach a common ground regarding the effectiveness of the theory and the strategies it supports. In general, deterrence elaborates little about how to move from hostile relations into peaceful ones. Deterrence deals with relations characterized by high conflict, when the main outcome is non-aggression. Because of the influence of the realist school of international relations¹⁸¹ on deterrence, the theory overestimates the

¹⁷⁸ Andrew FJ. Krepinevich, "The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence," *Foreign Affairs*, vol 98 (winter 2019): 65-66.

¹⁷⁹ Mazarr, "Understanding Deterrence," 2.

¹⁸⁰ Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, 160.

¹⁸¹ According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2010), Realism, also known as political realism, is a view of international politics that stresses its competitive and conflictual side. Realists consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are

power of threats and neglects other feasible approaches such as rewards and compromises. Realists believe that states achieve their goals using superior power. Superior power and retreat are in opposite corners of the ring. This assumption makes statesmen believe that giving rewards to the other side or attempting a compromise would at best postpone an upcoming conflict and at worst show weakness, which could encourage the other side to raise new demands. In addition, because deterrence theory is influenced by western values, culture, and experience, it assumes that the other side has the same values at stake.¹⁸² This is one the main causes of failure. Deterrence, therefore, may fail when the deterrent party misunderstands the adversary's values, worldview, strength, and options.

Jervis sustains that third-wave research, for instance, has revealed important deficiencies in deterrence theory but has not developed new theories. Nor has it shown exactly what can be retained from older views, what must be discarded, and what can be reformulated in bounded, conditional terms.

One of the biggest criticisms of deterrence theory is that it overestimates the rationality of decision-makers, particularly in high stress situations. The definition of rationality is not simple. Rational behavior varies according to different cultures, beliefs, perceptions, and personalities. The rationality paradigm that evolves deterrence may be questioned, for example, in authoritarian regimes. In general, authoritarian leaders can be extremely risk tolerant and believe they can beat the odds.¹⁸³ They are rational in the sense they can create a logical way of how to achieve their goals, but this

concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power.

¹⁸² Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," 296.

¹⁸³ Krepinevich, "The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence," 70.

rationality does not necessarily mean reasonableness. They tend to ignore inconvenient facts and unpleasant information to construct convoluted scenarios that allow them to believe events will play out in the way they want.¹⁸⁴ Also, rationality may not be necessary for deterrence. A potential aggressor is less likely to carry out his plans if he fears the defender will respond without properly analyzing the risks involved. If decision makers were totally rational, deterrence would have never worked in a world of mutually assured destruction (MAD). If the aggressor believed the defender would retaliate and then destroy its own world, it would have assumed the defender was less than rational.

3.2.4 Summary

Deterrence was not created during the beginning of the nuclear age. Also, it is not only about nuclear weapons. Deterrence became a very comprehensive theory and strategy during the Cold War due to the demand to solve real-world problems. Three waves of thought developed the theory as well as strategies and approaches to deal with the problem of how to deter in a mutually assured destruction environment.

The disintegration of the USSR and the September 11th attacks displayed a new world scenario where the international systems of states had to deal with asymmetrical threats. Notably, the challenge for the state system became how to deter non-state actors. The fourth wave of deterrence addresses this issue by envisioning how to adapt a theory designed for relationships between nuclear state powers to asymmetrical threats, such as rogue states, weak states, and non-state actors, in an international environment of expanded normative constraints on using force.

¹⁸⁴ Amatzia Baram, "Deterrence Lessons from Iraq: Rationality Is Not the Only Key to Containment," *Foreign Affairs*, vol 91, no. 4 (2012): 78.

The fourth wave is relevant not only for nation-states concerned of their national security, but also for the collective security institutions committed to international peace. After 1990, the increasing number of intrastate conflicts has demanded actions from international institutions such as NATO and the UN. In particular, the UN has faced great expansion in the number of peace operations assigned to intervene in civil conflicts and to help weak states in fighting insurgency or terrorism within their borders. The challenge of establishing sustainable peace in hostile environment, while preserving core peacekeeping principles such as impartiality, neutrality, and minimum use of force pushed the UN to adapt.

One of the most discussed adaptations is related to the use of force. The UN has been criticized when using and not using military force. Deterrence is central in this matter. The greater the deterrence capability the lesser the use of force. In UN peace operations, while the term “enforcement” may sound like a military strategy, it is essentially political, with the military use of force playing supporting role involving deterrence and compellence when required. It will be the ultimate sanction in case it needs to coerce one side or the other to behave. In the new UN stabilization operations, such as MONUSCO, deterrence means deploying a credible and capable military force committed to executing the full range of military options during a long-term deployment. In the third and final part of this chapter the environment where peacekeepers have been deployed is analyzed through the lenses of Complexity Theory.

3.3 PART III - UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND COMPLEXITY THEORY

In his seminal theory of war, Carl von Clausewitz affirms that “the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish

by the test that kind of war on which they are embarking.”¹⁸⁵ Framing the operational environment is key for this judgement. United States Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, *The Operations Process*, describes the operations process through the actions of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing military operations.¹⁸⁶ Understanding is the first and most relevant action for establishing context—the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation – and improve understanding of the operational environment and the problem. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.¹⁸⁷




Figure 8. The Operation Process.

Source: Created by the author inspired by US Army ADRP 5-0 *The Operations Process*, 2012, 1-2.

The analysis of the use of force in UN peace operations on this research hinges on some principles of complex systems theory. It argues that complexity dominates the

¹⁸⁵ Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

¹⁸⁶ United States Army, ADP 5-0, 3.

¹⁸⁷ United States Joint Staff, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, xx.

operational environment where peacekeepers are currently deployed. In this sense, the third part of the literature review elaborates on principles relevant to understanding the relationship of complexity and operational environment. First, it provides a background linking the idea of complexity and modern UN peace operations. In section two, a theory of complex systems is described, highlighting its features, critical aspects, and limitations. The last section presents ideas of how military force can be useful in complex adaptive systems.

3.3.1 Background

In a paper called *Improving Security of United Nations: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business*, also known as the “Cruz Report,” former MINUSTAH and MONUSCO’s Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Roberto dos Santos Cruz outlines that two-thirds of all United Nations peacekeepers are deployed in environments of ongoing conflict and operate in increasingly complex, high-risk environments.¹⁸⁸ In the section that states the problem regarding modern UN peace operations, he points out that the organization lacks required supporting skill sets, processes, and mindset for executing operations in modern complex conflict environments. In his opinion, one of the most important initiatives is to identify specific areas of adaptation for United Nations peace operations to complex conflict environments.

Several other UN documents, scholars, and distinguished authors have also linked UN peace operations to the idea of complexity. For instance, the word “complex” or “complexity” appears 19 times in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

¹⁸⁸ United Nations, *Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We Need to Change the Way We Are Doing Business*, 1.

Principles and Guidelines, ‘The Capstone Doctrine.’ The document states that over the past six decades, UN peacekeeping has evolved in to a complex undertaking.¹⁸⁹ The 2015 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations says that peacekeepers have been deployed in complex conflict settings.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, independent mission reports such as the Center on International Cooperation’s Global Peace Operations Review affirms that peace operations have evolved into a complex endeavor. Finally, authors such as Bellamy, Findlay, Berdal, Fortna, Howard, and Hunt describe the operational environments where modern peace operations are deployed as complex.¹⁹¹

Modern UN peace operations, stability missions in particular, differ from the traditional cold war era operations. Peacekeepers have been deployed in the middle of intrastate conflicts where sometimes there is no peace to keep. In such an environment, conventional linear thinking is not sufficient to cope with the challenges presented by the environment. However, Western approach to warfare has been heavily influenced by the scientific, linear, tactical-focused, and top-down detailed planning process from war experiences of the past two centuries. Thus, planners tend to rely upon the conceptual framework of Newtonian determinism that suggests the initial locations and

¹⁸⁹ United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 1.

¹⁹⁰ Ramos-Horta, “Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People,” 17.

¹⁹¹ Alex J. Bellamy (2004), “The ‘next stage’ in peace operations theory?” *International Peacekeeping* vol xx (2004), 28; Mats Berdal, “Peacebuilding Operations and the Struggle for Legitimacy,” *The Adelphi Papers* vol 49 (2009), 120; Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” *The Annual Review of Political Science* vol 11 (2008), 285; Charles T. Hunt, “All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the ‘Robust Turn’ in UN Peace Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* (2016), 1.

velocities of masses uniquely determine their future states.¹⁹² This framework is quantitative in nature, isolates system components, and uses linear approximations to describe the environment. The obvious limitation of this framework is that the operational environment of civil wars, for instance, cannot be quantified, isolated, or precisely measured. The result is unpredictability in accurate force ratio, inexplicable reactions, and the collapse of strategies. Moreover, from an early age, pure scientific reasoning has taught people to break apart problems, to fragment the world. This makes complex tasks and subjects more manageable, but there is a hidden, enormous price. People can no longer see the consequences of their actions; they lose their intrinsic sense of connection to a larger whole.¹⁹³ Peter M. Senge argues that dividing an elephant in half does not produce two small elephants. According to him, complex systems have integrity. Their character depends on the whole. To understand the most challenging managerial issues requires seeing the whole system that generates the issues.

Even though complexity is widely mentioned in UN peace operations literature, there are no official documents within the organization that defines its meaning or presents guidelines of how to deal with complex environments. The *Cambridge Dictionary of English* defines complexity as “the state of having many parts and being difficult to understand or find an answer to.”¹⁹⁴ In *Harnessing Complexity*, Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen explain the term as a system that “consists of parts

¹⁹² Briggs, John and F. David Peat. *Turbulent Mirror* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1989)

¹⁹³ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990), 3, 66.

¹⁹⁴ Cambridge Dictionary of English. Complexity, available at <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/complexity>, accessed 10 September 2020.

which later interact in ways that heavily influence the probabilities of later events.” According to them, complexity creates new and emergent properties resulting in an unpredictable outcome.¹⁹⁵ The *US Army Operating Concept* defines complexity as “an environment that is not only unknown but unknowable and constantly changing.”¹⁹⁶

Complexity can also be a systems’ theory. Robert Jervis explains that we are dealing with a system when a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts.¹⁹⁷ Complex Systems Theory aims to provide the basis for understanding complex environments and their applicability to the social sciences including military organizations. It is the study of self-reinforcing interdependent action among adaptive entities that shows how such interactions create creativity, learning, adaptability, and change.”¹⁹⁸

A myriad of variables influences the process of using force in an uncertain, complex environment with multiple interactions amongst a great number of actors. Based on the application of complex systems theories, the next two sections propose to understand the use of force in modern UN peace operations with innovative lenses.

¹⁹⁵ Robert M. Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000), 15.

¹⁹⁶ United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The Army Operating Concept*, iii.

¹⁹⁷ Robert Jervis, *Systems Effect Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 10.

¹⁹⁸ James K. Hazy, Jeffrey Goldstein, and Benyamin B. Lichtenstein, eds., *Complex Systems Leadership Theory: New Perspectives from Complexity Science on Social and Organizational Effectiveness, Vol. 1* (Mansfield, MA: ISCE Publishing, 2007), 148.

3.3.2 Complex Systems Theory

This doctoral dissertation explores the potential contribution of Deterrence and Complex Systems theories to understand the use of force in UN Peace Operations. Thus, the categorization of the environment where modern peace operations are deployed as a complex adaptive system is instrumental.

The origins complex systems theory lies on the General System Theory (GST) and Chaos Theory. In the 1960s, Ludwig von Bertalanffy explained GST as a new scientific discipline based in foundational principles applicable to biological, social, and economic systems. His main argument focuses on the consideration of all the mutually interacting aspects that operate in a system. GST was then conceived as a science of “wholeness.”¹⁹⁹

General Systems Theory (GST) seeks to conceptually fuse elements of physics, cybernetics, information theory, automata, game theory, decision theory, queuing theory and classic scientific understanding of systems to develop a general model that understand “sets of elements standing in interrelations,” whether they were closed or open. Examining each of these components, it appeared that there is an underlying unity to many, if not all systems. This reoccurrence of patterns is also known as self-similarity or fractal behavior. In systems, actions often interact to produce results that cannot be comprehended by linear models. In simple terms, linearity involves two propositions: changes in system output are proportional to changes in input, and system outputs corresponding to the sum of two inputs are equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Ludvig von Bertalanffy, *General System Theory* (New York: George Braziller, 1993), 37.

²⁰⁰ Jervis, *Systems Effect*, 34.

In contrast to linearity, Chaos Theory underpins its formulations in mathematical models and a deterministic, non-linear processes.²⁰¹ Complex Systems Theory is rooted in some of the postulates of Chaos Theory. According to Osinga, “Complexity Theory examines emergent order in large, interactive adaptive networks such as neural networks or ecosystems.”²⁰² Complex systems exhibit non-linear, self-organizing behavior to survive and thrive in this environment. This behavior then generates a level of hierarchical self-organization within the system. Osinga argues that complex systems have the unique capability of balancing between order and chaos, “the edge of chaos.” In this sense, most of complex systems find themselves at the frontier of the phenomena of chaos. Without order, the timely retention and transferability of information between structures along with the ability to reproduce success would not happen. Without chaos, an absence of creativity and adaptability necessary for continued evolution would not occur.

The birth of complexity as a science provided a conceptual framework of understanding how complex systems can generate simple patterns and simple systems can display complex behaviors. Military professionals such as John Boyd and others realized that land warfare had very much in common with these other complex systems. This is evidenced by the relevance of similar behavior in complex systems to that of the battlefield where small initial changes can produce significantly large outcomes.

The idea of complexity is straightforward – a complex system is much more than a simple sum of its parts. For the military, this means the use of force demands a focus on effects and influence, rather than prediction and control. Unfortunately,

²⁰¹ James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin Books, 1988), 48.

