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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS UNDER UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS:
A CASE STUDY OF SOUTH SUDAN 2013-14 CRISIS

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Abstract

UNPKO evolved from traditional missions to complex environments with non-combatants victims, becoming Protection of Civilians an important role after human rights violations at 1990’s. A serious task, as even troops had authorization to “all appropriate measures” and use force in “self-defense”, they repeatedly failed implementing POC mandates and even to protect themselves (HENDERSON), as Rwanda-genocide (800,000 dead), Balkans executions and other’s occurrences (LARSEN), causing confidence loss at UN1.

POC reflections expanded tasks, as human security concept 2, connecting state-building, “comprehensive approach” and peacebuilding, at same time missions increased (WILLS, 2009).

At fragile host countries,3 aggression against UN raised, as UN death peaks at 90’s4 ambitious mandates5, facing deaths mostly at POC related tasks, as main factors are:

- Intercommunal violence (cattle raids, revenge attacks, internal borders, historical resentments);
- Warlord’s area violence;
- Ethnical/political violence;
- IDPs freedom of movement;
- Food/health insecurity and violence against humanitarian convoys/actors;
- Violence against UN/humanitarian personnel and civilians at IDPs/UN premises.

As ground assessment, UNMISS 2013-14 failed or was a success6? Which challenges continue, and what recommendations could improve POC by UN, host and contributing countries after new 2015 policy?

Secondly, we approach reasons why POC issue happened and failed.

Experts as WILLMOT (2013) stated the principle of nonintervention made POC fail, and unclear rules to use of force delayed troops reaction. WILLS (2008) remarks troops haven’t training or study at International Humanitarian Law. HOLT (2009)

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1 MUNSON, R.; 2015
2 AGUIAR, 2018
3 TAYLOR, 2009
4 CRUZ REPORT, 2017
5 HOLT, 2009
6 HILDE, F.; 2016

KENNY (2016) stated the combination of political, social and logistical, as low capacities and resources. In my research was found mandate’s POC non-prioritization, wide tasks and non-preparation for crisis escalation.

Most indicated problems instead solutions, but “CRUZ REPORT”, funded by China, made by a Brazilian General, twice UN Force Commander who conducted POC preemptive actions retaking cities under civilian aggressor’s dominance (Haiti and Congo), is a tool to check POC fails.

Requested by UN to analyze reasons of 2017 historical record of UN deaths, tries change way UN works in high-risk PKO, adapting to a new reality: blue helmet/UN flag no longer offer “natural” protection to troops, neither to civilians.

It enlists 14 improvement areas, defining “must take” actions: changing mindsets; improving capacity, achieving threat sensitive mission footprint; and enhancing accountability.

It allows check POC fails occurred same time attacks against UN raised, as components haven’t proper mindset, capacity in figures, composition and specialization (mechanized troops, jungle experts etc), bad operational procedures (standing instead conduct operations) and accountable responsibility.

As third part of this thesis, why POC issue was chosen and how was his evolution? Because it is a very typical UN mission, Humanitarian Law/UN Chart obligation, and fails in POC occurs as UN casualties increases, indicating troops and mission’s review. Also, because I was engaged on UNMISS as Military Liaison Officer, Chief G-2 (information) Cell, performing field tasks at 2013-14 crisis.

The academic value of this paper is study POC policy evolution, the practical significance is obtaining recommendations, draft of troops compositions/capabilities/assets to implement POC and China-Brazil International Military Cooperation opportunities, as both have peacekeepers there.

UN tried to have a goal POC policy after 90’s, improving it, but wasn’t successful. Released human security concept (Economic, Food, Health Personal, Community and

UN linked peace development to state-building, but wasn´t a POC Policy clarifying what is and how to do, and

“… injunctions … were insufficient-even incoherent—-Confusion at the strategic level … conceptual and doctrinal void at the operational and tactical. Missions … still deployed with little understanding and … less guidance on how to go about POC….” (HOLT; 2009).

S. Sudan 2013 crisis’s violence proved it, conducting UN to write a Policy as:
- UN POC Policy (2015),
- CRUZ REPORT (2017);
- UN CPOC: Comprehensive POC Training Materials (2017) and

The first defines POC, solving questions by three tiers of action: Protection through dialogue and engagement; Provision of physical protection; Establishment of a protective environment. Indicates priorities instead impose tasks (response phases: Prevention, Preemption, Response and Consolidation), classical military planning at threat and risk assessment, but keeps Early warning mechanisms.

Proposing actions and solutions, CRUZ REPORT is a guide to SECURE CONDITIONS TO IMPLEMENT MANDATE’s made by personal experience, lessons learned/field research, useful to implement POC.

The other documents boards strategic, operational and tactical level, standardizing concepts and practicals with previous ones.

Shortcomings happened at UNMISS MALAKAL IDP’s Camp attack (2016) and new crisis in JUBA (2017), revealed improvements isn’t enough yet and POC continues an issue to UN, host states and international community.

At last, study case and recommendations will be presented, indicating that improvement at troops security conditions and narrow aims of mandate may allow better implementation of POC.

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7 AGUIAR, 2018
As main essence ground assessment, crisis has historical ethnical-political origins. UNMIS (2005/2011) concluded at a peace agreement, and UNMISS was established with an ambitious mandate and no priority on POC, addressing comprehensive approach to:

“consolidate peace and security, … help establish the conditions for development; … strengthening the capacity of the Government … and establish good relations with its neighbors”,

Tasks varied from popular political participation, independent media, justice, management of natural resources until formulation of national policies in government regards, an ambitious mandate trying “build a country from the scratch: creating S. Sudan”8, with few troops, taking state’s roles and planning troop reduction soon.

As 2012 violence against civilians and UN (60 cases) increased, mission failed prevent violence return, unable to identify main risk, as at same time the ethnical-political crisis was ongoing, not assessed this as most dangerous situation.

UNMISS tasks to act on POC were Information collection/analyses; Security/risk/threat assessments; safe environment developing; Escort humanitarian convoys/actors/actions; IDPs safe transit and camps management; Key Leaders and community engagement; Patrols around mission footprints and Base; Preemptive actions deploying troops at risk areas; Search IDPs from road, air and river; humanitarian evacuation; risk/security assessment patrols; Humanitarian support by military substituting civilian components/humanitarians and Engineering support.

As 90’s, UN wrongly assessed environment, got larger tasks than capabilities, didn’t assess dangerous scenarios and POC priority, facing an intra-estate war-conflict when President dismissed Vice and fight erupted (December 2013) that threatened UNMISS, that wasn’t prepared for crisis escalation, receiving 500,000 IDPs in 4 weeks, inside UN bases for first time in History.

AS ASSESSMENT, cities destroyed, ethnical killings, looting and tension which could lead a new Rwanda massacre9, as said S. Sudan authority. Fight spread around country, with 8 POC sites at UN bases, reaching 85,000 civilians protected and 3.2 million people into food insecurity at 2014. Crisis persists until today, with peaks of violence.

As figures10,11 from December 2013 to 2017, total of estimated IDPs was 2 million, 2 million fled other countries, UNMISS treated more than ten thousand people, both sides

8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQfluxpYVds
9 HILDE F.; 2016.
11 https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background
wounded combatants, evacuated hundreds of casualties, had dozens contractors/military killed; hundreds of civilians wounded or killed at UN premises and 2 helicopters down.

Crimes against humanity as mass graves executions; extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, torture and children recruitment were reported, estimating until 2017 hundreds of thousands dead, but considering low troops figures/capabilities, mobility lack, low consensus on POC, UNMISS was relatively successful, but failed at environment assessment, prevent violence and identify threats, criticisms varying from troops conducts, unclear mandate and troops composition/capabilities.

As EVALUATION, UNMISS had medium results facing terrible crisis, wasn’t preemptive, but reactive, failed mostly by unclear UN POC Policy and strategy, lack intelligence and bad early warning system, but criticisms damaged UN image.

As future challenges at Political field, host countries fragilities as primary security actor jeopardizing POC. At Economical, acquire specific equipment and suitable troops.

At Military, get troops composition and capabilities (enough engineering, riverine, tropical diseases hospital vessel, logistic troops, mechanized cavalry, attack helicopters, indirect fire support) and specialization/training (jungle, semi-desertic and swamp) ensuring secure conditions to implement POC;

At Science and technological, grant assets to provide advantage against hostile actors, helping safe POC environment by thermal/movement radars,

“Appropriate vehicles, special rifles for snipers, special ammunition, night vision capability …, and laser aim, among other … technology, are needed “(Cruz Report, p. 14)

At Psychosocial, integrate civilian-military components and improve Public Relations and Psychological Operations.

As experiences/lessons learned, Policy improved, but political and operational level have gaps. State-building tasks are complicated, long-term, may sounds interreference at host country, diminishing support.

At political level, UN principles may confuse execution, indicating review; at Operational level, undefined troops organization and composition, and intelligence assessment determining not only troops figures, but capabilities (jungle experts, mechanized troops to convoy escort, etc).

12 OLADIPO, KEVIN and LUX
15 CRUZ (2017), FOLEY (2013)
At Strength and capability, low level, no specialization, lack armored protection/heavy weaponry jeopardized POC escort actions and bases security. Mechanized cavalry has training, capabilities and material to deterrence, using combined tactical recon during road movements (engineering mobility, indirect fire and air support) may grant safe POC environment.

At Operational procedures, physical protection of civilians/Bases is related to engineering capability and road mobility, military aircrafts are necessary at Sector level, allowing transport and supply autonomy, avoiding incidents as AKOBO POC site, were civilians were killed by delayed contractor’s evacuation.

At Intelligence, bad evaluation was caused by using confuse early warning system, without data classification or information flow. Worse case must be assessed, as volatile environments most dangerous case many times is also most probable.

At Political level, China and Brazil have opportunities by CHINA-CELAC plan to joint efforts at international military cooperation, as far Brazil have needed capabilities (mechanized cavalry, riverine, jungle etc), and China-Brazil are studying joint produce armored vehicles, chance to propose mechanized cavalry troops, as far studies of better troops composition for mobile operations and convoy escorts is ongoing by UN, projecting countries capacity to implement POC tasks. Riverine navigation Units (barges, vessels and escort boats) and troops to locate and support isolated IDPs areas could be studied also, and China-Brazil PK training centers can exchange UNMISS former Officers to produce a Compilation of environment aspects and lessons learned.

At tactical, Ambush Threat Mitigation can be implemented by mechanized cavalry and supports, depreciating attackers “hit and run” technique by indirect fire, gunned aircrafts, tracked armored cars, heavy/medium weaponry and road Recon tactics, irradiating security from the bases.

As conclusion, POC policy attends relevant international comumnity role under rule of law at volatile high risk areas and will continue for long. UNMISS internal contradictions affected POC tasks. Mandates should be narrowed prioritizing POC, as safe environment demands employ overwhelming force. Contributors countries should have initiative proposing solutions, not only waiting requests. Mandates should indicate troops composition/capabilities, new UN POC policy and documents need deep study. China and Brazil have opportunities to international military cooperation by UNPKO joint efforts, providing operational solutions at troops composition/capabilities to POC.
Joint preparation and training at pre-deployment being conducted in Africa, by China-Brazilian composed troops, uniting troops and assets from both countries, specialized capabilities to attend operational area demands, prepared to act on POC issue, is an image that could show entire world that a dream of shared future mankind can be achieved, and China-Brazil cooperation can lead it acting as well-prepared UN troops jointly working at POC issue.

UNMISS had partial success at crisis, many failures, avoided a new Rwanda genocide, but mission should be reinforced, from HQ planning, troops actions, composition and capabilities/specialties/equipment, creating safe environment by preemptive measures/strong actions and reactions to prevent POC crisis.

Key Words: UNPKO; UNMISS-South Sudan; Protection of Civilians; China-Brazil international military cooperation
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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS UNDER UNITED NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS:
A CASE STUDY FROM SOUTH SUDAN 2013-14 CRISIS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 VALUE AND INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

This dissertation title was chosen because the importance of the theme at International Military Cooperation in United Nations Peace-keeping Operations (UN PKO), as far Protection of Civilians (POC) activities seems will continue to be inserted at mandates. It aims to analyze how POC tasks have influence about planning, development and conduct of the UN missions and troops, focused on lessons learned during the crisis occurred at South Sudan 2013-14, under the mandate of UNMISS (United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan).

At that time, the author was working as UNMISS Military Liaison Officer (MLO) at State Support Base (SSB) in BOR City, JONCLEI State, South Sudan, one of the sites where the crisis erupted, being possible witnesses Mission conditions and analyze situation development, once role performed was Chief of G-2 (information) Cell. Therefore, more than only an Office service, the particular characteristics of UNMISS involved the performing of field tasks, as Patrol Leader/component, acting in the terrain with troops and humanitarian actors, sharing activities with civilian components, SPLA (South Sudan Liberation Army), Opposition Forces and other local armed groups and interacting with local residents and authorities.

As particular case, having graduation in History helped understand those region, as lesson learned about the importance of studying the environment past facts to analyse it proper during the planning and running of UNPKO.

Research was done in bibliographical material both at the library of the International College of Defense Studies (ICDS)/National Defense University (NDU), as in official
documents collected during the UNMISS period, as reports, and a detailed search for sources in the world Network of computers deeping the subject.

The main reasons selecting this topic includes the personal experience working at UNMISS during crisis eruption resulting in lessons learned; the continuation of high-risk volatile environments that will continue to require POC tasks, and that still are improvements to be done at this role. Other important overview is that China and Brazil are present with blue helmets at South Sudan and have other presences at region, an important perspective to both countries.

The academic value is providing a scholar study at evolution in POC implementation and practices, allowing identify if the updates reached most of the needs pointed at “Cruz Report” or if – and which- level are required others upgrades. After analyses of the newest POC Policy at 2015-17, will be possible to check if the changes are enough or still are necessary implementations from the lessons learned.

The practical significance is contribution to POC activities improvement, best training of China and Brazil PK personnel who will deal with POC tasks, development of troops compositions within capabilities and assets necessary to grant the wide range of tasks related to prevent and act at POC threats, and the opportunities to China and Brazil join together International Military Cooperation Programs to implement those.

1.2 PROBLEMATIZATION

“Inter-state threats and conflicts are increasingly rare, and a new type of non-state conflict and transnational threats and risks are emerging. They can be caused by a variety of religious, ethnic, environmental, and organized crime or terrorism motives that risk the lives of thousands of human beings. Many are threats without definite authorship, without a declared flag, that put national and international security in constant challenges. ”

The initial UNPKO task to deal with two states/main parts in a conflict, managing peace deals, diversified and changed along past decades.

As intra-states conflicts, in particular, tends to involves threats to civilians, it had become an important task since was established for the first time, and, as consequence, this kind of role turned a prominent activity at PKO, with many examples of failures occurred, with terrible results paid in blood and jeopardizing UN credibility.

So on, we reached the following problem: Which, why, where and by whom are the causes of this failures at UNMISS POC tasks in 2013-14 crisis?

1 SILVA, M. 2018
It is merely troops lack of preparation, inputability fearless or misconduct? Or misty mandates and non-specification of the tasks generated problems at tactical level? The study of UNMISS mandate is fundamental at this point.

And so on, WHICH improvements are necessary and where to avoid further similar problems? And, which changes was made at POC policies after crisis?

To analyze this, the “Cruz Report” (2017) allows a wide overview, as far contains observations from a commander that had success in similar tasks and environment at same period UNMISS had his problems.

Aspects of Policy, strength and capability, operational procedures, intelligence, logistical support and others, overthrown by CRUZ REPORT will be problematized, perceiving the broader Picture that conduct to unsuccessful actions, reminding that troops are the spearhead, the “end of line” of many links to be entirely observed, and it looks to be an easy-but unfair- task to quickly attributes their mistakes the main cause of failures.

1.3 OBJECTIVE, HYPOTESIS AND VARIANTS

The Scope of this work is to study the case of POC under UNMISS during the South Sudan national crisis in 2013-14. The objectives are:

- Describe the main points of POC Policy at UN, his origin and evolution;
- Identify previous UN failures in POC;
- Present POC Policy at UNMISS;
- Discuss experiences and lessons learned, under methodological aspects including “CRUZ REPORT” perspectives;
- Present the future challenges and recommendations; and
- Concluding about how those experiences modified UN policy at POC and measures still needed to improve in other levels avoiding further failures.

The raised hypothesis is that the breaches that allows the failures can be observed by the areas indicated at CRUZ REPORT, presented the following variants:

1) Independent variant:
- The “need to protect” task overall UN missions since the implementation of POC;

2) Dependent variants:
  a. Situation under UNMISS was implemented (UNMIS and historical background);
b. The intelligence perception of the mission about his situational awareness;
c. The low clarification of the task and his operationalization at clear procedures and conditions crossing the political until the tactical level;

3) intervenent variant
   a. Rising/increasing of ethnic and political tensions
   b. Failures and difficulties to establish good results at POC tasks;

1.4 METHODOLOGY

_The only true story, which can only be made for mutual aid, is the universal history (Le GOFF, 2005, p. 40)._ 

The work developed bibliographical, documentary and field research, including:

An exploratory study to identify the sources of the case study, and an empirical research conducted to assess their effectiveness on POC due previous missions historical, the evolution of mandates and his implementations, scouted by the items selected at Cruz Report.

Research followed qualitative approach and document analysis, using UNMISS reports and the Literature Review reported from scholars.

The difficulties anticipated during the research were inserted at establish parameters to analyses the development of POC concepts.

The solutions are found by lessons learned from POC tasks at UNMISS crisis. The increasing POC activities was fitted by the mission’s timeline and mandates development, reinforced by the resolutions that updated the previous failures.

Completing, will be integrated the obtained results, serving as a basis for the final product of this Master Thesis, a proposal presenting opportunities for innovations and improvements in the various areas at POC, since the political level to the tactical.

1.4.1 Categories, concepts and theoretical field

To facilitate work perception, categories, concepts and theoretical will be cleared and established, as necessary.