²⁰² Frans P. B. Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, Vol. 18* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 95-96.

because complexity requires a quantification of what is more of a qualitative measure, it is an extremely difficult concept to define.²⁰³ Complexity is usually greatest in systems when the outcome is difficult to predict from its initial state, or whose components are arranged in an intricate pattern.²⁰⁴

Agents and the relationships among them are the basic components of systems. Although agents are relevant, the relationships between them are one of the aspects of complex system. The nonlinearity of these relationships means that the outputs from the system are out of proportion to the inputs due to multiple interactions.²⁰⁵ Consequently, this essential feature demands a holistic approach to such systems and requiring in-depth consideration of the relationships among actors. Plowman and Duchon believe that the relationship between agents and inputs from the environment foster self-organization. It is one of the most recognizable phenomena in Complexity Theory. Lower-level agents interact through positive and negative feedback loops that result in higher-level order without the establishment of centralized control mechanisms.

For instance, the relationships amongst the different agents that compose the intrastate conflict are the key elements that deserve attention. These relationships are the ways in which the agents interact with their surrounding and pursue their goals. At the same time, groupings or populations of agents can be identified, as well as populating strategies. Some critical interaction patterns among agents lead to identify

²⁰³ Murray Gell-Mann, *The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1994), 16-19

²⁰⁴ Thomas Czerwinski, *Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Non-linearity in Military Affairs* (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), accessed 2 November 2019, <http://www.dodccrp.org/coptin.htm>.

²⁰⁵ Andrew Ilachinski, *Artificial War: Multiagent-Based Simulation of Combat* (River Edge, NJ: World Scientific Pub, 2004), 2.

causal relations and possibilities of intervention in the system. Inhibitions of some interaction patterns or increase in others, elimination of agents or strategies, introduction of new ones. All these changes are forms of selection. When this selection process leads to improvements in the system, according to some measures of success, the strategy achieves an advantage.

In *Systems Thinking*, Jamshid Gharajedaghi ranks five principles of complex systems: openness, purposefulness, multidimensionality, emergent property, and counterintuitive behavior.²⁰⁶ Openness means that the behavior of living systems can be understood only in the context of their environment. Lessons from other systems cannot be replicated because every system is unique. Regarding purposefulness, the author argues that a purposeful system not only learns and adapts but also creates. For instance, new relationships, actors and behavior are likely to be created in a continuous effort for adaptation and survival within the system. Multidimensionality is the ability to see complementary relations in opposing tendencies and to create feasible wholes with infeasible parts. For instance, Gharajedaghi believes that freedom, justice, and security are three aspects of the same thing. They should not be separated; threatening them in isolation is problematic. The author emphasizes that a multidisciplinary approach is not systems thinking. Multidimensionality is far more critical than the ability to generate information from different perspectives.²⁰⁷ Emergent properties are the property of the whole not the parts and cannot be deduced from properties of the parts. They are product of interactions among several elements. Finally, counterintuitive behavior means that actions intended to produce a desired outcome may generate opposite results, based on

²⁰⁶ Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture*, 3rd ed. (Amsterdam, NL: Morgan Kaufmann, 2011), 29.

²⁰⁷ Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking*, 89.

the three assertions: (1) cause and effect may be separated in time and space; (2) cause and effect replace one another, (3) and an event may have multiple effects, a set of variables that initially played a key role in producing an effect may be replaced by a different set of variables at a different time.

Among all principles and features of complex environments previously described, for the purpose of this research, emergence and non-linearity are subjected to come under scrutiny. Traditional wisdom views combat as a collision between two billiard balls obeying the linear laws of Newtonian physics. Through the new lens of complexity, it is better perceived as an evolving activity between interacting fluids of self-organized hierarchies. Patterns emerge from this evolving activity that emphasize survival. In the effort for survival, locally unanticipated behavior emerges. John H. Holland defines emergence as “interactions where the aggregate exhibits properties not attained by summation.”²⁰⁸ Steven Johnson defines the concept of emergence as what happens when an interconnected system of simple elements self-organizes to form more intelligent and adaptive behavior.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁸ John H. Holland, *Complexity: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4.

²⁰⁹ Steven Johnson, *Emergence* (New York, NY: Scribner, 2001), 288.




Figure 9. System Principles.

Source: Jamshid Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking: Managing Chaos and Complexity: A Platform for Designing Business Architecture*, 3rd ed. Amsterdam: Morgan Kaufmann, 2011.

Nonlinear interaction is the defining feature of complex systems. Minor inputs in the system bring up major outputs or consequences; this issue relates to the sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The importance of interconnectedness in a complex system emphasizes nonlinearity and the difficulty to predict future system's behavior. Unfortunately, as a direct result of genetic make-up, education, society and experiences throughout life, humans tend to think very linearly. Newtonian understanding is based on the arrangement of nature as a linear phenomenon where inputs are proportional to outputs; careful planning result in reliable predictions; and reductionist processes are placed as a premium in gaining results. The breaking down of large, complex problems into smaller, manageable pieces is the fundamental nature of this linear reductionism. Complexity is post-Newtonian in the understanding that the world, including warfare, operates in a nonlinear fashion where inputs and outputs are not proportional, and events are unpredictable.²¹⁰

²¹⁰ Czerwinski, *Coping with the Bounds*.

3.3.2.1 Complex adaptive system (CAS)

One specific type of complex system has gained relevance in complexity science over the last two decades: the complex adaptive system. This is a special case of complex systems; whose main feature is its capacity to continually evolve and adapt from learning and experience.²¹¹ Initially developed to study the behavior of living organisms, this concept soon expanded to explain other forms of social organization. Some authors even argue that the complex adaptive systems approach is “a way of looking at the world,” with a great potential as a source of change in social systems, and whose principles and dynamics are of value for decision-makers.²¹² Complex adaptive systems’ properties include simple components or agents relative to whole system, nonlinear interactions among components, no central control, emergent behaviors, hierarchical organization, information processing, dynamics, and evolution and learning.²¹³

A complex adaptive system is always shifting and adapting to accommodate the changes and incongruencies created by the actions of each individual element of the system. Each of these individual elements is in turn a complex system of systems adapting to previous shifts by the system, thereby triggering reciprocal shifts in change that result in a continual loop of change with no possible state of equilibrium. The shifting and changing of a complex adaptive system never end, never stay the same, and most importantly, the more one tries to control it the more the system takes control.

²¹¹ John L. Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2018), 155.

²¹² Axelrod and Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity*, 22.

²¹³ Melanie Mitchell, “What Is Complexity?” (Santa Fe Institute, September 24, 2013), accessed 2 November 2019, <http://s3.amazonaws.com/complexityexplorer/IntroToComplexity/Unit1Slides.pdf>.

This is why some strategists such as Cohen and Mintzberg question the idea of prediction in strategy like “end state” or “final victory.”

Cohen explains that the terms “end state” and “exit strategy,” commonly found in the military jargon, suggest that planners can anticipate what they will achieve by carrying out a military campaign, including how to safely extricate troops from conflict, once the war is won. The author believes that these ideas disintegrate upon close examination. Cohen portrays these terms as a kind of strategic pixie dust, where sprinkling over the complex problems may make them more manageable. However, in oversimplifying them, these concepts eventually paralyze decision-makers rather than inform them. In complex adaptive systems, decision-makers and planners need to move away of precision and predictability that have long informed the military mindset. A strategy to stabilization operations, for instance, needs to accept high levels of uncertainty. In this fashion, troops must be ready to perform the full range of military operations and be able to learn from a shifting environment.²¹⁴

Likewise, Mintzberg affirms that, in complex adaptive systems, strategies need to mix two concepts: attempt to control, and learning processes from a fluid environment. In his opinion, the realized strategy will be always different from the intended one. Thus, planners need to be flexible enough to learn from the emergent characteristics of the environment and adapt intentions to achieve advantage.²¹⁵ In *the Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, the author explains that viewed in retrospect, few strategies were realized in accordance to their deliberate plan. A perfect realization of an intended strategy implies brilliant foresight, what is unlikely to happen in complex

²¹⁴ Cohen, *The Big Stick*, 200-208.

²¹⁵ Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, 25.

environments, such as civil wars. Mintzberg presents the concept of emergent strategy, where a realized pattern was not expressly intended. According to him, strategies in complex environment need to attempt to control without stopping the learning process. An effective strategy, he argues, must have the ability to learn from the environment as well as the need to react to unexpected events. Figure 10 shows the process in which strategy is formed.




Figure 10. Strategy Formation in Complex Environments.

Source: Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning: Reconceiving Roles for Planning, Plans, Planners* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1994), 24.

Borrowing heavily from his work in genetics, John Holland empirically showed how an agent could develop an adaptive plan that judged fitness against the environment. He demonstrates that complex adaptive systems depend on “large numbers of parts undergoing a kaleidoscopic array of simultaneous nonlinear interactions.”²¹⁶ The interaction of a few simple components (genotypes) can self-organize over multiple iterations into extremely complex emergent hierarchical

²¹⁶ Holland, *Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems*, 95.

outcomes (phenotypes). The details of Holland's work helped to generate an understanding of why agents anticipate and adapt to their environment. This constant adaptation is what allows survival in a continually evolving environment without drifting into the chaotic region. The most successful systems are those that exist in 'far-from-equilibrium' states and are continually seeking new ways to adapt to their environment.²¹⁷ According to Nassim N. Taleb, this happens because 'far-from-equilibrium' systems build mechanisms to opportunistically reinvent themselves. They learn from continuous failures and work to preserve, adapt and even create within the system.²¹⁸ The categorization of the environment where peacekeepers are currently deployed as a complex adaptive system permits exploiting the potential of Complexity Theory and provides the essential bedrock to elaborate guidelines in using military force in modern UN peace operations.

3.3.3 Dealing with Complexity

Several authors have elaborated on the application of complex systems theory for military purposes, specifically for a better understanding of modern warfare. Ilachinski identified the fundamental properties of a complex system in the main features of land combat, which led him to the conclusion that land combat has great similarities with complex adaptive systems.²¹⁹ In intrastate conflict, for instance, parties adapt and learn from experience out of necessity and in a much higher degree than other social systems, as they must fulfill their role in a specific, highly demanding

²¹⁷ Andrew Ilachinski, *Land Warfare and Complexity, Part II: An Assessment of the Applicability of Nonlinear Dynamic and Complex Systems Theory to the Study of Land Warfare*. (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1996), 22.

²¹⁸ Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder* (New York, NY: Random House, 2012), 68.

²¹⁹ Ilachinski, *Land Warfare and Complexity, Part II*, 139.

environment. Thus, complexity at the “edge of chaos” is the normal situation that the military must deal with in some situations, as intrastate conflicts.

In dealing with complexity, Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch establishes three basic kinds of military failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt due to their linear orientation.²²⁰ Such line of thought is critical to influential linear formulations such as Lykke Equation (see chapter 3, page 29), because they overemphasize the role of individual addends for the sum. This section presents models and ideas of how military planners may deal with complexity.

3.3.3.1 Boyd and the OODA Loop

In military literature, strategist and USAF Colonel John Boyd’s “OODA Loop” is perhaps the most known model to deal with complexity.²²¹ Boyd developed the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop after his experience as a fighter pilot during the Korean War. It was conceived as a process by which individuals or organizations react to an event. According to this idea, the key is to be able to create situations wherein one can make appropriate decisions more quickly than one’s opponent.²²² The OODA loop is a practical concept designed to be the foundation of thinking in complex or chaotic situations. It is a loop because the action changes the environment, which requires that the observe, orient, and decide steps of the process be repeated. Ideally, the progressive improvement of the orientation and the consequential

²²⁰ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990): 59-164, 229-230, 233-243.

²²¹ Diane Hendrick, “Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications,” *University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, working paper 17* (2009), 16.

²²² John R. Boyd, *A Discourse on Winning and Losing* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2018).

action results in getting closer to reality.²²³ As Frans Osinga points out, Boyd adopted the thoughts of many of the same authors that outlined complex systems approaches.²²⁴ Each of these approaches helps conceptualize the process that individuals and groups go through, to move from being acted upon by the environment, to acting on the environment.




Figure 11. OODA Cycle.

Source: created by the author based on John R. Boyd, *A Discourse on Winning and Losing*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2018.

The *observe* and *orient* steps provide a pathway for the external to interact with the internal. During the observe stage, the agent is drawing information in from the environment, including direct and indirect information gathered through the senses. The second step is about transforming information into knowledge, by combing data with the cognitive schemas, heuristics, and other mental frameworks. The orientation phase is the point that historical influences of socialization, including culture and experience, merge with individual experience and historical knowledge. Filtering interactions through analysis and synthesis allows an individual to make a choice on what action to take on the environment. Therefore, the observe and orient steps help establishing what

²²³ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 194.

²²⁴ Osinga, *Science, Strategy and War*.

the individual believes to be appropriate expectations for their environmental conditions.

It is the *combined* effect of the individual's observation of the world and their social contextualization of those observations' significance that establish the strength and orientation of expectancy. The environment affects expectations. During observation, the probabilistic nature of the environment and perceptual limitations can lead to information bias. Even in rational agents, the inability to process the multiplicity of interactions relevant to a particular situation extends uncertainty into a given system. Furthermore, even if obtaining and processing all relevant data were possible, limitations of the mind emerge through psychological biases caused by cognitive processes, affective processes, learning, and cultural influences.²²⁵ While these biases toward self and social confirming hypotheses may be self-defeating to an individual, they still represent a winning adaption plan to the group, due to the power of parallel iteration of individuals.²²⁶ True learning is inherently social and causes the dynamics of groups.

The lasting importance of Boyd's work lay in the focus on disrupting the enemy's decision-making, encouraging uncertainty and confusion. Boyd was showing that instead of searching for "laws" to match those developed by Newtonian physics, it was now necessary to make sense of new forms of theory which challenged concepts of systems tending to equilibrium and pointed instead to chaos.²²⁷ In the OODA Loop model, advantage is achieved to whichever side can complete the OODA cycle faster.

²²⁵ Dominic D. P. Johnson, *Failing to Win Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 38.