Humanitarianism is one term which cover the called humanitarian actions, but difficult to have strict definition as far:
"...is a very wide ranging term and concept, include ... dimensions as religion, politics, culture, the provision of aid, protection and security, international law, and even the possibility of humanitarian military intervention" (MCSWEENEY, D. P. J, 2012, p. 26)

Classical humanitarianism versus “new humanitarianism” leads to different posture, actions, and approaches to humanitarian action. Classical is highly strict neutral, supposing that anything less attempts against the principles of humanitarian universalism (as ICRC perspective), besides other argues that straight neutrality normally guides to moral irresponsibility, both views spreaded out after Rwanda’s genocide.

Under humanitarianism, there are three main pillars, acting together or not to protect life:
I) Humanitarian assistance/Response;
II) International Law and Humanitarian Intervention;
III) Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

First deals issues of aid, its appropriateness, timeliness, funding mechanisms, standards, accountability, impacts and reforms, second pillar, International Law, deals with 3 separate but related bodies of law (MCSWEENEY, 2002):
- International Humanitarian Law (IHL),
- International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and
- International Refugee Law.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL), laws of war or law of armed conflict unites the rules to protect to deal with humanitarian problems raised from international or non-international armed conflicts as:

"...ensure protection against the arbitrary exercise and abuse of power by authorities for all human beings who find themselves within a state’s ‘effective control’ (that is, over territory or otherwise over the individual, for example through detention)” (WILLMOT, H. and SHEERAN, S., 2013, p. 525)

IHL connect two types of rules: the law of war (Hague Conventions, about rights and obligations of belligerents and HL) and Geneva Conventions, to safeguard the basic rights of non-combatants and civilians (MCSWEENEY, 2002, p. xx)

IHRL has two points:

- To protect persons who not taken, or are no taking anymore part in hostilities (civilians, wounded, sick, and captured combatants), and
- Trying to regulate the means and kinds of warfare through rules on the conduct of hostilities and use of weapons.

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2 MCSWEENEY, D. P. J, 2012, p. 32
Humanitarian Intervention/R2P is described as ‘forcible military action by external agent in the relevant international community with predominant purpose of preventing, reducing, or avoid extreme suffering or threats for people’ evolved recently to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), sovereigns countries obligation to protect his population and the responsibility of international community to prevent genocides and atrocities, complemented by UNSC authority to intervene if necessary and suitable under laws.

The UNSC tools for humanitarian intervention are:
- Diplomacy,
- Conflict Resolution,
- Sanctions,
- Peacekeeping,
- Peace Enforcement, and
- Enforcement.

As responses, there are three main types by the UNSC:
- Peace Keeping Missions,
- Peace Enforcement Missions, and
- Enforcement Missions.

And the *Peacekeeping to Full Scale Enforcement Spectrum* (Boulden, 2001, p. 3) allows a quick understanding of differences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacekeeping</th>
<th>Peace Enforcing</th>
<th>Enforcement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impartial</td>
<td>Impartial</td>
<td>Not Impartial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent Required</td>
<td>Consent Desirable but not Required</td>
<td>Consent Not Required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self Defense</td>
<td>Self Defense plus Specific use of Force Authorization</td>
<td>Full use of force Authorization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MCSWEENEY (2002), p. 219

Discussions and reports after 1990’s atrocities at UNPKO generated the conceptions of Responsibility to Protect, The Responsibility to Prevent, The Responsibility to React and The Responsibility to Rebuild, connected to POC evolution.

1.4.2 Methodologic referential, the "CRUZ REPORT" and his applicability

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Many Reports, Official documents, Panels etc. were produced then as far Capstone Doctrine, Millennium and Brahmini Report, all of them contributing to POC development, and many were used at this work.

So why use “CRUZ REPORT” at this work as primary lenses to observe was choose?

1. It was designated by UN Secretary-General (and funded by China) due the increasing of violent acts at UN missions from 2013 to 2017 (195 deaths);
2. It allows connects the deaths and violence against UNPK personnel (including UN civilians) occurs during important tasks related to POC activities (convoy, attacks on Base, patrol, escort etc.);

3. It can be seen that the peak of UN personnel fatalities occurs at the great POC disasters on 90’s and increased since them (as far since then also almost all missions included POC roles), indicating a relation between planning, troops capability and failures at POC tasks;

---

Fig 1. UN personnel fatalities by type of activities, Cruz report, 2017

Fig 2. UN personnel fatalities per year, Cruz report, 2017
4. those previous documents have normally some good assertive, new perspectives, but normally don’t propose practical actions;

5. Is the most updated UN document about PKO analysis, providing practical, short and long-term actions, focusing in changing the way UN conducts his business of PKO in high-risk environments, where normally POC threats are higher;

6. Gen Santos Cruz commanded two successful UN PKO, being Force Commander (FC) at MINUSTAH (Mission of United Nations for Stabilization of Haiti) and MONUSCO (United Nations Mission at Congo), this last one at the same time UNMISS was suffering his worse situations. The following remarks shows his effectiveness that many times is measured by a good result at POC activities:

- He was FC at MINUSTAH for 3 years (2006-2009), when conducted the defeat of gangs which dominated the urban area of Cité Soleil keeping civilian under menace, regaining the area and protecting the civilians over there. Brazil lead the mission for 13 years, stabilizing urban environments without major criticisms or failures, being recognized as a successful example 4;

- Retired as Division General, was requested by UN to return to active duty (not common in Brazil) to lead MONUSCO by the results at MINUSTAH;

- Congolese crisis started as POC, as waves of refuges and armed groups fled from Rwanda´s massacre and further involved in violence against local civilian5;

- At MONUSCO, the Intervention Brigade and African troops combined retook Goma city (more than one million inhabitants)6, occupied and bombed by rebel group M23 with many atrocities against civilians, acting as POC tasks successful, further defeating completely M23, a decade acting group with historical violence against civilians 7, stabilizing entire city and region as POC role.


6 SAWYER, JON: In Congo tough talk from the UN’s top general. The Pulitzer center on crisis reporting- Available in https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/congo-tough-talk-uns-top-general

7. It is based on huge field research, hundreds of interviews and travels to MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO and UNMISS to obtain field views and observe high-risk field sites, given legitimacy to the statements collected at POC problems occurred or similar environments;

8. Troops good conditions are necessary to Comprehensive approach to POC, engulfing fundamental and basilar mission security.

9. Establish overall observations, recommendations and Projects beside only criticizing/report problems, as many scholar studies and previous UN documents;

10. It indicated\(^8\) 14 areas to be improved: LEADERSHIP, OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOUR, USE OF FORCE, DEFENSIVE POSTURE, PRINCIPLES OF PEACEKEEPING, SELECTION OF TCCs/PCCs, PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING, EQUIPMENT, INTELLIGENCE, TECHNOLOGY, MEDICAL, BASES, MISSION FOOTPRINTS, ADMINISTRATION, IMPUNITY, all useful to develop better POC actions, readiness and tasks, contributing to POC comprehensive approach,

11. Propose practical adjustments at overall mission level, not only regarding soldier’s death, but improving conditions to be capable to assess threats, avoid be surprised, prepare to them and act before suffer violent attacks (as always at POC camps or related tasks as humanitarian convoys or supplies) and react properly if necessary, generating more security to POC tasks.

The document (CRUZ, 2017, p. 10) identified four broad areas to UN and Member States must take actions, and they can improve POC tasks as far:

1) **changing mindsets**, so personnel are aware of the risks and empowered to take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to attacks; *contributing to conduct safe POC tasks as escort convoys, bases and IDP camps protection etc.*;

2) **improving capacity**, so being equipped and trained to operate in high-threat environments, and that missions have the assets and procedures necessary to deter attacks and limit fatalities and injuries when they occur; *avoiding being attacked when conducting POC related tasks*;

3) **achieving a threat sensitive mission footprint** that is coherent with mission mandates and limits the exposure of the mission to threat; *allowing to not rely on stable situations*.

\(^8\) CRUZ REPORT 2019.
at unstable environments and sight the worse course of action possibilities, which normally involves violence against civilians and POC actions;

4) **enhancing accountability**, to ensure that those able to take action to prevent fatalities and injuries are placed before their responsibilities, *enforcing civilian in charge of planning and military with protection tasks to face the responsibilities of their actions or lack of actions, as occurred at POC failures at the 90’s.*

13. The report presents an “Improving Security Peacekeeping Project”, funded by the People’s Republic of China through UN Peace and Development Trust Fund, divided in 2 phases. The first was the report, and the 2nd being high-impact projects/work streams that will implement one or more of the Phase I recommendations, leading to pragmatic results which can improve POC capabilities by strengthening troops capabilities.

As today’s changed environment (terrorists, gangs, armed groups, organized crime etc.) produces a wide range of threats to troops security, and: “The era of “Chapter VI-style” peacekeeping is over, but the UN and Troop/Police Contributing Countries are, by and large, still gripped by a “Chapter VI Syndrome.” If … do not change their mindset, take risks and show a willingness to face these new challenges, they will be consciously sending troops into harm’s way.” (CRUZ, S., 2017, n.p.), and we can complete that reducing threats to troops security provides better POC conditions and capabilities.

So, we use this approach as methodological board to analyses the questions regarding POC tasks to continue in the next chapters leading to better actions and study the lessons learned at POC tasks on UNMISS:

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**Fig 3**, Methodological Board for a case study of POC at UNMISS 2013-14 crisis, the author
Chapter 2 will study POC policy backgrounds, contents, Evolution and main points. EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED follows at Chapter 3, grouping UNMISS issues at Policy, Strength and capability, Operational Procedures & Intelligence, Logistical/Support Aspects and Others, facilitating an overview.

In Chapter 4, we observe FUTURE CHALLENGES at the camps of power of Political, Economic, Military, Science and Technology, Psychosocial and others, providing proceed at upper level of understanding, guiding RECOMMENDATIONS (Political, Strategical, Operational level, Tactical level and others) to the Conclusion.

Basing on this methodological approach, lets study the POC broader basis, his evolution and praxis, that allows us understanding posteriorly the situation at UNMISS.

2. PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN (POC) POLICY AT UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

2.1 BACKGROUNDS OF POC POLICY

“...Protecting civilians is one of the most important ways … the Organization gives expression to its ultimate objectives...“ Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6531, 10 May 2011, p. 11.

The closest POC related in past is “jus in bello” concept from Ancient Roman rule of law, which consist in the way the war is conducted. (ALMEIDA, 2011)

Westphalia treaty (1648) brought recognition of state’s sovereignty, self-determination, legal equality and principle of non-intervention, however, supporters of humanitarian intervention attest it was used in past as an excuse, resulting in genocide and horrendous crimes against humanity as Rwanda and Cambodia;

IHL and IHRL, developed from “jus in bello”, followed by Geneva (1929, 1949) and Hague Conventions (1899, 1907) and UN Charter are often understood as bases for POC concepts. UNSC was given the authority, under Chapter VII, to use of force against member states for maintaining or restoring international peace and security, under legal basement, the ways to use of force, and conceptual support for the POC, as far:

“POC mandate … represents both the mission’s tasking and its explicit legal authority to use force to protect civilians. However, the decisions of the SC do not exclusively define the authority to use force,
including to protect civilians. The use of force in UNPKO has one of two legal bases: (a) it is expressly authorized under Chapter VII (such as a protection of civilians mandate); or (b), it is implied under the rubric of the right to self-defense (usually under a non-Chapter VII mandate)” (WILLMOT and SHEERAN 2013)

The first large scale PKO was at Lebanon (1956).UN Emergency Force in the Middle East (UNEF), opening a new dimension at international relations, the deployment of armed troops to assist implementation of agreements reached between the UN and parts of a conflict, stating the classic three principles (MCSWEENEY 2002 p. 220):
- Consent from the territorial state and other parties involved,
- Impartiality by UN to grant credibility, and
- Non-use of force unless in individual or collective mission self-defense

From 1947 to 1987 thirteen (13) PKOs were established, most to monitor borders and demilitarized zones, preventing conflict between two or more nations.

At the 1990s, complex scenarios, predominance of non-state actors and intra-state conflicts led UN to use traditional peacekeeping and full-scale enforcement operations, creating 29 Missions between 1988 and 1996 increasing the number of missions by a factor of ten (from 0.325 to 3.22 missions/year)10. The use of force in situations that fell into the grey area in between has thus come to be known as Peace Enforcement, describing UN operations where force is involved less than enforcement operations, within traditional PK tasks such as monitoring cease-fires, but engulfing complex ones whose requires willingness and a capacity to use deadly force, but the problem was that…

“Following … crisis and interventions of the 1990s, Council mandates shifted to support ‘stronger’ protection measures through affirmation of IHL and human rights law and a more explicit emphasis on the protection of civilians. This shift came on the heels of conflicts that directly challenged both UNPKO and humanitarian efforts, testing their principles and capabilities. When peace agreements collapsed, conflict resumed and the consent of the parties to the presence of a mission disappeared-as seen in the Balkans, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia-peacekeepers were ill prepared and failed to protect civilians from slaughter, including mass atrocities and genocide” 11

So IHL acted as a intervenient variable, enforcing POC, becoming later a determinant factor in future missions, as described by MASTEN (2004, p. 19) that this requires troops acting between- or against- civilians, potential attackers, militias and gangs, as far act together or protecting aid workers, supply humanitarian convoys, NGOS etc.

Number of missions continued to increase at later 1990’s:

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10 MASTEN R 2004 P. 19
11 HOLT, V. K.; TAYLOR, G.; KELLY, M, 2009, p. 35

Some scholars considered them to be under ambitious mandates, and we will try to analyze this affirmation to confirm it in order to proceed our understanding of POC tasks.

At same time the number of missions increase, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) introduced in 1994 the concept of human security, overseen as a multifaceted approach, integrating individual security dimensions:

- Economic,
- Food,
- Health Personal,
- Community and
- Environmental Policy.

Not only in numbers, but missions scope also was outstretched at Political and Strategic level, but failures in the field indicates that operational procedures and tactical measures did not followed the wide broad expansion and adaptation. Many scholars point main issues of failures at PKO troops, some stresses vague mandate words, but we will try interconnect all levels, dismissing punctual approach, connecting the dots.

Besides POC incidents occurred at many missions (Cambodia, Laos, first DRC mission etc.), we will focus on Somalia, Rwanda and Balkans, as they appear have same characteristics we identify repeated at South Sudan that lead wide reasons to fail in POC.

UNSCR 751(1992) established UNOSOM I to monitor ceasefire deploying 50 UN PK to provide security, escort and delivery humanitarian supplies in Somalia, a big effort to a reinforced platoon, a troop without logistic chain neither planning capability.

Increased to 3000 soldiers (UNSCR 775) as crisis worsen, deployed a Unified Task Force (UNITAF- UNSCR 794) led by US in coordination with UNOSOM, under Chapter

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13 HENDERSON B (What have been the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping missions?), LARSEN G. & VEDSMAND K. (When the UN watched a massacre unfold in Croatia) and MASTEN R. G., (The path to Srebrenica).
14 OLADIPO T (The UN's peacekeeping nightmare in Africa); KEVIN S (Peacekeepers made major errors that contributed to South Sudan massacre, U.N. report finds); LUX, D. (Mission Impossible? Lessons from UN Peacekeeping in South Sudan.).
VII. UNSCR 814 (1993) implemented a peace enforcement operation (UNOSOM II) for first time in History, authorizing the use of military force against a nation-state or belligerent parties (MASTEN R. 2004 p. 17), unifying the two forces, and added nation-building tasks, which supports the view of “ambitious” objectives, as didn’t reached the firsts but already amplified the scope.

As the situation changed during the mission, it looks like a lack of intelligence can be identified, as so in a military decision-making process, where you should analyze the “most dangerous” and “most likelihood” perspectives, allowing to conduct proper planning to react in case of apply one of the “Course Of Action” (COA) to forward events.

After attacks at UN, UNSCR 814 (1993) authorized actions against incitators and attackers, as well arrest, detention, trial and punishment for perpetrators. After the bloody events between troops and local militias in October 1993, US reduced and withdraw from mission, but UN remained until 1995, and besides considered a fail, studies estimated that millions of people were avoided to die by famine or conflict due UN presence\textsuperscript{15}

The UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was also initially stablished to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid (UNSCR 872,1993) during a peace agreement implementation but started with less troops than indicated by the previous assessment (4000 requested, received few more than 2000).

The mandate comprised ensure the security of capital city, monitor ceasefire, establishment a demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor security situation during transitional government’s leading up to elections; mine clearance; and coordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction with relief operations; a large specter of activities to troops less than a Brigade. The military perspective of chain of command and dosage troops echelon (Platoon, Coy, Brigade, Division) helps understand that most of time troops employed don’t have the doctrinaire structure that allows keep chain of command, logistics, intelligence and other staff tasks aligned to support a good operational-tactical planning and decision-making process, leading to failures at tactical level by an operational cause that results in lower POC capability.

Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi died at a plane crash (April 1994) while returning from peace talks, setting a wave of political and ethnic killings. It was informed by UN

\textsuperscript{15} MASTEN, R, 2002, p. 16
FHQ that was intention to promote a massacre, but the source of the information was considered unreliable by UNSG and not forwarded, indicating lack of intelligence system to classify and analyze, delaying in allow UN forces to confiscate the known weapons caches for the genocidal plot\textsuperscript{16}, indicating no existence of source evaluation data system effectiveness and problems within the double chain of command.

Ceasefire was tried, without success, and as attacks at UN personnel increasingly, some countries unilaterally withdrew contingents, resolution 912 (1994) reduced strength from 2,548 to 270 (!), and under harsh conditions they protected thousands of civilians\textsuperscript{17}.

UNSCR 912 (1994) allowed act as intermediary between warring parties, fixing 2,548 troops, but was expanded (UNSCR 918, 1994), as situation worsen, to contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk, establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas, and security for relief operations. Resolution 929 (1994) authorized, under Chapter VII a multi-national humanitarian operation by French-led multinational forces, establishing a humanitarian protection zone in south-western Rwanda, until UNAMIR took over the zone. On 1995, following ceasefire and new Government, UNSCR 997 adjusted mandate at large scope, until withdrawal in 1996.