²²⁷ Freedman, *Strategy: A History*, 198.




Figure 12. Colonel John Boyd's OODA loop.

Source: Diane Hendrick, "Complexity Theory and Conflict Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications," *University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, working paper 1* (2009), 16, accessed 9 March 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242533461_Complexity_Theory_and_Conflict_Transformation_An_Exploration_of_Potential_and_Implications.

3.3.3.2 The Cynefin Framework

In 1999, David J. Snowden developed a framework named *Cynefin* to help planners and decision-makers in identifying how they perceived situations and make sense of the environment's behavior. *Cynefin* is a Welsh word that signifies the multiple factors in the environment and experience that influence people in ways they can never understand.²²⁸ The model is a sense-making framework originated in the practice of knowledge management as a means of distinguishing between formal and informal communities, and as a means of talking about the interaction of both with structured processes and uncertain conditions.²²⁹ The *Cynefin* framework challenges the universality of three basic assumptions prevalent in organizational decision support and strategy: assumption of order, of rational choice, and of intent.

²²⁸ C.F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, "The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a Complex and Complicated World," *IBM Systems Journal*, vol. 42, no 3 (2003), 462.

²²⁹ Kurtz and Snowden, "The New Dynamics of Strategy," 468.

The assumption of rational order states that there is an underlying relationship between cause and effect in environment's interactions, which are capable of discovery and empirical verification. This means that it would be possible to visualize solutions in advance and act accordingly to each situation. An identification of the casual links in past situations allows planners to define "best practices" for future scenarios. The assumption of rational choice means that humans make choices based only on the duality of pain and pleasure; and in consequence their behavior can be managed by manipulation and education. Finally, the assumption of intent of intentional capability sustains that the acquisition of a capability indicates the intent to purposely use that capability and then future actions are result of intentional behavior. The model sorts the issues facing decision-makers into five environments or contexts defined by the nature of the relationship between cause and effect. Four of them – simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic – require decision-makers to understand the situation and act in appropriate ways. The fifth – disorder – applies when it is not clear which of the four contexts is predominant.²³⁰

The simple context is the domain of "best practices," built based on past experiences. Simple environments are characterized by stability and clear cause and effect relationships in which the right answer is self-evident and undisputed. Here, decision-makers sense, categorize, and respond. Heavily bureaucratic situations, such as loan payment processing, are often simple in context. Although simple, problems can arise in this environment if, for instance, issues are incorrectly classified or are oversimplified. Additionally, when things appear to be going smoothly, decision-

²³⁰ David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, "A Leader's Framework for Decision Making," *Harvard Business Review* (November 2007), accessed 2 October 2020, <https://hbr.org/2007/11/a-leaders-framework-for-decision-making>.

makers may become satisfied with the current situation and negligent with changing. They are likely to miss the evolving situation, reacting too late or wrongly.²³¹

The complicated domain is the field of multiple right answers for a clear cause and effect situation. If tasks in simple context are sense, categorize, and respond, those in a complicated are sense, analyze, and respond. Specialized assessment is often necessary to diagnose the problem. In complicated contexts, the possibility of several possible solutions calls for “good practices” instead of best ones. Entrained thinking is the trap here. Also, suggestion from nonexperts may be overlooked or rejected, resulting in tunnel vision and loss of opportunities.

Both in simple and complicated contexts at least one right answer exists. In complex environments, however, solutions are not evident. Engines are complicated. They can be taken apart, assessed, and reassembled by an expert. The engine is the sum of its parts. It is a linear logic. On the other hand, a rainforest is in constant change and it is more than the sum of its parts. In this domain actions are intended to probe, then sense, and finally respond. Instead of attempting to impose a course of action, the idea is to allow an emergent pattern to reveal itself. Challenges in the complex domain are related to the temptation to fall back into traditional command-and-control management styles, demanding fail-safe plans with defined end states. Decision-makers may become impatient and insecure as they do not seem to be achieving the desired solution. They may also find it difficult to tolerate failure, which is an essential aspect of experimental understanding. In complex environments, solutions are local and unique. Successful plans are prepared to set the stage, step back a bit, allow patterns to emerge, and determine which ones are desirable have good chances to achieve a position of advantage.

²³¹Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making.”

For greater understanding, the debate requires differentiation between the terms complicated and complex. This is because in some documents and papers regarding UN peace operations, it is not noticeably clear in which sense the term “complex” is used. Complexity creates a new and emergent properties. While the term ‘complicated system’ also has many moving parts, it does not produce new or emergent features within the environment. Complexity creates an unpredictable outcome whereas complicated systems generate a predictable outcome.²³²




Figure 13. Complex Vs Complicated System.

Source: created by the author inspired by the Cynefin framework.

In a chaotic context, searching for right answers is pointless. The environment shifts constantly, and no manageable patterns exist. The immediate job in a chaotic context is not to discover patterns but to act, then sense, and finally respond. Act to establish some sort of order. Sense to identify where stability is present and from where it is absent. Respond by working to transform the situation from chaos to complexity. Rapid top-down flow of communication is imperative. In chaotic environments, there is no time to wait for feedback. In this sense, complexity is different than chaos. Chaos deals with situations

²³² Axelrod and Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity*, 15.

that rapidly become highly disordered and unmanageable. Complexity deals with interdependent agents. While complex systems may be hard to predict, they often have a good deal of structure and permit improvement by thoughtful intervention.²³³




Figure 14. Cynefin Framework.

Source: C. F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a Complex and Complicated World,” *IBM Systems Journal*, Vol 42 (2003), 468.

Linear thinking assumes that through the study of physical conditions, general rules can be derived that can be empirically verified and that create a body of reliable knowledge which can then be developed and expanded. This is not possible in complex environments. In the space of unorder the seeds of such patterns can be perceived, and new ways of thinking can emerge. Kurtz and Snowden reference the case of a group of West Point graduates who were asked to manage the playtime of a kindergarten as a final year assignment. They rationally identified objectives, determined backup, and prepared response plans. They tried to “order” children’s play based on rational design principles, and, in consequence, achieved chaos. Later, by observing the experienced

²³³ Ibid., xv

teachers, they realized that a degree of freedom was allowed at the start of the session and then teachers intervened to stabilize desirable patterns and destabilize undesirable ones.²³⁴

3.3.3.3 Australian Army Adaptive Campaigning

Based on its experience in fighting insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Australian Army developed, in September 2009, a novel approach to land force operations called *Adaptive Campaigning: Army's Future Operating Concept*. It states that complex intrastate conflict will be an enduring feature, and the most common form in the period to 2030. Thus, adaptability will be essential quality for the Australian Army to be effective.²³⁵ The document mentions that, traditionally, the military has conducted deliberate planning to reach a solution prior to interacting with the problem; the longer the planning prior to an operation, the more chances of success. Nevertheless, this approach disregards the complexities and adaptive nature of the current operational environment where the military is only one of the several lines of efforts in a whole of government approach to resolving conflicts.

²³⁴ Kurtz and Snowden, "The New Dynamics of Strategy," 466.

²³⁵ Australian Army, *Army's Future Land Operating Concept* (Canberra, AU: Australian Army Headquarters, 2009), 16.




Figure 15. Adaptive Campaigning.

Source: Australian Army, *Army's Future Land Operating Concept* (Canberra, AU: Australian Army Headquarters, 2009), 28.

According to the manual, Adaptive Campaigning consists of five mutually reinforcing and interdependent efforts that represent a philosophical conceptual framework to deal with complexity, as follows:

1. **Joint Land Combat** - actions to defeat organized resistance and secure the environment in order to set and sustain the conditions required for the other lines of operation.
2. **Population Protection** - actions to provide protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions to establish order and the rule of law
3. **Information Actions** - actions that inform and shape the perceptions, attitudes, behavior, and understanding of target population groups; assure the quality of our own information; while attempting to disrupt or dislocate enemy command capabilities.
4. **Population Support** - actions to relieve immediate human suffering by establishing, restoring, or temporarily replacing necessary essential services in affected communities. By doing so these actions seek to positively influence the population and their perceptions.
5. **Indigenous Capacity Building** - actions to nurture the establishment of capacity within civil communities whilst simultaneously working to establish longer term governance and socio-economic capacity which meets the needs of the people. This may include micro financial initiatives, local and central government reform – security, police, legal, financial, and administrative systems.²³⁶

²³⁶ Australian Army, *Army's Future Land Operating Concept*, 28.

Inspired by John Boyd’s OODA Loop and the *Cynefin* framework, the document proposes the so-called “Adaption Cycle.” Its intended result is a broad understanding of complex situations as well as an enhanced capacity to deal with them, the ability to learn at all levels, and an understanding of when adaptation is needed. It addresses complex problems through experience, knowledge, and planning, enhancing that understanding through interaction and explicitly drawing out the requirements to learn and adapt, individually and organizationally.²³⁷



Figure 16. Australian Army Adaptation Cycle.

Source: Australian Army, *Army’s Future Land Operating Concept* (Canberra, AU: Australian Army Headquarters, 2009), 31.

The four steps in the cycle are mutually reinforcing phases of the process. Act is the first step and aims to stimulate a response based on the current understanding of the environment. Sense observes and interprets the changes resulted by the Action Phase, while providing feedback of such actions. Decide leverages the Sense Phase to make a decision on how and when to adapt; this step considers several levels, including

²³⁷ Australian Army Headquarters, *Adaptive Campaigning: The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting* (Canberra, Australia: Future Land Warfare Branch, Australian Army HQ, 2007), 31.

problem hypothesis and strategy. The Adapt Phase means managing the change through a new level of understanding that challenges current perceptions and implements evolution.²³⁸

As in the OODA Loop and the *Cynefin* framework, the ‘Adaption Cycle’ can be defined as a continuous, iterative, and multilayered process that provides a framework for incorporating learning and achieving adaptation. However, based on the categorization provided by the *Cynefin* Framework, it seems that the Adaption Cycle was conceived to deal both with chaotic and complex systems, as ‘Act’ is the first action followed by sense, decide, and adapt. Snowden recognized that boundaries in the *Cynefin* Framework are sometimes artificial and real-life environments may behave in more than one categorization at the same time.

3.3.3.4 Design Thinking

Jamshid Gharajedaghi defines design thinking as the ability of human beings to visualize and create new alternatives, dealing with the issues of interdependency, adaptation, and choice all at the same time.²³⁹ Bryan Lawson goes in the same direction when asserting that design thinking is a sophisticated mental process capable of blending many kinds of information into a coherent set of ideas and finally generating some acceptable solution.²⁴⁰

Dealing with complex adaptive systems requires tools, techniques, and approaches not available in the ordinary military detailed planning process toolbox. In the United States Army doctrine design thinking resulted from a recognition that

²³⁸ Australian Army, *Army’s Future Land Operating Concept*, 32-34.

²³⁹ Gharajedaghi, *System Thinking*, 133-134.

²⁴⁰ Bryan Lawson, *How Designers Think: The Design Process Demystified* (Amsterdam, ND: Architectural Press, 2006)14, 109.

commanders and staffs had difficulty in understanding complex situations. This difficulty led them to develop solutions that addressed symptoms of problems rather than problem causes.²⁴¹ Thus, design methodology applies critical and creative thinking within the Operations Process to understand, visualize, and describe problems and approaches in complex situations. It can be an approach to cope with complex, ill-defined problems, which makes it a distinct process from an analytical method for solving complicated problems.²⁴² The U.S. Army's design methodology recognizes three cognitive spaces - the environmental, the problem, and the solution spaces. The environmental space is concerned with making sense of the context. In the problem space, planners use creative activity to define the nature of the problem and devise potential outcomes. The solution space leverages convergent thinking and synthesis to develop a solution in the form of a design concept.




Figure 17. U.S. Army Design Methodology.

Source: United States Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 5-1.

²⁴¹ United States Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), v.

²⁴² United States Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012).

Michael Arena goes in the same direction. He argues that critical and creative thinking is only possible in what he called *Adaptive Space*. According to him, an *Adaptive Space* is the freedom for ideas to flow into and throughout an organization. The author affirms that new ideas arise when people are free to openly exchange perspectives. Arena says that the exchanging of perspectives depends on a *4D integration*, consisted of discovery, development, diffusion, and disruption cycles. At the discovery and development cycles, connections between different teams are fostered to discover and trigger novel ideas. During the diffusion cycle, the *Adaptive Space* enables interactions of concepts across the organization for broader diffusion and get feedbacks from the lower levels. Finally, at the disruption cycle new solutions are endorsed into actions and these actions are evaluated by sensing reactions across the system.²⁴³ John L. Gaddis sees critical thinkers as better planners at “figuring out the contradictory dynamics of evolving situation, more circumspect about their forecasting prowess, more accurate in recalling mistakes, less prone to rationalize those mistakes, more likely to update their beliefs in a timely fashion, and better positioned to affix realistic probabilities in the next round of events.”²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Michael J. Arena, *Adaptive Space*, 8, 12, 21-25.

²⁴⁴ Gaddis, *Grand Strategy*, 9.




Figure 18. Adaptive Space in Complex Adaptive Environments.
 Source: created by the author inspired by Michal L. Arena, Adaptive Space.

To understand an issue, planners need to put the problem into context. Establishing context involves discerning the relationships of an idea, event, or situation and its surrounding. In this sense, framing the operational environment aims to understand what is going on and why and what the future operational environment should look like. It is an exercise of critical and creative thinking developed by a group to represent the current conditions of the operational environment and what the operational environment should look like at the conclusion of an operation.²⁴⁵

Gharajedaghi presents a sense-making model to understanding environments and organizing processes. It consists of a pattern of holistic and iterative inquiry into the context, function, structure, and process of a system.

²⁴⁵ US Army, ATP 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology*, 1-4.




Figure 19. Holistic Process of Inquiry.

Source: Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking*, 2011.