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR -UNSCR 743,1992) started in Croatia to ensure demilitarization of designated areas and protected from armed attack all persons residing there, which clearly shows a POC task, even before this term was used. It was changed and enlarged to a wide area of activities later, extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor "no fly zones" and "safe areas", and to the Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia for monitor border areas. It extended from 1992–1995 with initial strength of 38,599 (684 MLOb\textsuperscript{18}).

In 1995, Bosnian Serb forces at Srebrenica executed 8,000 muslim men and boys, at UN declared area free for hostile acts, as receiving thousands of civilians to be protected by 600 Dutch UN troops. There are relates that under perspective of threats, former soldiers in IDP areas requested to receive back their guns, taken at a disarmament process and stored by UN, but it wasn´t authorized.\textsuperscript{19} Other violence against civilians happened

\textsuperscript{16} MASTEN R. G 2004 p. 18
\textsuperscript{17} https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/unamirS.htm
\textsuperscript{18} https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unprof_p.htm
\textsuperscript{19} https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/11729436/Srebrenica-20-years-on-What-have-been-the-successes-and-failures-of-UN-peacekeeping-missions.html
without nothing being— or could being— done by the soldiers, as killing of dozen of disabled IDPs leaved behind shoot just besides Danish PK soldiers camp, with no reaction.20

A point of how lack of information and understanding of the geopolitical, historical background and current threat situation is seen as far the mission were issued to deal a interstate conflict between the former Yugoslavian states, but the civil war that resulted the dissolution were intrastate conflicts. It also can be seen when UNMIR ignored not only present ethnical tension in Rwanda, but the historical background of it, as unfortunately would happen again later when UNMISS did not consider at all the ethnic questions and huge far past troubles between Dinka and Nuer in South Sudan.

UNOSOM and UNPROFOR was originally deployed to deal with ceasefire agreements, but none of them conducted proper plan to crisis escalation, transitioning to Chapter VII in order to protect civilian population and aid workers after attacks initiated, at same time increased the tasks including wide humanitarian help at human security approach with no popper structure to conduct it, at a high-risk environment with diffuse threats and adding nation building tasks.

It generated, as MASTEN (2004) stated, inability or relutance to employ force against violations of the agreements or civilians and UN personnel, indicating that at Operational level, a study of “most probably” and “most dangerous” COA could be provided adequate planning to deal with new events. As SUN ZI (p. 269) said, one of the three ways a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army is by interfering with direction of fighting, while ignorant of the military principle of adaptation to cirscunstances, sows doubts and misgiving in the minds of his officers and soldiers. At this three missions, guidances changed “on the job”, showing lack of preempetion, planning and proper reaction from troops, but not relyng the fought only upon them, but by a “lack of security effectivness” in all levels from the initial evaluation until the cirsis escalation and further actions.

As the mission tasks increased and widened scope, Unity of Efforts was decreased, because multiple different, particular and complex tasks were taken under a duplicated—most of time—chain of command. It is stated by CRUZ (2017)21 as a necessary to change, but even previously MASTEN (2004) indicated that at the 3 missions studied “Lastly, the

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20 https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/05/watched-massacre-unfold-croatia-160520085629629.html
21 Ensuring Unity of Effort: Security Council resolutions should meet the requirements of peacekeeping operations when they deploy into potentially dangerous situations, especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort. (CRUZ, 2017)
UN failed to properly ensure unity of effort and unity of command.” in a precise explanation under a military planning perspective that NEEDS to be followed, in order to avoid more violence against PK personnel, allowing them to reach their objectives, specially at POC tasks:

“….. unity of command… “for every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander.” This is often difficult to achieve for UN peacekeeping operations, as the level of command authority given to the commander of a multinational force is established by agreement among the multinational partners. The lead-nation command structure, where one nation is assigned the lead role and its command and control predominates, is most commonly employed for this purpose. For example, Canada was assigned the role of lead-nation for the UNAMIR mission in Rwanda. This system works well for the military structure of peacekeeping operations. However, the UN exists as a political body and thus it feels compelled to play an active role in the operational and tactical side of the mission. Therefore, there existed a parallel command structure in UNOSOM, UNAMIR, and UNPROFOR that was comprised of both a military and a political side. As clearly illustrated in the chapter on Srebrenica, the politico-military parallel command structure can lead to severe problems in the conduct of peacekeeping operations.” (MASTEN, R, 2004 P. 3)

Nonetheless, is necessary to check what was inserted and the evolution of POC policy, stressing his main contents in order to proceed to relate the questions issued during UNMISS tasks, avoiding being so punctual as many criticisms used to be in many scholar, official and media documents, interconnecting the points to get a landscape perspective that could lead to an understandable framework of such complex problem.

2.2 CONTENT OF POC POLICY

2. 2.1 Evolution of policy.

“The protection of civilians is at the heart of the mandate of United Nations peacekeeping operations. In that framework our Organization, on a daily basis, must fulfill that mission.”

SC Meeting Record S/PV.6650 (9 November 2011), p. 19

The nature of armed conflicts changed at late 20th; large inter-state wars were replaced by violent internal conflicts, with vast majority of casualty’s civilians, guiding insertion of POC tasks at UNPKO, but having as collateral effects aggressions against UN personnel.
In 1994 Canada press at SC the authorization PKs needs to prevent violence as Rwanda, to ‘stop the physical violence against civilians… which, a clearer mandate… would help establish credibility for the Council and its missions.22

Instead clarify the conditions of mandates, the conceptions of Security were amplified (DANIEL AGUIAR, 2018) at The UN Global development report (1994) introducing the concept of “human security” extended in seven dimensions:

Food, Health, Physical, Economic, Political, Environmental and Community.

The UNSCR1265 (1999) stated as far civilian’s vast majority of casualties in armed conflicts guided to a wide range of activities related, addressing causes of armed conflict in a comprehensive manner to enhance POC at long-term basis, promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law and respect for and protection of HR, aligning with the broader human security concept and humanitarian civilians approach, but not detailing which conditions or how to take this role, emphasizing R2P as “responsibility of States to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of IHL” (UNSCR 1265, 1999, p. 3).

On 1999 SC established UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone, Chapter VI) guided by legal and practical principles rooted in IHL and UN charter, (TAYLOR V., 2009, p. 42), introducing training in IHL, under a mandate of POC task, successfully completed in 200523.

The Brahimi Report connected to a potential UN obligation to ensure respect for IHRL (also known as the ‘due diligence’ obligation) by others such as non-state actors, private individuals and even local authorities24

The Millennium Report 25 proposed that when a state fails to protect its civilians, the responsibility then shifts to the broader international community.

In 2001, SC recognized the issue of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) delimiting the scope your calls mass atrocities: genocide; ethnic cleansing; crime against humanity; and war crime (MACDERMOTT; HANSSEN, 2010).

In 2004, UN report “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility” strongly endorsed international responsibility to protect populations from grave threats,

22 WILLMOT, 2013
authorizing military intervention as last resort, in event of genocide or large-scale killing, ethnic or serious violations of HL which Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent (MCSWEENEY, 2004, p. 226)

UNSCR 1874 included regional organizations as important participants of POC, expressing intention of ensuring mandates include clear guidelines in the implementation26, but not detailed nor guided actions.

The *UN Capstone Doctrine* (2008) addressed POC as part of a larger discussion of principles of UN peacekeeping27, a wide range document that standardize many procedures, but as some critical states, it was also surpassed by the threat conditions and fragile security environments of 21th century (CRUZ REPORT, 2017), as stressed also by TAYLOR (2009), when remarks that now UN missions tends to occurs in fragile host states, with high risk environment and vicious security problems, that sometimes leads to even protect civilian against their own government.

In 2009, eight UNPKO were explicitly mandated to POC28, what exposes very clearly the importance of POC, as far:

- It will be a constant task at next missions,
- It is a response to late 20th-21th century new threats at intra-estate conflicts;
- UN Failed many times to POC be accomplished, attracting attention from the media and international community;
- It occurs principally at high risk and threat environments and at fragile host states;
- Fails in POC used to occurs at high level of PK personnel casualties, indicating that overall troops and missions’ conditions should be reviewed,
- POC role are under a comprehensive approach that includes many levels of security, connecting most of all UN mission tasks to the successful of the final condition of civilians being protected or not at a crisis event,
- To avoid the crisis event, all mission should be strengthening, specially HQ planning and troops actions to develop safe environment by preventive actions and strong immediate reaction capability, otherwise will be another “bite in the dust” situation.

POC Policy reached a wide scope, besides his huge importance, many and large activities under this concept of comprehensive approach, make it more difficult, as happened at UNMISS crisis, and should narrow down otherwise will not be successful. At 2015 a updated at POC policy occurs, with some good products on documents, but even doe at 2016 MALAKAL IDP Camp attack and 2017 new crisis at JUBA, UNMISS resulting in failure to protect. Anyway, lets check what increased after 2013 crisis with the newest policy and why and where still need to be improved.