The author emphasizes that understanding the whole requires understanding structure, function, context, and process at the same time. They represent four aspects of the same thing and with the containing environment form a complementary set. Function defines the outcomes or results produced, structure defines components and their relationships, process explicitly defines the sequence of activities and the know-how required to produce the outcome, and context defines the unique environment in which the system is situated. Each cycle of context, function, structure, and process is called iteration. After each iteration, a pause is necessary to synthesize the information into a whole. Interaction is the key to understanding complexity. Iterations of structure, function, and process in each context examine assumptions and properties of each element in its own right, then in relationship with other members of the set. Subsequent iterations would establish validity of the assumptions and successively produce an understanding of the whole.

Gharajedaghi provides an example of how to apply his model to appreciate the heart in the context of the body. Starting with the function, the output of the system is

circulation of the blood; therefore, its function must be that of a pump. The structure of this pump consists of four muscular chambers and a set of valves, arteries, and veins. And the process, which must explain *how* the structure produces the function, simply uses alternating cycles of contractions and expansions of the chambers to push the blood through arteries and then pull it back into the chambers through the veins by suction. After the first iteration, a pause is necessary to understand function, structure, and process together to appreciate *why* the heart does what it does. By placing the heart in the context of the larger system of which it is a part, planners may conclude that the heart is at the core of a circulatory system. The purpose of the circulatory system is to exchange matter and energy between the body and its environment.




Figure 20. Understanding the Heart as a System.

Source: Gharajedaghi, *Systems Thinking*, 2011.

Design thinking is not an end in itself. It is simply a tool that helps reach a non-optimal, although acceptable solution to a problem as formulated during the design process. The essence of methodological approach to design hinges on the concept of cognitive space. Conceived as a useful tool to organize information and intellectual processes in broader terms than a frame does, the cognitive space encompasses both

actors –the social element– and relational dynamics amongst them –the cognitive element.²⁴⁶The cognitive space represents a potential trigger for organizing processes, as it serves practical purposes. It confines thinking processes but does not strictly bound intellectual activities.

One of the major dilemmas that planners must address relates to the terms in which they define the mission’s desired end state. The more specifically this end state is defined, the easier all subsequent actions are programmed and implemented. At the same time, this clear end state will make it more difficult to deal with the inevitable uncertainty and change that will occur in the process. Frank Knight defines uncertainty as “characterized by a decision-making context in which probability distributions on outcomes were not or could not be known with assurance at the time of choice.”²⁴⁷Clausewitz sees uncertainty as one of the characteristics of military activity. He states that in war all actions take place in “a kind of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”²⁴⁸

It is surprising however to note that uncertainty plays a subordinate role or is even nonexistent in some influential military land doctrines, such as the American and Brazilian doctrines. These doctrines do not demand that a planner pay due consideration to the topic of uncertainty and therefore provides no tools to deal with it. Consequentially, planning methodologies in both countries are still heavily influenced by scientific reasoning approaches based on linear, tactical-focused, and top-down

²⁴⁶ Peter J. Peverelli, *Creating Corporate Space: In Search of Chinese Corporate Identity* (Amsterdam, ND: Vrije Universiteit, 2004), 11.

²⁴⁷ Frank Knight, *Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit* (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, The Riverside Press, 1921), 199.

²⁴⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 119, 147.

processes to present options for decision-makers. One of the major consequences of this influence is the idea of “end state.” Brazilian Army Field Manual EB70-MC-10.223, “*Operations*,” sees military power as part of a unified action to defeat adversaries and create conditions to reach campaign’s desired end state. In this sense, strategic planners must, among other things, identify a desired end state that represents final victory.²⁴⁹ In other words, force, if applied in a rational and methodical way, win conflicts.

Following the same thinking, the United States Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*, focuses on best-estimate predictions of the future, which requires an environment with a low degree of uncertainty. Analysts assemble available evidence into best-estimate predictions of the future and then use models and tools to suggest the best strategy given these predictions.²⁵⁰ These approaches work well when the predictions are accurate and not controversial. However, one of the disadvantages of this approach is that it starts once the threat or enemy is known. It does not consider unknown threats or unknown opportunities in the planning process.

There are options to deal with uncertainty. Yakov Ben-Haim proposes an info-gap theory for modeling and managing severe uncertainty. It relies on the principle of robust satisficing. The principle of satisficing is one in which the planner is not aiming at best outcomes or minimizing worst outcomes; instead, the goal is to achieve an outcome that is possible based on three steps. The first step is getting environment awareness. During the second step, possible goals are identified. Finally, in the third step, planners identify those aspects of the first two steps—the knowledge and the goals—

²⁴⁹ Brazilian Army. EB70-MC-10.223, *Operations*, 2-1, 2-18.

²⁵⁰ United States Joint Chief of Staff, P 5-0, *Joint Planning*, G-1.

that are uncertain, about which we might be wrong or ignorant. The critical question is how large an error can be tolerated? Furthermore, the question is not “what is the best outcome?” but rather “what is the most robust plan for achieving possible outcomes.”²⁵¹

Hayward offers a possible solution to this dilemma with his definition of ‘zone of tolerance.’ This concept defines an area which represents our systemic understanding bounded by our values and desires in relation to the environment; what is tolerated goes inside, and the intolerable remains outside.²⁵² In the face of uncertainty, definition of this basin of attraction as the zone of tolerance must be the preferred approach to define objectives, instead of a well-defined, unambiguous, long-term end state. In addition, the basin of attraction serves as a multidimensional intellectual construct to help plan and implement the interventions of all sorts that the process requires to bring the military to the ‘desired basin of attraction.’

Design thinking may also suit as a facilitator to achieve cooperation and common understanding amongst agencies, organizations, and hierarchies inside and outside the military. The endeavor of using force in UN peace operations, which implies multiple agents and relationships cooperating in a synergistic manner, is an ideal field to apply Design thinking. Additionally, a great number of the problems current peacekeepers must tackle fall under complexity, derived from the conflicts’ inherent nature as a social system. Furthermore, they are ill-structured problems of social policy that traditional scientific approaches are unable to confront, but that military planners have to address based on judgment to reach an adequate solution, not an optimal,

²⁵¹ Yakov Ben-Haim, “Thinking Strategically: Dealing with Uncertainty in Strategic Decision-making,” *Parameters*, 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2015): 66, 67.

²⁵² Edward Hayward, *Planning Beyond Tactics: Towards a Military Application of the Philosophy of Design in the Formulation of Strategy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 21.

definite one.²⁵³ Ill-defined problems have characteristics that include difficulties in agreeing on a starting hypothesis and desired end state. Thus, effective planning process requires learning to improve techniques, adjust solutions, and refining problem structure to find the possible solution.

3.3.4 Summary

This part of the literature review sustained the thesis that complexity dominates the operational environment where peacekeepers are currently deployed. Thus, it argued that Complexity Theory is instrumental for the use of force in modern UN peace operations. Complexity provides the basis for understanding self-reinforcing interdependent actions among adaptive entities and show how such interactions creates creativity, learning, adaptability, and change.

Even though complexity is widely mentioned in the UN peace operations literature, there is no official document within the organization that defines its meaning or presents guidelines of how to deal with complex environments. In this sense, planners and decision makers have largely used the scientific, linear, tactical-focused, and top-down detailed planning process from war experiences of the past two centuries to cope with the challenges presented by the current environment. As complex adaptive systems, intrastate conflicts for instance, cannot be quantified, isolated, or precisely measured, the result is unpredictability in accurate force ratio, inexplicable reactions, and the collapse of strategies. Through the lens of complexity, intrastate conflicts are better perceived as an evolving activity between interacting fluids of self-organized

²⁵³ Horst W. Rittel, and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences vol.4* (1973), 160.

hierarchies. Patterns emerge from this evolving activity that emphasize survival. In the effort for survival, locally unanticipated emergent behavior emerges.

Different processes, frameworks and techniques were presented to deal with complexity. Generally, these structures focus on the ability to learn, adapt, and orient in an environment of continuous change. Additionally, they emphasize decentralized control and execution as critical to identify emergent opportunities locally and act preemptively. Finally, the processes presented in this chapter changes the idea of a strategy designed to achieve a well-defined end state. In complex adaptive system, use of force is an endless process in a continuously shifting environment.

4. MONUSCO: THE SEVEN YEARS WAR

MONUSCO was chosen for analysis because it was the first time in the UN history a peacekeeping force was assigned to execute offensive operations to neutralize spoilers to the peace process. It is both a unique case and a test of theory. The mission has been used as a laboratory for new approaches including use of force. The chapter analyzes how MONUSCO has used force since 2013. In the light of this objective, three criteria were chosen as described in Chapter 2: (1) MONUSCO's ability to deter violence against civilians; (2) implementation of the FIB's mandated key task: to neutralize armed groups in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by them on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC; and (3) capability to adapt. In this sense, the chapter will first describe the operational environment in the DRC. Second, it will provide an overview of MONUSCO's background and features. Finally, the chapter will discuss military power as employed by MONUSCO based on deterrence and complexity theories.

4.1 THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)

Located in the central sub-Saharan region of Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is the second largest country in the continent, with an area of 2,267,048 km² divided among 26 provinces. The estimated total population is 85,281,024, with roughly 40% living in urban areas.²⁵⁴ Kinshasa is the major city and capital, located in the western side of the country and with a population of more than 12 million people.²⁵⁵

²⁵⁴ The World Bank, "The World Bank in the DRC: Overview," 20 April 2019, accessed 16 December 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>.

²⁵⁵ World's Capital Cities, "Capital Facts for Kinshasa, DR Congo," accessed 25 April 2019, https://www.worldscapitalcities.com/capital_facts_for_kinshasa_dr_congo/.

Although MONUSCO is the biggest UN mission ever deployed, the number of UN troops is still modest given the size of the country and the dispersion of the population.



Figure 21. The DRC.

Source: Maps Zaire, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo,” accessed 29 October 2020, <https://maps-zaire.com/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-map>.

The DRC is currently a presidential republic. It became independent from Belgium in 1960. From 1971 until 1997, it was called “Zaire;” following the First Congo War, the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The DRC is remarkably diverse in ethnicity and language. The country is home of several ethnic groups which in turn speak many different dialects. Congo’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranks 103rd among the world largest economies. In 2018, the GDP reached \$ 47.32 billion dollars, in which mining alone accounts for almost 40%. The main exported minerals are copper, cobalt, gold, diamonds, coltan, zinc, tin, and tungsten. Although extremely rich in mineral resources, the DRC displays low levels

of development.²⁵⁶ The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (nominal) is \$542, and the Human Development Index (HDI) is 0.470, ranking 176th out of 187 countries.²⁵⁷ Low development creates even more challenges for the UN, as the organization has to deal not only with conflict management and resolution but also with a variety of health security issues. Moreover, Paul Collier argues that countries which have a substantial share of their income (GDP) coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at risk of conflict.²⁵⁸

History, geography, and economy have affected the DRC government's ability to project authority over its territory. In *Colonialism in Africa: Its Impact and Significance*, A. Adu Boahen addresses the legacies that colonialism bequeath to Africa as well as its significances to the continent. The author emphasizes that the new geopolitical set-up that emerged created far more problems than it solved. Many of the states that emerged were artificial creations, and this artificiality created a number of problems that bedevil the development of the continent. One of the most important is the fact that some of these boundaries cut across pre-existing ethnic groups, communities, and kingdoms causing widespread social disruption and displacement. For instance, the Bakongo are found divided by the boundaries of Angola, Belgian

²⁵⁶ The World Bank, "The World Bank in the DRC: Overview," accessed 5 October 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>.

²⁵⁷ The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. It was created to emphasize that people and their capabilities should be the ultimate criteria for assessing the development of a country, not economic growth alone. United Nation, *Human Development Reports: Congo* (New York, NY: United Nations Development Program, 2018), accessed 05 October 2020, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD>.

²⁵⁸ Paul Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy," *Oxford University Department of Economics Report* (April 2006), 9-10, accessed 15 March 2020, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.460.9440&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

Congo (now the DRC), French Congo (now Congo) and Gabon. In addition, the artificiality and arbitrariness of the colonial divisions meant the states that emerged were of different sizes with unequal natural resources and economic potentialities. While some states have very rich natural resources such as Ghana, Zambia, the DRC, Ivory Coast and Nigeria, others such as Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda have not been so fortunate. Finally, while some states have borders with only one other state to police, others such as the DRC have as ten, a situation which poses serious problems of ensuring national security and curbing smuggling.

Boahen goes on to explain that a product of colonialism which has turned out to be crucial and fundamental importance was a full-time or standing army. He demonstrated that pre-colonial African states south of the Sahara did not have standing armies. In most cases, there was not a dichotomy between civilians and soldiers. Rather, all adult males, even members of the ruling aristocracy, became soldiers in times of war and civilians in times of peace. According to Boahen, one of the most novel institutions introduced by the colonial ruler was the professional army. These armies were originally created for the conquest and occupation of Africa, then for the maintenance of colonial control, and, finally, for the prosecution of global wars and the suppression of independence movements in Africa. After the overthrow of the colonial rulers, these armies were not disbanded but were taken over by the new independent African rulers and they have turned out to be the most problematic of the products of colonialism since armed forces have operated in the longer term against the stability of the ex-colonies.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁹ A. Adu Boahen, "Colonialism in Africa: Its Impact and Significance," in A. Adu Boahen ed., *General history of Africa: Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880-1935* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), 784-789.

Jeffrey Herbst in *States and Power in Africa* highlights that because colonial rule was designed to benefit European countries, power in the African possessions was concentrated towards the ocean. Little or nothing was done to control the interior; a colonial regime had no interest in developing an extensive administrative network due to high costs. This is the case of the DRC, where the capital Kinshasa is located close to the coast, while most the underdeveloped and problematic areas are in the eastern side of the country, miles away from the coastline. Moreover, African politicians in general equate their political survival with appeasing their urban population, not that of the rural interior.²⁶⁰ In addition to its rural character and large size, the relatively low population density in the DRC means that it is expensive to exert control because resources have to be dispersed, rather than concentrated. The geography of the Democratic Republic of the Congo makes it unusually hard for government forces to control because the population lives around the fringes of a huge area, with the three main cities in the extreme west, extreme southeast and extreme north. Economically, underdevelopment impedes the DRC's ability to build necessary transportation and communication infrastructure. (See Figure 22.)