The importance of POC task generated as newest products:
- DPKO/DFS POLICY ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN UN PEACEKEEPING, 2015, (to be reviewed 2017 not released up till now)
- UN Comprehensive Protection of Civilians (CPOC) Training Materials for UNPKO Military Version, DPKO /DFS, 2017
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Use of Force by Military Components in UNPKO, 2017

**UN 2015 POC Policy** divides in
- **Defining the protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping** under:
  - Guiding principles
  - The operational concept for protection of civilian’s action
  - Protection of civilian’s response phases
  - Implementing the protection of civilian’s mandate

The 2015 POC Policy states new Guiding principles that facilitate planning, establishing the model text to insert POC task at mandates, avoiding interpretations but also restricting definitions or details, but define POC as:

“Peacekeeping operations are required, under the POC mandate, to protect civilians, particularly those under imminent threat of physical violence” To fulfil their POC mandate, PKO are provided with the authority to afford direct physical protection, including through the use of force under certain conditions,”

Also defines POC mandate for civilian, military and police components as follows:

“All necessary means up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government.”
It is a nice improvement the inclusion of preventing actions and remarks Government
tasks and defines **Threats of physical violence or POC threats** as:

“Encompass all hostile acts or situations that are likely to lead to death or serious bodily injury, including sexual violence, regardless of the source of the threat.”

and stablish that “the mandate does not demand that peacekeepers engage in actions for which they are not equipped. At the same time, no peacekeeping force will always be able to address all threats.”, which is a good clearance for acting.

As **guiding principles** of POC 2015 Policy defines:

- Grounded in international law
- A priority mandate
- The primary responsibility of governments
- A responsibility of peacekeepers
- An active duty to protect
- Under effective command and control
- Consonant with the principles of peacekeeping
- A whole-of-mission activity
- A comprehensive approach
- In cooperation with humanitarian actors and in respect of humanitarian principles
- A community-based approach
- Undertaken with a gender perspective
- Undertaken with mainstreamed child protection concerns.

It is a gathering of perceptions that were spread at many different documents, and the definition of some that was not written before, providing an updated and good guidance for POC understanding that would help on future planning’s at lower levels (strategic, operational and tactical). Next item of Policy is **Operational concept for POC at UNPKO**.

Before proceed, is interesting to note that here we find a “gap”, as there is no strategy of POC, but the Policy enter straight to Operational level, but at same time it have operational name but talks about great strategy, as far defines how to achieve objectives, which way to follows, defining that actually the real gap maybe at Operational level.
Anyway, it gave good strategic guidance, useful for mission mindset understanding as establish The three tiers of POC action:

**Tier I:** Protection through dialogue and engagement;

**Tier II:** Provision of physical protection;

**Tier III:** Establishment of a protective environment.

At the details, it produces a good overview of the comprehensive approach, but still promotes a wide range of tasks, but allows the planners to guide his efforts at studied priorities, instead impose all of them at the mandate.

Other very good item is The POC response phases, guiding the implementation of POC operations are implemented along four operational phases:

(i) prevention, (ii) preemption, (iii) response and (iv) consolidation,

**Prevention:** Prevention activities shall be conducted in areas where no clear threat to civilians has yet been identified.

Support the establishment of key infrastructure, including roads, transport and communications in remote and inaccessible areas;

**Pre-emption:** When likely threats are identified and attacks against civilians are anticipated, pro-active measures are required to mitigate or eliminate them before violence occurs.

**Response:** Whenever physical violence against civilians is apparent, missions will aim immediately at stopping aggressors from conducting hostile acts through political, security or legal means.

An important measure is the establishment of priorities to where to afford physical protection in areas of displacement and accommodate IDPs:

1. Outside UN premises, including in IDP camps or with host communities;
2. In areas adjacent or close to existing mission premises identified for that purpose;
3. In extremis situations, including due to a lack of preparedness or where the mission has insufficient military or police capacity to secure a site outside the mission compound, in ‘POC sites’ within existing mission premises.33 This option will be enabled for the minimum duration possible, and the decision to relocate IDPs shall lie with the mission leadership, acting in close consultation with the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).

At guidance E.4., Implementing the Protection of Civilians mandate, the E.4.1. Protection of Civilians threat and risk assessment item establish some good proposals and definitions almost as classical military planning, but still insists at Early
warning mechanisms in a complex model that jeopardize the effectiveness of the risk assessments proposed, deserving revision under intelligence concepts.

It launches a framework for drafting comprehensive POC strategies in reasonable lines, presenting many documents models, but not all feasible or useful, as the complex EWM matrix that proved not work during UNMISS 2013-14 crisis and is repeated here. The Comprehensive POC Training Materials military version and the Guidelines for Use of Force by Military Components in UNPKO, both from 2017, are good materials that should be used at tactical level to train troops at establishing concepts of POC and practical measures, and are aligned, as the Policy, with many aspects described at Cruz Report.

This product provides better training and mindset at POC role, but there are still remaining gaps at Political level, as principles have influence and may turn implementation confuse, indicating a need to review Capstone Doctrine, that is previous to main POC last decade problems, and at Operational level, specially at organization, composition and capabilities of troops according each specific mission Area of Operations and intelligence assessment that should be conducted previously not only to determine amount of troops in figures, but which capabilities are required (jungle experts, Cavalry mechanized troops to escort convoy-liaison-recon-security operations, riverine patrols and transports, indirect fire, desertic training, military logistic support etc.)

2.2.2 Main points of policy

If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault of sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity? (ICISS, 2001, VII). KOFI ANNAN

The two views of humanitarianism developed in parallel, sometimes in different way, complex contradictions and points of view, leading to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) conception, which comprehends The Responsibility to Prevent, The Responsibility to React and The Responsibility to Rebuild. UN adopted the perspective that every state has the responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes; and the international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility; if states fail to do so, international
community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN charter (Ibid., 2001).

R2P differs in that it may be invoked without the consent of the host state. R2Ps envisages action that goes beyond the principles of peacekeeping (which usually require the consent of the host state).

In fact, the principle of international collective responsibility to protect civilians emerged and was emphasized in the mandates of peacekeeping missions in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica mass killings, in 1994 and 1995 respectively. Since then, this principle has become a clear norm within the obligations of peacekeepers and multinational forces whether deployed according to a UN Security Council resolution or authorized by regional organizations (SIOBHÁN WILLS, 2009, p. 388).

As AGUIAR (2018) perceived, POC approach is wider than R2P application, since it involves measures to protect the dignity and safety of individuals under the threat of violence. On the other hand, POC under the auspices of the international law of armed conflict (DICA) is limited to armed conflict situations. R2P already focuses on a prevention of mass atrocities, and can be raised regardless of the occurrence of armed conflict (BADESCU; BERGHOLM, 2009), generating controversy, with respect to "duty to intervene" in the form of the "responsibility to protect", by means of coercive measures (sanctions political, economic, etc.) or by the intervention the military itself, as ultimate resource (EVANS; SAHNOUN, 2002).

Summarizing the main contents of POC policy, we can state:

1) POC policy attend a relevant international community role that appeared following the changes at volatile and high risk conflict areas after 20 th century last decade, under very important law principles;

2) It will continue to be issued probably at any UN future mission, as far the comprehensive approach was internalized by UN and there is a new Policy regulating its definition;

3) The mandates should be narrowed in order to allow accomplish the POC tasks, and the 2015 Policy facilitates to develop planning to attend POC tasks prioritizing, putting tiers and phases;

29 Also referred to as international humanitarian law (IHL).
4) UNPKO should have good strength to attend demands of high risk volatile environments, and capabilities to develop good operational actions, but there are still a gap on troops organization and composition, echelons integrated completed units and other demands at Operational level to improve POC tasks;

Now we will study how POC Policy was inserted at UNMISS by the historical background of the South Sudan history and his previous mission, UNMIS.
3. POC IN UNMISS

3.1 SOUTH SUDAN CRISIS AND UNMISS

3.1.1 Historical background

Republic of South Sudan, Capital Juba, official language English, located at NE Nilotic sub-Saharan Africa, hosts 11 million inhabitants in 644326 km² bordering Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR). Mostly plain terrain with isolated low altitude mountains and hills, crossed at middle S-N by Nile River (almost all navigable) and one biggest world permanent swamps (The Sudd), flooding large terrain during rainy season.

Fig 4 swamp near Bor, the author

Known by ancient Arabs as “Bilad al-Sudan”, land of black people, nilotic groups Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and others was there since 5th century, Islamic people arrived at 7th.

Many black kingdoms (Kush and Funj Kingdom, Fur and Masalit sultanate) disputed leadership for 1000 years, until 14th century collapse of Christian Nubian kingdoms and arrival of Arab slave traders and merchants from central Sudanese area. During Turk-Egyptian administration (1821) South were used to slave hunting, further endurance of ethnic questions, as historical evidences of Nuer-Dinka rivalry¹, and western powers pressured open region to tusker traders and European missionaries, and a private

¹ LANE AND JOHNSON, 2009, P.524
businessman, Zubair, established (1850) a network of small fortresses (Zaribas), trade posts for tusks and slaves, and a huge private army, defeating Darfur sultanate. Governor Charles Gordon defeated him (1874) without control region, and the Mahdists, Islamic warriors that believed to be the “chosen one” conquered North, isolating South until British (1889) take Equatoria area, and whole Sudan came under Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement, presenting Arabicized domination (N), catholic priests and Christian missionaries (S), and a clear non-interest of the North about southern people´s conditions, a great area of slaves capture, where Islamic influence is suppressed by traditional African religions, with leaders (prophets) historically offering resistance and having great influence specially at Nuer people.