²⁶⁰ Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15-17, 62.




Figure 22. Transportation Infrastructure in the DRC.

Source: Julian Keane, BBC World news, “Waiting in vain for a train in DR Congo”, 24 November 2011, accessed 10 January 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15859686>.

Transportation infrastructure is key when analyzing the state’s capability to exert its authority, and roads in particular are the most efficient instrument for projecting military power.²⁶¹ In the DRC, of 95,378 miles of roads, only 1,793 miles are paved. In terms of railways, there are around 2,485 miles of narrow-gauge track in poor condition.²⁶² Moreover, while Goma, the main urban economic hub in the eastern side of the DRC, is a distant 997 miles from Kinshasa, it is located only 100 miles away from Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, and 350 miles from Kampala, the capital of Uganda. Thus, the local population may be more subject to the influence of Rwanda and Uganda than to Kinshasa. The lack of ground transportation infrastructure also impacts the UN’s ability to monitor, verify, and implement the terms of any peace agreement. In addition,

²⁶¹ Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, 84.

²⁶² Julian Keane, “Waiting in vain for a train in DR Congo,” BBC World News, 24 November 2011, accessed 10 January 2020, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15859686>.

poor road conditions during the rainy season makes the UN dependent on air assets to move troops across the country.

The DRC has faced several internal conflicts since 1960. Some of them escalated to the regional level due to the interference of neighbor countries and extracontinental powers, such as the USA and the USSR. The eastern provinces, particularly South and North Kivu, Ituri, Haut-Uele, Tanganyika, and Katanga, are the most unstable regions. They are the home of several different ethnic groups and have received large numbers of refugees over time due to the numerous and violent conflicts in the Great Lakes Region, such as the Burundian and Rwandan Civil Wars of 1993 and 1994, respectively. The International Organization for Migration estimates that currently there are over 1.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern DRC.²⁶³ The historical background has shaped UN's stabilization efforts because in the first decade of post-conflict, societies face roughly double the risk of conflict resurgence. Post-conflict societies may have no tradition of conducting their political conflict non-violently and rebel organizations usually maintain their effectiveness during the post-conflict period.²⁶⁴

4.2 A FLASH BRIEFING ON THE UN OPERATIONS IN THE DRC

The UN presence in the DRC can be divided in three distinct periods. In the first period, from July 1960 to June 1964, the United Nations Operations in Congo (French: *Opération des Nations Unies au Congo*, or ONUC) deployed peacekeepers to deal with internal security following the DRC's independence from Belgium. The operation is

²⁶³ United Nations, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo," International Organization for Migration, accessed 25 April 2019, https://www.iom.int/countries/democratic_republic_congo.

²⁶⁴ Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy," 19-20.

viewed as an exception when compared to the Cold War era peacekeeping operations. During that time, UN peacekeeping missions were basically deployed in the last phase of conflict, when some sort of agreement between the parties had been already achieved.²⁶⁵ Although designed to perform “traditional” peacekeeping, ONUC carried out tasks that differed little from large-scale-combat operations and, ultimately, became the most violent peacekeeping mission conducted by the UN during the Cold War era. For instance, Operation Morthor, which took place in the Katanga province from September 12 to 20, 1961, marked a temporary lapse from peacekeeping into peace enforcement. It was a pre-emptive UN offensive operation to address the Katanga secession, involving significant use of force. As a result, 127 peacekeepers died in action and another 133 were wounded.²⁶⁶

Trevor Findlay, when analyzing the use of force in ONUC, identified ten lessons to learn for future UN operations. Among these lessons, one is strictly connected to deterrence. Military capability of peace operations should match the expectations of their mandates. In Findlay’s point of view, ONUC needed better military capabilities to carry out more assertive actions than an observation role. The author further states that a major reason for having a militarily capable force is deterrence. The more powerful the force the greater the deterrent and the less likely the force will be used. The force needs to be designed for both most likely and most dangerous scenarios in order to maintain “escalation dominance.”²⁶⁷ Findlay states that in ONUC some of the

²⁶⁵ Jessica Di Salvatore and Andrea Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017), 17.

²⁶⁶ United Nation, “ONUC: Facts and figures,” United Nations Mission in Congo, accessed 28 April 2019, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/onucB.htm>.

²⁶⁷ Findlay. *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations*, 378.

fighting could be avoided if the weakness of the UN military force had not encouraged the parties to commit acts of violence.²⁶⁸

The second phase began in the end of the 1990's and is linked to the First and the Second Congolese Wars (1996-97 and 1998-2003, respectively). The two wars were a culmination of interconnected conflicts at the local and regional levels.²⁶⁹ The regime change in Rwanda that followed the 1994 genocide sparked a massive influx of ethnic Tutsis and Hutus refugees, including some of its perpetrators, into what was then eastern Zaire. Hutus soon controlled access to mines and weapons and started fighting Tutsi refugees, as well as launching attacks against Rwandan forces from eastern Zairean territory. In retaliation, the Rwandan government, aided by Uganda, began training Tutsi militias within Zairean territory. A Tutsi-led insurgency began in 1996. The rebellion managed to mobilize the Congolese population and, eventually, the Tutsis took power in 1997, renaming the country as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).²⁷⁰

The new government proved to be disappointingly similar to the former, marked by corruption and economic stagnancy. Moreover, it was unable to stabilize the ethnic tension in eastern DRC.²⁷¹ In 1998, a rebellion known as the Second Congo War began against the new government and seized large areas of eastern DRC. Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe supported the DRC government while Uganda and Rwanda

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 83-84.

²⁶⁹ Denis M. Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War," *International Peacekeeping* 16, no. 2 (2009): 216.

²⁷⁰ United Nations, "MONUC Background," accessed 25 April 2019, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/background.shtml>.

²⁷¹ Erik Kennes, "The Democratic Republic of the Congo: structures of greed, networks of need," *Rethinking the Economics of War. The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed* (2005): 140-77.

were backing the rebels. As the situation escalated from national to regional level, the UNSC called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC, urging bordering states not to interfere and aggravate the situation. In July 1999, the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement that brought an end to the hostilities within the territory of the DRC²⁷²

Following the signature of the peace agreement, the UNSC, by its resolution 1279 of November 30, 1999 established the MONUC for an initial period until March 2000, to observe the ceasefire and disengagement of forces and maintain liaison with all parties to the Lusaka Agreement.²⁷³ The new presence of UN peacekeepers in the DRC can be better understood when divided by phases.²⁷⁴ Phase one was marked by the initial deployment of UN military liaison personnel to support the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. Phase two began in 2003, when the Transitional Government took the oath of office in accordance with the 2002 Pretoria Accord.²⁷⁵ The third phase of the UN operations started in 2009 with a more robust peacekeeping mandate in order to deal with the increasing instability promoted by armed groups in the eastern DRC.

²⁷² United Nations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), *Resolution 1258* (New York: United Nations Security Council, 6 August 1999), accessed 25 April 2019, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1258>.

²⁷³ United Nations, "MONUC Background," United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 25 April 2019, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/monuc/background.shtml>.

²⁷⁴ Global Peace Operations Review, *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Country Profile* (New York, NY: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2011), 26, accessed 25 April 2019, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/country-and-regional/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>.

²⁷⁵ The Pretoria Accord was an agreement made between Rwanda and the DRC in an attempt to bring about an end to the Second Congo War. Rwanda agreed to the withdrawal of the estimated 20,000 Rwandan troops from the DRC in exchange for international commitment towards the disarmament of the Hutu militias.

The Fourth and final phase began on May 28, 2010, when the UN mission was reframed as a stabilization mission by the UNSC Resolution 1925.²⁷⁶

Phase one began with the deployment of a small team of 90 military liaison officers, together with the civilian, political, humanitarian and administrative staff.²⁷⁷ There was no mention of the use of force by UN personnel, but only the traditional tasks of monitoring and observation of the peace agreement implementation. On February 24, 2000, however, concerned with the security and humanitarian situations in the country, the UNSC decided to expand MONUC's strength to 5,537 military personnel, including up to 500 observers. This new mandate highlighted that MONUC should act under Chapter VII, taking the necessary actions to protect UN personnel and installations as well as civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.²⁷⁸ Late 2002, MONUC gained some more teeth to accomplish its mission as the troop ceiling was boosted to 8,700 soldiers.²⁷⁹

MONUC's size and strength, however, did not deter violence against civilians, one of the key tasks of its mandate. In 2003, for instance, around 400 civilians were massacred in the presence of 700 UN peacekeepers in a city called Bunia, in the Ituri Province, eastern DRC. A year later, MONUC failed to prevent killings and human

²⁷⁶ Global Peace Operations Review, *Democratic Republic of the Congo: Country Profile* (New York, NY: New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2011), 27, accessed 25 April 2019, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/country-and-regional/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/>.

²⁷⁷ United Nations, *Resolution 1258* (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 6 August 1999), accessed 25 April 2019, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1258>.

²⁷⁸ United Nations, *Resolution 1291* (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 24 February 2000), accessed 25 April 2019, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1291>.

²⁷⁹ United Nations, *Resolution 1445* (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 4 December 2002), accessed 25 April 2019, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1445>.

rights violations when rebel forces led by a former RCD²⁸⁰ general occupied Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu.²⁸¹ MONUC was being tainted by a perception of impotence.²⁸² During that time, the UNSC tool of choice to deal with a deteriorating human rights situation was to broaden the concept of use of force by increasing the number of blue helmets and expanding their mandate. The existent gap between ambitions and political willingness to use force, however, remained huge.²⁸³ Thus, MONUC's strength continued to rise in an attempt to break the escalation of violence in the country. By 2008, it became the biggest and most expensive mission ever deployed by the UN with 18,434 uniformed personnel. Moreover, MONUC's mandate was at that time the most comprehensive and robust ever issued to a peacekeeping operation. However, despite the robust mandate, MONUC was surprisingly reluctant in the use of force.²⁸⁴

Although MONUC achieved some positive results in terms of preserving the independence and territorial integrity of the DRC as well as promoting the first free elections for over four decades in the country (2006), the mission was unable to protect people from violence perpetrated by rogue elements and militias, or to dismantle foreign armed groups.²⁸⁵ In this fashion, the general perception of failure about

²⁸⁰ Rally for Congolese Democracy is a political party and a former rebel group that operated in the eastern region of the DRC.

²⁸¹ Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 218.

²⁸² James Traub, "The Congo Case," *New York Times*, 3 July 2005, accessed 30 March 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/03/magazine/the-congo-case.html>.

²⁸³ , Katarina Månsson, "Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo," *International Peacekeeping*, vol 12, no. 4 (2005): 503.

²⁸⁴ Otto Spijkers, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo," *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, vol 19, no. 1-2 (2015): 112.

²⁸⁵ Sadiki Koko, "MONUC and the Quest for Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Assessment of a Peacekeeping Mission," *African Security Review*, vol 20, no. 2 (2011): 37.

MONUC's performance, according to Denis Tull, is rooted in conceptual and operational problems that relate to the use of force. Furthermore, equally important in analyzing MONUC's poor performance is to understand problems in interpreting and implementing the vague concept of robust peacekeeping and flaws in adapting strategies to a quickly changing situation. 286

S  verine Autesserre highlights that the conceptual problem regarding the use of force in MONUC is related to its reactive approach. In her point of view the UNSC resolutions related to MONUC interpreted protection of civilians in a very restrictive way. Protection was seen as a reaction to imminent threats, rather than deterrent actions to prevent such threats in the first place. Preventing conflicts was never explicitly mentioned in any of these resolutions. Therefore, preventive actions on the ground were rare, and normally they were no more than side-effects of programs unrelated to civilian protection²⁸⁷

This reluctance to use force and the conceptual understanding of its utility reflects the general idea that force should be undertaken only as a last resort. In order to stimulate the peaceful settlement of disputes and avoid any escalation of the conflict, decision-makers and military leaders had avoided using military power – despite the large deployment of military assets. In MONUC, the peacekeeping principle of “non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate” was interpreted as non-use of any force.

²⁸⁶ Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 216.

²⁸⁷ Autesserre, "The Responsibility to Protect in Congo," 33.

4.3 THE EARLY YEARS OF MONUSCO

On 28 May 2010, by resolution 1925, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) renamed MONUC as MONUSCO. The resolution is the milestone of the fourth phase of the UN deployment in the country. In general terms, the mission was expected to cooperate with the government of the DRC to protect civilians under threat and to stabilize and consolidate the peace. The mission was authorized to deploy a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units, in addition to the appropriated civilian, judiciary and correction components.²⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the mission reached the peak of its troops levels only after 2013, when figures reached around 19,000 soldiers.²⁸⁹ Figure 23 provides the data regarding UN authorized personnel versus actual personnel in the DRC between 1999 and 2017. The smaller the gap the greater the UNSC political commitment in providing military capabilities to the mission.

In its early years, MONUSCO seemed to suffer from the same issues as MONUC regarding the use of military force. Despite the fact MONUSCO was the largest mission in UN history, criticism of the mission's performance increased as rebel groups sized towns, increasing the number of IDPs and civilian casualties. For instance, in November 2012, the rebel group M23 took the capital of the North-Kivu Province, Goma, a commercial hub in eastern DRC. The seizure of Goma represented a strategic victory for the group and an embarrassment for MONUSCO.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ United Nations, *Resolution 1925* (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 28 May 2010), accessed 26 April 2019, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1925>.

²⁸⁹ Tull, "Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo," 223.

²⁹⁰ Global Peace Operations Review. *Democratic Republic of the Congo – Achieve Profile* (New York, NY: New York University Center for International Conflicts, 2014), accessed 26 April 2019, https://peaceoperationsreview.org/country-and-regional/democratic_republic_of_the_congo




Figure 23. MONUC/MONUSCO – Authorized Vs. Deployed Personnel.
 Source: New York University, “Uniformed Personnel on MONUC/MONUSCO, 1999-present” (New York, NY: Center on International Cooperation, 2017), accessed 30 March 2019, <https://peaceoperationsreview.org/featured-data#authorized>.

The impact of the seizure of Goma on MONUSCO’s credibility was great. According to *The New York Times*, “witnesses said United Nations peacekeepers sat in their armored personnel carriers and watched.”²⁹¹ In an interview to the BBC, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius called for MONUSCO’s mandate had to be altered to give it more powers. He assessed the seizure of Goma by the M23 in the presence of peacekeepers as “absurd.”²⁹² In December of the same year, two MONUSCO helicopters came under fire by M23 elements, the second time in less than thirty days that UN helicopters had been targeted.²⁹³ MONUSCO was struggling for

²⁹¹ Jeffrey Gettleman and Josh Kron, “Congo Rebels Seize Provincial Capital,” *The New York Times*, 20 Nov 2012, accessed 26 April 2019, at https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/21/world/africa/Congolese_rebels_reach_goma_reports_say.html.

²⁹² Gabriel Gatehouse, “Goma: M23 rebels capture DR Congo city.” *BBC*, 20 November 2012, accessed 26 April 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-20405739>.

²⁹³ Global Peace Operations Review. Democratic Republic of the Congo – Achieve Profile.

credibility. According to The Guardian, “critics of the UN performance had given the hashtag #MONUSELESS on Twitter.”²⁹⁴

Increasing insecurity during the first three years of MONUSCO can be expressed in numbers. As stated in Chapter 2, this work collected data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project to assess violence against civilians in eastern DRC. The data includes the number of attacks against civilians in the DRC as well as the number of fatalities caused by these attacks. In addition to violence against civilians, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) is going to be considered to provide an idea of the intensity and impact of violence towards the populace. The data on IDPs in the DRC was collected from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). By crossing the data of violence against civilians and the number of IDPs it will be possible to have a more accurate picture of the violence against civilians in the eastern DRC.

Figure 24 displays the number of attacks led by armed groups in eastern DRC as well as the number of fatalities within the populace. Between 2010 and 2012, the number of attacks increased four times and the fatalities doubled. This trend can be observed when analyzing the data regarding IDPs on figure 25. During the same period, there was a remarkable increase in the number of IDPs in the DRC.

²⁹⁴ Christoph Vogel, “Congo: Why the UN peacekeepers have a credibility problem,” *The Guardian*, 30 August 2013, accessed 30 April 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/30/congo_un_peacekeepers_problem.




Figure 24. Violence Against Civilians in the DRC, 2010-2012

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 May 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.




Figure 25. Conflict and Disaster Displacement Figures – DRC, 2010-2012.

Source: Created by author using data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Democratic Republic of the Congo”, accessed 10 January 2020, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo>.

The FDLR led the ranking of the major perpetrators of violence against civilians in the DRC between 2010 and 2012. The group was founded through an amalgamation of many ethnic Hutu groups in September 2000 and has been opposing the Tutsi influence in eastern DRC. The FDLR is one of the last factions of Rwandan genocidaires still active in the Congo. Although the number of violent attacks against civilians decreased from 2011 to 2012, the fatalities caused by these attacks almost doubled from 2011 to 2012. In 2012, the FDLR’s most violent attacks were executed

during the first six months. 100 out of 131 total casualties in 2012 resulted from attacks carried out between January and July 2012.




Figure 26. Violence Against Civilians Executed by Armed Groups.

Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.




Figure 27. Number of Fatalities Caused by Armed Groups Attacks.

Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

The M23 ranks second among the four groups analyzed in this work. The name is a reference to the 23 March 2009 peace agreement,²⁹⁵ which the M23 leadership claims was never fully implemented. The group was created in May 2012 by former members of the National Congress for the Defense of the People militia (CNDP – *Congrès national pour la défense du 125people*), which explains why there is no data related to the M23 before 2012. High tempo operations and violence marked the beginning of the M23 activities. In 2012 alone, the M23 executed 92 acts of violence against civilians causing 102 fatalities. Its logistical, financial and recruitment support came from Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda. Considering the number of citations within Resolution 2098, the M23 seemed to be UN's main concern among the armed groups which operates in eastern DRC and eventually became the FIB's priority target.

The LRA is a rebel group which operates not only in the DRC, but particularly in northern Uganda, South Sudan, the Central African Republic. It is considered an ultra-radical Christian group that pursues the establishment of a theocratic government in Uganda, ruled according to a unique interpretation of the Ten Commandments. The group has been accused of widespread human rights violations, including murder, abduction, mutilation, child-sex slavery, and forcing children to participate in hostilities. During the first three years of MONUSCO, the number of acts of violence against civilians executed by the LRA increased considerably from 2010 to 2011 and then decreased in 2012. The number of fatalities, conversely, decreased from 2010 to 2011 and then increased again in 2012.

²⁹⁵ The Peace Agreement Between the Government and Le Congres National Pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) aimed to cease CNDP military activities, integrate its combatants into the Congolese National Police and the Armed Forces, transform the group into a political party, and seek solutions to its concerns through political means in accordance to the DRC law.

The ADF is an Islamist rebel group originally based in western Uganda that has operated into eastern DRC's North-Kivu province. The ADF was created by Ugandan Muslims in the 1990s aiming to fight for the rights of the Tablighi Jamaat²⁹⁶ (Society for Spreading Faith). In order to gain support and reach a wider audience, the ADF has broadcasted videos which feature a flag similar to the Islamic State. The group calls for martyrdom and violence against infidels. However, despite its religious inspiration, reports have linked the ADF operations in eastern DRC to banditry. The group is also considered a terrorist organization by the Ugandan government. The number of acts of violence against civilians carried out by the ADF decreased from 2010 to 2012. In the considered period of time, the ADF's numbers are modest when compared to the other three groups. In 2010, the group executed 9 attacks which resulted in 32 fatalities. In 2012, the data shows only three attacks with no fatalities recorded.

4.4 FORCE INTERVENTION BRIGADE: THE UN ATTEMPT TO REGAIN CREDIBILITY

Because MONUSCO appeared to be either incapable or unwilling to deal with the security situation in eastern DRC, regional actors took the initiative. For most of 2012, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)²⁹⁷ mediated the crisis through negotiations between the M23 and Kinshasa. The ICGLR partners agreed to send its own intervention force, with the approval of, and in close cooperation with,

²⁹⁶ Tablighi Jamaat is a non-political global Sunni Islamic missionary movement that focuses on urging Muslims to return to primary Sunni Islam, and particularly in matters of ritual, dress, and personal behavior.

²⁹⁷ The ICGLR is an inter-governmental organization of the countries in the African Great Lakes Region. Its establishment was based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in these countries have a considerable regional dimension and thus require a concerted effort to promote sustainable peace and development. The organization is composed of twelve member states, namely: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.

the African Union.²⁹⁸ Initially, the DRC government, however, did not welcome the deployment of an ICGLR force within its borders. Because Uganda and Rwanda were accused of providing logistic and financial support to many armed groups in the DRC, including the M23, the ICGLR negotiations were not seen as neutral by the DRC government, and therefore, fraught with difficulties from the start.²⁹⁹ The UN identified the issue as an opportunity. Anxious to regain the initiative after Goma, and to avoid a parallel force deployment in the DRC, the United Nations proposed to incorporate the ICGLR idea of an intervention brigade into MONUSCO.³⁰⁰ This was the genesis of MONUSCO's Force Intervention Brigade.

The fall of Goma served to mobilize the UN into two-steps of action. The first step involved an international diplomatic effort under the coordination of the UN, African Union (AU), and South African Development Community (SADC) in the search for a settlement among key actors in the Great Lakes Region. In February 2013, 11 countries reached an agreement on a Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (PSCF).³⁰¹ The document recognizes that eastern DRC has continued to suffer from recurring violence by armed groups with displacement figures ranking among the highest in the world. The PSCF established principles of engagement at the national, regional, and international levels to improve the security situation in the eastern DRC. For the government of the DRC, the PSCF asked for

²⁹⁸ Otto Spijkers, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Congo," *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, vol 19, no. 1-2 (2015): 100.

²⁹⁹ Naomi Kok, "From the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region-led negotiation to the Intervention Brigade: Dealing with the latest crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo." *African Security Review*, vol 22, no. 3 (2013): 177.

³⁰⁰ Patrick Cammaert and Fiona Blyth, "The UN Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *International Peace Institute, Issue Brief*, (July 2013): 2.

³⁰¹ Mats Berdal, "The state of UN peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol 41, no. 5 (2018): 735.

renewing political commitment anchored on the implementation of something similar to a liberal-peace agenda in the country; based on free elections, open market, and respect for human rights. For the Great Lakes Region, the PSCF requested the countries not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring states and neither tolerate nor support any armed groups activities. Finally, the PSCF asked the international community to remain engaged in supporting both DRC and Great Lakes Region stability. Particularly, the PSCF requested a strategic review of MONUSCO to address the security challenges in the eastern DRC.³⁰²

This last request from the PSCF is responsible for the second step taken in response to the fall of Goma. The UN decided to strengthen MONUSCO's military capability to actively engage armed groups in eastern DRC.³⁰³ In other words, MONUSCO should be able to carry out offensive operations. Consequently, in 2013, by resolution 2098, the UNSC assigned a "Force Intervention Brigade" consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery, one special force, and one reconnaissance companies,³⁰⁴ with headquarters in Goma, under direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander. The document states the FIB key task on paragraph 12, as follows:

In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade referred to in paragraph 9 and paragraph 10 above, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to

³⁰² Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. "Peace Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region" (Addis Ababa, 24 February 2013), accessed 30 April 2019, <http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/au-peace-and-security-drc.pdf>.

³⁰³ Berdal, "The state of UN peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo," 736.

³⁰⁴ The FIB initial strength consisted of some 3000 troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi.

disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities;³⁰⁵

4.4.1 The First Three Years of Using Force

Although Resolution 2098 was issued on 28 March 2013, the FIB reached full force only by July 2013. It executed its first offensive operations in August, aiming at M23 positions in the eastern DRC, particularly outside of Goma. The initial success was exploited using a variety of offensive capabilities in joint operations with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC - *Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo*). The actions proved to be effective and by November 2013, the M23 renounced its insurgency. The remaining M23 combatants fled to Uganda, where they surrendered and were disarmed.³⁰⁶ The actions against the M23 impacted the group's capability to attack civilians, as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 28 provides an overview, month by month, of the M23's ability to execute acts of violence against civilians in 2013. It shows that both the numbers of acts of violence against civilians and fatalities increased in the first six months, before the effective deployment and beginning of the offensive operations. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 2000 to August 2008, in his book *The Fog of Peace*, explains that the expectation that physical protection is to be provided by peacekeepers to civilians threatened by an armed group may prompt that group to step up attacks against the threatened population before effective protection can be provided.³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ United Nations. *Resolution 2098* (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, 28 March 2013), 6, accessed 13 September 2018, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2098>

³⁰⁶ Jay Benson, "The UN Intervention Brigade: Extinguishing Conflict of Adding Fuel to the Flames," *A One Earth Future Discussion Paper, vol 2* (Jun 2016).

³⁰⁷ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 159.




Figure 28. M23: Acts of Violence Against Civilians, 2013-2016.

Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

Another explanation for the increasing number of acts of violence against civilians, before the initial operations of the FIB, is the absence of FARDC and MONUSCO forces in Goma, as the city had been taken by the M23. After the initial operations of the FIB, in Aug 2013, the number of attacks against civilians as well as fatalities decreases exponentially.




Figure 29. M23: Violence Against Civilians in 2013.

Source: create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

Figures 30 and 31 display information regarding acts of violence against civilians and fatalities, respectively, by the other three studied armed groups in 2013.




Figure 30. Acts of Violence Against Civilians Executed by Armed Groups in 2013.
Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.




Figure 31. Fatalities Caused by Armed Groups Violence Against Civilians in 2013.
Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

The pattern identified in figures 30 and 31 is remarkably different of that shown in figure 29. In general terms, acts of violence against civilians and fatalities decreased between March and August. In September, however, the numbers increased. Specifically, in the cases of the LRA and the ADP, the joint operations of the FARDC and the FIB against the M23 did not deter the two other groups to commit acts of

violence against civilians. According to the numbers, these two groups were more active after the beginning of the operations.

In order to check if this pattern persists in a longer timeframe, figures 32 and 33 provide information on the acts of violence against civilians and fatalities, respectively, between 2013 and 2016. Except for the LRA, all groups increase their acts of violence against civilians between 2013 and 2014. 2015 is a turning point that impacts all groups activities. After 2015, the number of acts of violence against civilians decreases exponentially. It is important to highlight, however, that even decreasing after 2015, the number of acts of violence against civilians executed by the FDLR in 2016, for instance, remained higher than in 2013.




Figure 32. Acts of Violence Against Civilians Between 2013-2016.

Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

Figure 33 displays the number of fatalities caused by acts of violence against civilians. Again, except for the LRA, the numbers increase between 2013 and 2014 and then decrease abruptly after 2015. Like the acts of violence against civilians, the number of fatalities caused by the FDLR remains higher in 2016 than in the beginning of the period.




Figure 33. Fatalities by Acts of Violence Against Civilians Between 2013-2016. *Source:* Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

Figure 34 provides the number of battles in which MONUSCO and the FARDC were involved, between 2013 and 2016. As stated before, UNSC Resolution 2098 assigned MONUSCO the task to carry out targeted offensive operations through the FIB, either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC. Between 2013 and the end of 2015,³⁰⁸ not only has MONUSCO joined the FARDC in fighting armed groups, but also shared intelligence, assigned tactical enablers to FARDC operations, and provided logistical support to the Congolese forces. To understand the developments regarding security in eastern DRC, this work considered the military battles fought by MONUSCO and the FARDC, either unilaterally or jointly. MONUSCO and FARDC forces have been used to achieve similar operational objectives.