![Fig 5 Nuer prophet at AKOBO, JS, 2013, the author](image)

Cultural diversity and ethnic complexity (principal groups Nuer, Dinka, Toposa, Murle) features hundreds of languages and livelihoods from difference levels of urban occupation, from fishermen villages to cattle nomadists\(^2\), cattle raiding being a traditional dispute.

Some months after independence (1955), a Battalion rebelled near Torit against his transfer to Khartoum, initiating a civil war that endured until 1972.

Peace keeps until 1983, when unrest arose non-attendance of deals. A garrison at Bor refused to be transferred, government sent troops, but commander defected, taking leadership uniting the South multi-ethnic groups to fight Arabic North. He was John Garang.

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\(^2\) JOHN R., JUSTIN W., SULIMAN B., JOK MADUT J., Sudan handbook. London: (RVI), 2012
further 1st President and founder of Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and his armed brace, Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

Longer than 2 decades war with violent outcomes for civilians, hundreds of thousands displaced abroad and inside, plus 2.5 million dead destroyed infrastructure.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005) established an independence referendum 6 years later, but leaved uncertain condition to Abyei rich oil contested area, ethnic minorities, border passing permission to nomadic groups etc.

![South Sudan Administrative map with Abyei contested area at N](image)

After Garang perished at a helicopter crash (2005), raising independence perspective, Resolution 1590 (2005) established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) to support CPA implementation; perform some humanitarian assistance tasks and protection and promotion of human rights, stablishing 10000 troops, indeterminate civilian staff number and 715 police officers. The mandate have a vague POC content, “reaffirming” the UNSCR 1296 (2000)³ and tasking to “to coordinate international efforts towards the POC”.

UNMIS had to quickly move out Sudan after 2011 Referendum results guided to independence, and UNSC created UNMISS (UNSCR 1996, 2011).

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³ UNSCR 1296 (2000) talk about POC in very widely, reaffirming regretting of civilians being majority casualties at armed conflicts and the “case-by-case” on POC and intention of clear mandates on this tasks.
3.1.2. UNMISS

To understand UNMISS´s POC tasks is necessary check South Sudan characteristics, with semi-desertic areas at N, NW and NE, Nile River runs S-N from Uganda through swamp, savannahs grows until small jungles, with more closed forests to S, E and W in direction to this borders, and some jungle areas spreads around country.

![Fig 7 South Sudan boundaries and jungle areas, Google](image)

Bad infrastructure, poor, neglected and damaged earth road network deteriorated by years of war (circa 200 km asphalted road only), monsoons, rainy and dry season (6 months each), limited air/road mobility by weather and mine conditions that jeopardizes Helicopters Landing Zones (HLZ) and airports, as far during rainy mines swiped by running water, requesting new assessment by demining sector if not used for some months⁴.

There is almost no electric lines, basic sanitation or plumbed water, most revenue came from oil export passed by pipeline to Sudan, high level of poverty and inequal economic distribution; chronical tropical and endemic diseases occurs all country.

![Fig 8 road conditions at rainy seasons, the author](image)

⁴ HILDE F., South Sudan The Untold Story 2016
10 States (plus N contested area) different in geography, ethnic, social conditions, guiding to different threats and environments to each mission area, a society strongly marked by many ethnical groups (main groups Dinka and Nuer and languages, traditional religions, Christians, catholics and small Islamic presence, huge indicators of corruption at government⁵, low education regarding war periods, reduced agricultural production by war displacement. Livelihood exists as cattle nomadism and semi-nomadic, fishing villages, urban occupation, dozen thousands of inhabitants at capitals, more than million in JUBA, but most small cities/villages hardly accessible isolated by weather/geographical conditions.

Under this environment, from decades of war and violence, UNMISS was stablished.
Implemented by UNSCR 1996 (2011), Chapter VII, UNMISS mandate “stressed the need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to peace consolidation … coherence between political, security, development, HR, and rule of law activities”, reaffirming resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on POC.

The long list of widespread activities/roles pass below, with author’s bold and remarks:

About the actors:

From and to the host country, the mandate requires clarity about roles, responsibilities, … collaboration, need for cooperation with other relevant actors in the region, including UN missions around (UNAMID, UNISFA and MONUSCO), for foreign stronger and well-defined partnerships among the UN, development agencies, bilateral partners, and other relevant actors, regional and sub-regional institutions and the international financial institutions, to implement national strategies aimed at effective institution building, including cooperation about LRA (Lord Resistance Army) threat.

The Mandate of UNMISS was: “to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development; with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbors”, authorizing the following Tasks:

(a) Support for peace consolidation … fostering longer-term state building and economic development;

(i) Providing good offices, advice, and support to GoSS on political transition, governance, and establishment of state authority, including formulation of national policies in this regard;
(ii) Promoting popular participation in political processes, … establishment of an independent media; and ensuring participation of women in decision-making forums;

(b) Support GoSS in exercising its responsibilities for conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution and protect civilians through:

(i) Exercising good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation at the national, state, and county levels within capabilities to anticipate, prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict;

(ii) Establishment and implementation of a mission-wide early warning capacity, with an integrated approach to information gathering, monitoring, verification, early warning and dissemination, and follow-up mechanisms;

(iii) Monitoring, investigating, verifying, and reporting regularly on HR and potential threats against the civilian population as well as actual and potential violations of IHL and IHRL, bringing these to the attention of the authorities as necessary, and immediately reporting gross violations of human rights to the UNSC;

(iv) Advising and assisting GoSS including military and police …, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, in compliance with IHL, IHRL, and refugee law;

(v) Deterring violence including … proactive deployment and patrols in areas at high risk of conflict, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular when GoSS is not providing such security;

(vi) Providing security for UN and humanitarian personnel, installations and equipment …;

(c) Support GoSS in developing its capacity to provide security, to establish rule of law, and to strengthen the security and justice sectors through:

(i) Supporting the development of strategies …;

(ii) Supporting GoSS in … national DDR …;

(iii) Strengthening the capacity of … Police Services through advice on policy, planning, and legislative development, …;

(iv) Supporting GoSS in developing a military justice system …;

(v) Facilitating a protective environment for children affected by armed conflict, through implementation of a monitoring and reporting mechanism;

(vi) Supporting GoSS in conducting de-mining activities;

To accomplish this wide, broad and long list:
UNMISS composition was 7,000 military personnel, including MLO and staff officers, 900 civilian police personnel, civilian component, including technical human rights investigation expertise; and further decides to review …. a reduction of military personnel to a level of 6,000;

The very wide mission is citated to consisted yet in to:
- consolidate peace and security and to help establish conditions for development,
- strengthening the capacity of the Government by consolidate the peace and prevent a return to violence;
- develop an early strategy in support of national peacebuilding priorities, including establishment of core government functions, provision of basic services,
  - establishment of the rule of law,
  - respect for HR,
  - management of natural resources,
  - development of the security sector,
  -…..and revitalization of the economy.

An ambitious mandate, trying to “build a country from the scratch”, as indicated at the ingenuous documentary from NY times (How to Build a Country From Scratch: Creating South Sudan | Op-Docs | The New York Times)6, under very low number of troops and personnel, sometimes proposing taking the lead of actions that should be in charge of GoSS, and aiming a strong perspective of HR investigation against the Host Country government. To accomplish all this, the strength was only:
- 6 Infantry Battalions, with some armored transport vehicles, but not mechanized troops;
- Support troops: 4 engineering Coys, 3 military hospitals, 1 Military Police (MP) Coy, 1 small Rwanda aircraft Unit and 1 Indian signals unit, all of them did not report to the FC, but to the civilian Director of Field Support (DFS).

The troops were under the State Coordinator (SC), SSB civilian Chief, at some aspects, and straight linked to FC at others, facing no proper command chain. There aren’t a SHQ Gal level commanding or Sector HQ Staff planning.

6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQfluxpYVds
It was under very low patterns of security at troops figures, as for instance MINUSTAH, which area can be inserted about 7 times inside Jonglei State, with almost same troops.

Fig 12 Comparation between areas of SOUTH SUDAN and HAITI, and JONGLEI STATE x HAITI, and UNMISS x MINUSTAH. Troops number 3 Set 2013: MINUSTAH 6230 troops, UNMISS 6802 troops.

UNMISS structure **footprint** was divided in:
- State Support Bases (SSB),
- County Support Bases (CSB),
- Company Operating Bases (COB) and
- Temporary Operating Bases (TOB).

The composition of mission was:

![UNMISS Organization](image)

Figure 13 UNMISS Organization (MUNSON, R,xx)

The FHQ at JUBA were as bellow, with a Deputy MLO, chief of all MLO cells, and troops deployment is beside.
At 2012 / 2013 many violent incidents against UN personnel occurred:

A contractor helicopter shoot down by government troops (4 crew killed), UN convoy ambushed in JS by unidentified elements (1 PK serious injury), convoy in JS attacked by unknown armed persons (vehicles damage), convoy ambushed in JS (April 2013), 12 fatalities (5 Indian PK, 7 civilians), contractor vehicle ambushed (1 killed) (4 May), all very criticized by poor troops reaction.