Following the timeline in figure 34, the numbers of battles and fatalities increases between 2013 and 2016, reaching a peak at the end of the period. The data also indicates an increment in the lethality ratios³⁰⁹ between 2014 and 2016. In 2014,

³⁰⁸ Late 2015, MONUSCO suspended its military support for the FARDC due to of the latter’s human rights violations.

³⁰⁹ Number of fatalities relative to number of battles.

the rate was 1.64 fatality per battle. In 2015 and 2016, it jumps to 2.35 and 2.42, respectively. When compared to the figures 31 and 32, the data shows an existing relationship between use of force and acts of violence against civilians. In the case of the eastern DRC, between 2013 and 2016, the use of force against armed groups did decrease the acts of violence against civilians. The initial engagement may increase the group’s activities, which explains the rising figures between 2013 and 2015. However, a persistent willingness to coerce armed groups to prevent undesirable actions caused the figures to decrease. The increase in lethality of the engagements after 2014 may indicate better military capabilities and higher political commitment to stabilize the eastern DRC.




Figure 34. Battles and the Resulting Fatalities Between DRC Forces/MONUSCO and Armed Groups in Eastern DRC.

Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acledata.com/data>.

There was also a reduction in the number of IDPs. Figure 35 presents the number of IDPs in the DRC between 2013 and 2016. There is a remarkable reduction from 2013 and 2015, that may reveal a more secure environment. However, from 2015 to 2016 the number of IDPs increased again. The suspension of joint operations between MONUSCO and the FARDC and the accusations of the latter’s human rights

violations may have impacted the security environment in the eastern DRC in 2015.³¹⁰ Another intervening variable to be considered in this case was the decision to fight the armed groups one by one. As show in figures 36 and 37, while the engagements between the FARDC/MONUSCO and the M23 are concentrated in 2013, most of the fighting against the other armed groups, particularly the ADF and the FDLR, are concentrated in 2015. These two groups have operated in eastern DRC for more than 20 years, which might indicate strong ties with local communities. The fight against them, therefore, has greater potential of displacing people.




Figure 35. Conflict and Disaster Displacement Figures in the DRC, 2013-2016. *Source:* Created by author using data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” accessed 10 January 2019, <http://www.internaldisplacement.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo>.

³¹⁰ Denis M. Tull, "United Nations Peacekeeping and the Use of Force: The Intervention Brigade in Congo is no Model for Success," *German Institute for International and Security Affairs* (2016): 4, accessed 4 May 2019, <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/46787>.




Figure 36. Number of Battles Between the FARDC/MONUSCO and the Armed Groups in Eastern DRC.

Source: create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acledata.com/data>.




Figure 37. Resulting Fatalities from the Battles Between the FARDC/MONUSCO and the Armed Groups in Eastern DRC.

Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acledata.com/data>.

4.4.2. From 2017 to 2019

The scenario dramatically changed from 2017 to 2019, as violence against civilians increased considerably. The armed groups initially considered weakened or defeated, including the M23, had adapted to the new circumstances and began to react.

In addition, violence appeared to have spilled over to additional regions of the country.

On March 10, 2017, the Report of the Secretary General on MONUSCO (S/2017/206)

described the security situation as follows:

Community-based violence and inter-ethnic clashes have spread from areas already affected by armed conflict, such as in North and South Kivu provinces, to Tanganyika, the three Kasai provinces and Kongo Central. Armed group activity in the east has increased, particularly with the resurfacing of the former *Mouvement du 23 mars* (M23). The increasing use of self-defense militia, acting along ethnic lines, points to a growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty.³¹¹

The same report also stated that although under military pressure, the ADF, the FDLR, and the Patriotic Resistance Force of Ituri (French: *Force de Résistance Patriotique de l'Ituri*, or FRPI) retained the capacity to conduct destabilizing activities.³¹² The document emphasized the deterioration of the human rights amid rising violence and political turmoil, with an increase of 30 percent in the number of incidents of violence against civilians, when compared with 2015.³¹³ Finally, two tragic incidents affected MONUSCO in 2017. On March 12, two members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo who were monitoring the sanctions regime went missing in the Kasai Central region. On March 27, their bodies were

³¹¹ United Nations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2017/206, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (New York, NY: United Nations, 10 March 2017), 3.

³¹² The FRPI is a Bunia-based armed militia and political party active in the south of the Ituri Province. The militia was born out of local fighting over land as well as the proxy wars between DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda. Between 2002 and 2003, the FRPI received support from Congolese and Ugandan armies, to fight the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). By 2007, most FRPI human resources had integrated the Congolese army, but reminiscent remain active in the Ituri district. Elsa Buchanan, "Battle for control of the DRC: Who is the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FRPI)?" *The International Business Times*, 22 February 2017, accessed 11 January 2019, <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/battle-control-drc-who-are-front-patriotic-resistance-ituri-frpi-1526289>.

³¹³ United Nations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2017/206, *Report of the Secretary-General*, 7.

found.³¹⁴ On December 7, in Semuliki, North Kivu, 15 peacekeepers from Tanzania were killed and forty-four injured during an attack attributed to the ADF.³¹⁵

In the terminology of complex adaptive systems, the system was reacting after some short-term success by interventionist agents. This phenomenon has been observed in other internal conflicts. In his analysis of irregular warfare, Visacro noted that the initial shift in the balance of power favors the interventionist force. After some time, however, the armed groups adapt to the new scenario and strike back. To regain momentum, the interventionist force must learn from the environment and revise their *modus operandi*.³¹⁶

MONUSCO's operational commander seemed to understand this necessity. In 2017, the mission adjusted its operational approach from "protection-by-presence" to "protection-by-projection."³¹⁷ In this new approach, the use of force would rely on rapidly deployable battalions operating in standing combat deployments as opposed to static postures.³¹⁸ By late 2019, in an independent strategic review report of MONUSCO requested by UNSC Resolution 2463 (of 2019), Youssef Mahmoud,

³¹⁴ Aaron Ross, "Who killed U.N. experts in Congo? Confidential prosecutor's file offers clues," *Reuters World News*, 19 December 2017, accessed 11 January 2020, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-violence-un/who-killed-u-n-experts-in-congo-confidential-prosecutors-file-offers-clues-idUSKBN1EE0CT>

³¹⁵ United Nations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2018/16, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (New York, NY: United Nations, 5 January 2018), 4.

³¹⁶ Visacro, *Irregular War*, 351, 352.

³¹⁷ United Nations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2017/824, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2 October 2017), 12.

³¹⁸ In situations of high uncertainty or constraint of resources, rapidly deployable units provide more flexibility to commanders. Different than forces in static posture, mobile forces can be moved across the area of operations to reinforce, disengage or achieve local advantage. United Nations, United Nations Security Council (UNSC), S/2017/826, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (New York, NY: United Nations, 29 September 2017), 15.

Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute (IPI), argued that the political and security situation in the DRC has remained fragile. More than 100 armed groups are significant sources of insecurity, resulting in population displacement and continued violence against civilians. Many of these groups fragment, reconstitute themselves, and at times strike new alliances, undergoing various iterations to suit different political and economic agendas. The author welcomed the operational shift from “protection by presence” to “protection by projection,” highlighting that “the mix of presence and projection enabled the Mission to cover a greater area and to respond to major protection crises successfully.”³¹⁹

Yet Mahmoud questions some assumptions underlying the mandate tasks. In his point of view, the first concept that needs to be revisited is the neutralization of armed groups. The successful campaign against the M23 rebels was due to the alignment of several critical factors, such as political will of the government; support of regional actors; effective diplomatic efforts, and the conventional structure and tactics of M23. Nevertheless, the perception of military victory moved MONUSCO to embark on more military operations that provided no political advantage. After five years “the impact of offensive operations on the protection of civilians remains controversial, as these operations seem to have escalated the violence in the country to its highest levels in a decade, caused collateral damage and triggered retaliatory attacks against communities.” Finally, the report states that the focus on neutralization overshadowed the activities of the civilian component of the Mission. Therefore, the local population has identified MONUSCO with its military component.³²⁰

³¹⁹ United Nations, *Transitioning from Stabilization to Peace*, 18.

³²⁰ United Nations, *Transitioning from Stabilization to Peace*, 3, 7, 19-21.

This study sees the evolution of the use of force in MONUSCO in similar fashion, based on the discussion provided within the previous chapters. Figure 38 compares the numbers of acts of violence against civilians and the use of military force from March 2013 to December 2019. There is a direct relationship between the number of battles and the act of violence against civilians. When the number of battles increased the numbers of acts of violence against civilians increased as well.




Figure 38. Violence Against Civilians in the DRC, 2013-2019.

Source: Created by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 10 January 2020, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

The number of military engagements did not contribute for a more stable and secure environment, as the number of IDPs remarkably increased since 2015 as well. Figure 39 presents the flow of IDPs since the beginning of the offensive operations. At the time this thesis was written, no data was available for 2019.




Figure 39. Conflict and Disaster Displacement Figures in the DRC, 2013-2018.
Source: Created by author using data from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” accessed 10 January 2019, <http://www.internaldisplacement.org/countries/democratic-republic-of-the-congo>.

4.5 RESULTS AFTER SEVEN YEARS OF FIGHT

Jeffrey W. Meiser argues that strategy can be better understood as a theory of success than the traditional concept of ends, ways, and means. He states that the purpose of strategy is to create advantage, generate new sources of power, and exploit weaknesses in the opponent. The literature on strategy makes distinction in applying the instruments of national power to influence the decision of an adversary to use force, through compellence or deterrence, or to influence the capacity of an adversary to use force, by offense and defense.³²¹

The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, “The Capstone Doctrine,” describes the environment where peacekeepers are deployed as characterized by the presence of non-state actors, such as militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers to the peace process. According to the document, the UNSC has assigned “robust” mandates to peacekeepers in order to “deter forceful attempts to disrupt the

³²¹ Kersti Larsdotter, “Military Strategy and Peacekeeping: An Unholy Alliance?” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol 42, no. 2 (2019): 194.

political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order.”³²² The document emphasizes that the ultimate goal of the use of force in peacekeeping operations is to influence and deter spoilers; not to seek their military defeat. The Capstone Doctrine affirms that the United Nations has learned from experience that a credible peacekeeping operation helps to deter spoilers and diminish the likelihood to use force. Finally, a credible peacekeeping operation is described as a mission with a “a clear and deliverable mandate, with resources and capabilities to match; and a sound mission plan that is understood, communicated and impartially and effectively implemented at every level.”³²³

In peacekeeping operations, deterrent credibility is achieved by the quick deployment of a military contingent capable of using the threat of force to persuade the parties to behave in a way it would otherwise not do. It is not about making the parties defenseless but persuading them not to use organized violence. In this sense, deterrence in peacekeeping is passive in nature. When the force fails to deter, however, compellence can be used to change the status quo and punish the parties, by using limited military force, for instance. If both deterrence and compellence fail and the peacekeeping force is no longer able to influence the decision of the parties to use force, the only option to maintain or regain credibility is to influence the capacity of the parties

³²² United Nations, *Principles and Guidelines*, 34.

³²³ United Nations. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York, NY: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008), 39

to use force. This last situation requires the use of offensive and defensive strategies.

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Effective peacekeeping missions are those capable of decreasing the intensity of battle violence, protecting civilians, and containing conflict diffusion and recurrence in the postwar phase.³²⁵ Since the deployment of MONUSCO, in 2010, the mission did not have either the necessary means or the political will to accomplish its goals, which made the mandate undeliverable. The mission credibility eroded day-by-day due to its incapacity or unwillingness to deal with the complex environment in eastern DRC. Attacks on MONUSCO's peacekeepers and violation of human rights became frequent, despite the mission's military size and strength. As stated before, the mission was reluctant to use force and the parties took advantage of this weakness.

The seizure of Goma by the M23 culminated a series of tactical and strategic defeats and became the turning point of the status quo. MONUSCO became incapable to influence the decision of the armed groups to use force and was not perceived as a credible deterrent force by the regional actors. The AU and the ICGLR were leading the talks between the M23 and the government of the DRC. These regional actors were also considering deploying their own intervention force to stabilize the eastern DRC. The UN, however, did not want to lose the protagonism as the main conflict-resolution force in the DRC. As deterrence strategy was no longer feasible, the option to regain credibility was to influence the armed groups capacity to use force. Therefore, MONUSCO increased the use of military force to regain or even to achieve a reputation

³²⁴ Kersti Larsdotter, "Military Strategy and Peacekeeping: An Unholy Alliance?" *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol 42, no. 2 (2019): 194.

³²⁵ Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, "Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations," 2.

as a credible conflict-resolution military force. Resolution 2098 can be considered a milestone in this fashion.




Figure 40. Comparison Between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO Vs ADF and Number of Acts of Violence Against Civilians Executed by the M23
Source: create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

From the data provided, it is possible to make some conclusions about the MONUSCO’s efficiency in influencing the armed groups’ decision and capability to use force. As soon as the FIB became operational, in July 2013, MONUSCO and FARDC decided to fight one of the major armed groups at a time. The first targeted group was the M23. Figure 40 shows the relationship between the number of offensive operations (battles) carried out by FARDC/MONUSCO against the M23 and the acts of violence against civilians executed by the armed group, from 2013 to 2016.

After defeating the M23, the military operations aimed the neutralization of the ADF, the FDLR and to a lesser extend the LRA. The operations against the LRA reached a peak in 2014 while the peak against the ADF and the FDLR was reached in 2015. Figures 41, 42 and 43 display the relationship between the number of offensive

operations carried out by FARDC/MONUSCO against the ADF, the FDLR, and the LRA and the groups' ability to attack civilians.




Figure 41. Comparison Between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO Vs ADF and Number of Acts of Violence Against Civilians Executed by the ADF.
Source: create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.




Figure 42. Comparison Between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO Vs FDLR and Number of Acts of Violence Against Civilians Executed by the FDLR.
Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.




Figure 43. Comparison Between Number of Battles FARDC/MONUSCO Vs LRA and Number of Acts of Violence Against Civilians Executed by the LRA.

Source: Create by author using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, “Data Export Tool”, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://www.acleddata.com/data>.

The first criterion this work adopted to verify the MONUSCO’s credibility as a deterrent force was the ability to deter violence against civilians. The analysis of figures 41, 42, and 43 indicate that the increased use of military force by the FARDC/MONUSCO impacted the armed groups capability to attack civilians. Specifically, they reduced the number of acts of violence against civilians between 2013 and 2016. The data showed an increasing number of acts of violence against civilians during the initial period of the joint offensive operations. This trend of increase did not persist over time, however. On the contrary, the continuous commitment to use force by the UN and the government of the DRC seemed to influence both the decision and the capability of the armed groups to use force.

In relation to the second criterion, the MONUSCO’s ability to neutralize armed groups in the eastern DRC, results are mixed. During the first three years, the defeat of the M23 and the decreasing acts of violence against civilians carried out by the LRA and the ADF indicate a partial accomplishment of the mandate. However, other relevant armed groups like the FDLR continued to pose a threat to the civilian population and

the overall stability and development of the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region.³²⁶

Moreover, several Reports of the Secretary-General on the MONUSCO informed increasing attacks of the ADF, FDLR and other new armed groups in 2017 and 2018.³²⁷

Regarding the third criterion, MONUSCO's capability to adapt in a complex adaptive environment, during the whole period of analysis it is possible to affirm that MONUSCO operated in some sort of reactive mode. Changes in strategy, operations, and tactics were reactive by nature. Specifically, reactive after failure. The mission never had initiative to identify emergent opportunities in the system, act preemptively and later reassess its actions in a new context. Initial tactical victories obscured the organization's capability to pay enough attention to possible side effects and long-term repercussions. The system reacted after some short-term success by UN and the organization took so long to learn from the environment and revise its *modus operandi*. Between 2017 to 2019, violence against civilians increased considerably; armed groups initially considered weakened or defeated adapted to the new circumstances and begun to react; violence spilled over to additional regions of the country; and human rights situation deteriorated.

4.6 SUMMARY

This chapter aimed to understand the use of force in UN peace operations by analyzing MONUSCO as a case study. The three selected criteria listed in Chapter 3

³²⁶ United Nation, S/2014/957, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Strategic Review of MONUSCO* (New York, NY: United Nations, 30 December 2014), 16.

³²⁷ United Nation, S/2017/565, *Report of the Secretary-General on the MONUSCO* (New York, NY: United Nations, 30 June 2017), 6-8; United Nation, S/2017/824, *Report of the Secretary-General on the MONUSCO* (New York, NY: United Nations, 2 October 2017), 4-8; *United Nation, S/2018/16, Report of the Secretary-General on the MONUSCO* (New York, NY: United Nations, 5 January 2018), 4; United Nation, S/2018/174, *Report of the Secretary-General on the MONUSCO* (New York, NY: United Nations, 1 March 2018), 4-7.

were evaluated based on data collected from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), mission mandates, reports of the Secretary-General to the UNSC, and strategic reviews.

In relation to the first two criteria, results showed that positive achievements in the short-term did not persisted in a longer term. Regarding the third criteria, the analysis indicated mission's inability to learn, decide and adapt based on emergent opportunities within its operational environment.

The next chapter will present a theory to use force in complex adaptive systems, such as civil wars.

5. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this doctoral thesis is twofold: first, to understand how military force has been used in UN peace operations and why it has not provided significant advantage to the political process; and second, to design a recommendation on the potential application of force to UN peace operations. The hypothesis sustained here is that there is a relationship between scientific, linear, tactical-focused mindset and the use of force in current UN peace operations. The primary question is: how does the UN use force in peace operations? The secondary research questions are: what is the relationship between the increasing use of military force and the UN's reputation as a credible conflict-resolution institution? How do the concepts of force, strategy and deterrence influence the utility of force in current UN peace operations? How does Complexity Theory impact the use of force in current UN peace operations?

Beginning with secondary questions, based on the case study, this work defends that the UN decided to increase the use of force in the DRC after 2013 based on two different reasons. The first reason was to regain credibility and maintain its protagonism as the main conflict resolution actor in the DRC. The second reason was to reestablish the status quo. The seizure of Goma by a Rwandan backed group, the M23, changed the regional balance of power in the Great Lakes region. The principal contributors to the FIB, South Africa and Tanzania, saw the M23 as an instrument of Rwandan policy in the region. As shown during the data analysis, the M23 was not the most violent group in the eastern DRC. However, it is the most cited group in the UNSC Resolution 2098 and became the first target of the military campaign to neutralize armed groups carried out by MONUSCO and the FARDC. In summary, politics, and prestige rather

than the protection of civilians moved the UN to a more assertive use of force in the DRC.

Regarding the concepts of force, strategy, and deterrence, the findings show that current UN peace operations still privileges scientific, linear, tactical-focused, and top-down detailed planning process from best practices of past operations. First, force is used at last resort. Second, military power is still perceived as decisive. The combination of these two ideas has driven strategic planners to emphasize tactical engagements and overestimate the relevance of means to strategy. The more means, the easier the victory. The case study displayed two recurrent patterns in the UN approach to strategy: allocate more means, and issue more comprehensive and robust mandates. In addition, these two ideas have avoided the UN to employ military power during the whole continuum of conflict, across the range of military operations, to change, influence and control. The use of force – or the threat of use –has not provided the position of relative advantage to future negotiations because it was unavailable, incapable or unwillingly during key moments of crisis. Third, there are limitations in implementing a strategy of deterrence in UN stabilization operations. It is challenging to match a theory designed for interactions between strong often nuclear-armed states to problems posed by weak states and non-state actors. In addition, as in the DRC, deterrence may not be effective when peacekeepers are deployed in the midst of conflicts to contain escalation while protecting civilians. When deployed in civil wars, peacekeepers must be prepared to deter and compel, to perform a broader range of military operations across the continuum of conflict. Deterrence, in this sense, will never work if the adversaries believe the UN is incapable or unwillingly to implement its threats. The greater the deterrence capability, the lesser the likelihood in the use of force.

In relation to how Complexity Theory impacts the use of force in current UN peace operations, this research indicates that complexity dominates the operational environment where peacekeepers are currently deployed. Thus, it argued that Complexity Theory is instrumental for the use of force in modern UN peace operations. It provides the basis for understanding self-reinforcing interdependent action among adaptive entities and show how such interaction creates creativity, learning, adaptability, and change. Through the lens of complexity, intrastate conflicts are better perceived as an evolving activity between interacting fluids of self-organized hierarchies. Patterns emerge from this evolving activity that emphasize survival. In the effort for survival, locally unanticipated behavior emerges. UN peacekeepers, particularly planners and decision-makers, should be educated to improve their abilities to learn, adapt and orient in an environment of continuous change. In a complex adaptive system, use of force is an endless process in a continually shifting environment.

Finally, the primary question of this research was how the UN uses force in its peace operations. The answer is straightforward – reactively and unevenly. First, there are several structural limitations on the UN’s ability to execute operations in complex environments which, by definition, involve the full range of military options. There is no unity of effort in the UN. The organization represents a variety of agendas and interests that sometimes create significant obstacles to develop coherent strategic objectives and guidelines. In this sense, force is likely to be used unevenly because of the different interests between member states. In addition, the UN has no permanent military structure. It relies on a diverse number of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) that have no common doctrine, organization, materiel, and training. Moreover, the provision of military assets is dependent on TCCs’ national interests. High-risk

missions that offer few political and economic attractions are unlikely to find countries interested in participating and force preservation tends to become the primary condition behind the decision-making process at the tactical level.

Second, adherence to peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force has failed. The multitude of parties involved in complex environments, such as in the DRC, and the variety of their political agendas have made broad consent unrealistic. The UN has not showing itself to be an impartial actor, siding instead with the government of the day to attempt to achieve stability. Executing combined joint military operations with national security forces impacts local populations perception of the UN, as some of these forces such as FARDC have been accused of human rights violations.

Finally, non-use of force privileges the primacy of diplomacy and the *jus ad bellum* requirement that military power should be employed only as a last resort. In this sense, force remains passive, in the backstage waiting for the failure of the other instruments of power. However, as discussed in Chapter III, force is never last resort. A good strategy should envision the use of force – or the threat to use it – as a mean to change, influence, and control since the early stages of a crisis. Military power is not decisive. Particularly in limited-contingency operations, tactical victory does not infer strategic success. Instead of pursuing tactical victories, the use of force should be understood as a bargaining tool to be exploited by politics to achieve advantage.

The next section aims at the second purpose of this research, that is to elaborate a theory on the potential application of force to UN peace operations. Thus, it presents an alternative approach to use force in complex adaptive systems called *Adaptive Use of Force*.

5.1 ADAPTIVE USE OF FORCE: A THEORY TO USE FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

As exposed in the previous chapters, learning and adaptation, rather than traditionally engineered solutions to problems, are the key features to deal with complex adaptive systems. Accordingly, *Adaptive Use of Force*, rather than the traditional military planning, is presented here as an alternative approach to use force in complex adaptive environments. Two major postulates inform this model. First, the use of force in UN peace operations must become a continuous, multidimensional, decentralized, and a self-evolving process of permanent adaptation. Second, uncertainty, as a hallmark of complex environments, makes it unfeasible to define an end state in unequivocal terms.

In terms of continuity, complex environments are in continuous change and adaptation. Every military operation creates unexpected opportunities and consequences. Today's solution is tomorrow's problem. While a victorious general celebrates his victory; the head of state faces the new situation born of that very victory itself. Thus, ends and means are interchangeable concepts. An end is a mean for future ends. Complexity is fluid, continuous and sometime deliberately contradictory. To better serve politics, *Adaptive Use of Force* requires learning to improve techniques; adjustment of past actions; and refining problem structure to find possible approaches in a continuous adaptive iteration. Also, because the system is in continuous adaptation, all operational options must be available to achieve the political intention.

Regarding multidimensionality, there are no such things like a pure military solution. *Adaptive Use of Force* requires the application of all instruments of power as an indivisible whole. One instrument of power cannot exist for long in the absence of the others. Thus, force is better used by the intelligent integration and networking of

diplomacy, defense, development, and other available tools. Focusing on only one aspect of power is bound to lose in the long run. To this proposition, it is relevant to differentiate multidisciplinary from multidimensionality. The first is the ability to generate information from different perspectives. The second is the ability to synthesize separate findings into a coherent whole. Multidimensionality is far more critical than multidisciplinary, when dealing to complexity because the whole is more than a sum of its parts. Although some of the modern UN peace operations are called multidimensional, it seems that military and civilian components share perspectives and information for the sake of their own agencies' agendas. They do not synthesize their perspectives into a coherent whole.

In relation to decentralization, *Adaptive Use of Force* privileges down-top flow of information and local actions. It implies centralized intention with decentralized control and execution instead of traditional top-down centralized control and decentralized actions. Decentralization allows a fighting unit the ability to utilize initiative to adapt seamlessly to the environment without having to work through layers of decision-makers for approval. The adaptive nature of a complex system represented on the intrastate conflicts may significantly change during a delay and require a wholly different response. By privileging down-top flow of information and local actions, *Adaptive Use of Force* recognizes the complex adaptive systemic structure of intrastate conflicts. Therefore, centralized intention fed by down-top flow of information provides the holistic view of the system. Decentralized control and execution generate tailor-made local solutions based on the capability to probe and sense opportunities in the environment's emergent behavior.

It is relevant to emphasize that decentralized control does not imply the absence of control. Instead, it implies a structure that allows subordinates to receive guidance

and direction by superiors to achieve a particular effect or vision, then be given the independence to succeed within the intent of their commander's guidance. It also does not imply the inability of the superior to closely monitor the action of subordinates, nor prevent adjustments. Decentralized control needs to be flexible enough to transition towards centralized one if necessary.

With reference to self-evolving, *Adaptive Use of Force* sees innovation, represented by creative and critical thinking, as paramount when facing a system able to learn, adapt, and create. Complex adaptive systems are unique. Thus, although doctrine and lessons learned from past experiences inform basic knowledge, they may not be useful to deal with new situations. This happens because complex adaptive systems recognize patterns and react to survive. In this sense, planners must be able to challenge current doctrine and develop innovative actions to overcome new and multiple dilemmas posed by the system.



Figure 44. Role of Innovation and Doctrine Across the systems.
 Source: created by the author

The second postulate asserts that uncertainty, as a hallmark of complex environments, makes it unfeasible to define an end state in unequivocal terms. Uncertainty is one of the characteristics of military activity. Moreover, in modern

conflicts planners are overwhelmed with large amounts of data from multiple sources, data that might be unclear, ambiguous, or even contradictory. This is even worse in complex adaptive systems where nonlinear interactions make difficult to predict future system's behavior. Thus, this work defends that final victory does not exist in complex adaptive systems and therefore the pursuit of an end state in unequivocal terms is pointless. In such environments, strategy is an anticipation of the probable and a preparation for the possible. The utility of force is then to provide options for political decision-makers to achieve a continuous situation of advantage. Force is therefore a bargaining power to be exploit by politics.

Figure 46 synthesizes the idea of adaptive use of force. While traditional military planning tends to be linear and focused on the idea of an end state (figure 45), adaptive use of force recognizes the limited role of military power in any political endeavor, such as UN peace operations; the necessity of deep and comprehensive understanding of the environment as well as the capability to adapt when dealing with complexity; and finally, the acceptance of possible outcomes that would provide advantage to the continuous and fluid political process.




Figure 45. Traditional Military Linear Planning

Source: United States Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-0.1, *Army Design Methodology* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 6-4.




Figure 46. Adaptive Use of Force.

Source: Created by the author.

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