Violence against civilians, as cattle raids, intercommunal attacks with hundreds of death and vengeance responses, a rebellion of Murle people at JS after his leader lost election for governor, the expulsion from country of UNMISS HR chiefs by GoSS, and many incidents of restriction of movement to UN personnel around all country was the overview of period, guiding UNMISS to establish a new mandate, UNSCR 2109 (July 2013) listing:

Main reasons and causes for act on POC:
- Increased occurrence of conflict and violence and its effect on civilians, in particular … deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation in Jonglei,
- grave concern at the continuing HR violations, including … arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, … extrajudicial killings, as well as looting of property, by armed groups and by national security institutions, in particular in Jonglei State,
- worsening humanitarian situation, … large-scale displacement of persons … food insecurity, …. caused by internal conflict and inter-communal violence.

The mandate continues issuing clarity about roles, and collaboration … including UNAMID, UNISFA, MONUSCO; The need for forging stronger and well-defined partnerships among UN, development agencies, bilateral partners, and other relevant actors:
regional and subregional institutions and the international financial institutions, to implement national strategies aimed at effective institution building.

At POC, Mandate also reaffirms:
- States bear the primary responsibility to protect civilians, and
- UNMISS is a POC mandate and authorizes to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and added “in the areas where its units are deployed”.

Reaffirms the comprehensive, integrated and prioritized approach to peace consolidation, … concern at restrictions placed upon the movement of UNMISS … and condemning all attacks on UN personnel and facilities.

Stated the peacebuilding institution-building and primary responsibility of the GoSS, to consolidate the peace and prevent a return to violence;

Stated UN to support national authorities, … and therefore to further develop its partnership with national authorities on implementing an effective strategy in support of:
- national peacebuilding priorities and plans, including
- establishment of core government functions,
- provision of basic services,
- establishment of the rule of law,
- respect for human rights,
- management of natural resources,
- development of the security sector,
- tackling youth unemployment,
- and revitalization of the economy,

Under Chapter VII, priority of UNMISS’ mandated tasks in resolution 1996 (2011) for the POC … urges UNMISS to:
- deploy its assets accordingly,
- focus adequate attention on capacity-building efforts in this area,
- welcomes the development of a POC strategy and early warning and early response strategy, encourages UNMISS to implement them, and requests the SG to include progress made in implementing these strategies in his reports to the Council;

Underscores that UNMISS’ POC mandate as set out in paragraph 3 (b) (v) of resolution 1996 (2011) includes taking the necessary actions to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, irrespective of the source of such violence;
Determines UNMISS to:

determines geographically reconfigure its military and asset deployment so as to focus on volatile high-

risk areas and associated protection requirements, expresses its concern about the currently deteriorating security situation in parts of Jonglei State, to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed, to carry out its protection mandate.

Demands that GoSS and all relevant parties cooperate fully of UNMISS, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and unrestricted freedom of movement. Government refrain from placing restrictions on UNMISS’ movements, and strongly condemns all attacks on UNMISS troops and staff including.

Calls upon all parties to allow, in accordance with international law, access of relief personnel to delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to IDPS and refugees; demobilization of child soldier.

Expresses deep concern at the increasing violence.

Implement the national DDR strategy,

coordinate with GoSS and participate in regional coordination and information mechanisms to improve protection of civilians and support DDR efforts in light of the attacks by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) reports regional and international partners LRA threats;

Concern the strategic gap in mobility for the mission, and the continuing critical need for aviation capacity and other mobility assets, including military helicopters and riverine capability, for UNMISS, the need to have all appropriate capabilities and resources to accomplish its mandate, and underlines the critical importance of mobility, surveillance, early warning, and quick reaction capabilities, as well access to all conflict-affected areas, to the mission’s POC mandate tasks;

Includes HIV prevention, treatment, care, and support, including voluntary and confidential counselling and testing programs in the mission.

As far seen, the new mandate prioritized POC, but without have a strategy, established many tasks that should be from GoSS to himself, increased the number of roles, extended POC responsibility without proper definition of which area, whom, how protect, and even without a POC strategy. An important remark, the political crisis ongoing was not even
mentioned or evaluated to be assessed as a risk, and the HOM memories attest the surprise of violence eruption, proving that there was no intelligence, the so-called “early warning system” don’t work and they not assessed a worse course of action.

Humanitarian actors, linked or not to UN, are important to understood mission mindset, as exists hundreds of humanitarian agencies/Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), in different areas and interests, and coordination between them and UN was difficult, as they keep a traditional mindset to “impartiality” that leads to not join even the areas where the Bases are located. Some under UN umbrella like OCHA and WFP were deployed km far from UN bases, manned by private security and stocking huge amount of supplies as food and medicines to humanitarian actions, and others were spread around country, with presence of ICRC (Red Cross) and MSF (Medicine San Frontier).

Fig 15 humanitarian agencies at South Sudan

This author worked at October 2013/October 2014 as Military Liaison Officer (MLO) at BOR SSB, JONGLEI STATE, and will use this experience to characterize the UNMISS POC actions, as far it was the most violent and prioritized area from the last mandate.
Fig 16 Jonglei State Map with demography, geographical and other data, and JONGLEIS STATE ethnic composition the author

Jonglei Area of Responsibility (AOR) had 715x615 km, comprising 7 times HAITI, border Ethiopia at E, 11 municipalities, social tensions due ethnic composition, being the limits lands between main ethnic groups (Dinka and Nuer) and other important ones (Murle, Shilluk, Anyuak). It is a traditional tribal clashes area, and faced a great massacre imposed by Nuer against Dinka during 1990’s in Bor town.

SPLA area troops were 2 Divisions and 1 Special Operations Brigade with mixed ethnic composition, but UN We faced difficulties to assess location and deployments, as they had finished campaigns against rebel groups. All State live under night curfew.

BOR SSB was composed at multidimensional style, under State Coordinator (SC) civilian UN chief, all civilian sectors (HR, Civil Affairs, Child Protection, Rule of Law, Air transport by private Russian company and others), and hundreds of employees.

At military component:
- 1 INDIAN Infantry Battalion (equipped with some BMP tracks personnel carrier armored cars and KASPER over wheels armored vehicles),
- 1 NEPALESE QRF Coy (some KASPER)
- 01 SOUTH KOREAN EngCoy,
- 01 CAMBODIA Military Police (MP) detachment,
- 1 BANGLADESH FPU (Force Protection Unit for disturbs control),
- 1 Air Unit (3 helicopters: flairs, armored plate, no gunnery) from Rwanda Air Force;
- 01 MLO Office with 23 MLOs.

01 civilian doctor attended at one small UN clinic, but troops had medical Officers and ambulances. Other sectors are SPLA Liaison Officers cell, a private security company that
guards the main Gate control and the airport, and a UN Police Officers cell (UNPOL) to conduct liaison, trainings and linkage with police authorities.

The SSB had as footprint:
- 02 CSB (PIBOR and AKOBO), 1 Coy (-), civilian components, MLO, UNPOL,
- 01 COB (YUAI), 1 Coy (-),
- 01 TOB (GUMURUK), 1 Coy (-), MLO, UNPOL.

![Fig 17 Jonglei State map with SSB mission footprint of CSB, COB and TOB.](image)

The airport was located beside the base, operated by UN in coordination with GoSS, a strict control of flying routes, MLOs brief with the destination military and local authorities to get the FSA (Flight Safety Assurance) by SPLA that all UN flight depends upon, there was civilian flights, night flights not allowed.

Cattle raiding is a big problem at intercommunal violence, leaving dozens or hundreds of casualties at each attack, rising ethnical tensions.

### 3.2 MANDATE AND PRACTICE OF POC IN UNMISS

#### 3.2.1 POC situation until 2013 crisis

To understand POC practical’s at UNMISS, we will summarize what the mission components and Peacekeepers do on POC, which was the tasks, clarifying this.

The initial mandate not focused on POC, but a wide range of nation-built proposals, as the country was enjoying a peacefully time after decades of war.
From 2011 first mandate, UNMISS focused in organize, spending lots of time and efforts at logistical deployment of troops (MUNSON, R., 2013) and relocations due new country support tasks, and as far POC was at that time a quite new and non-prioritized task yet it take less attention that other nation-building efforts.

It was difficult why:
- It was a new task at moment;
- There was no consensus about WHAT was POC and HOW accomplish the tasks.

During 2012/13 increasing of violence against civilians and UN, and in order to deal with violence escalation, POC was inserted as priority at new mandate in middle 2013, but still was great confusion about WHAT IS and HOW TO DO POC tasks.

The way how does UNMISS protect civilians was a considerable “under construction” context (MUNSON, R., position 580) still at early 2013, and many diverse visions was in course at sectors and levels, causing lack of readiness to deal with the crisis at late 2013.

After 2013 new mandate, still The SRSG report ⁷ confirm this non-clear mindset, presuming that challenges in POC remained centered at JS violent areas, and tried to update and reviewing its strategy, as well as to define new tools and approaches, but it was, as stated at mandate, UNMISS – and even UN- don’t have a proper POC Policy nor strategy, difficult ting strategic, Operational and tactical level.

So, **HOW** POC tasks was accomplished by UNMISS and PK.

The mission proceeds in slowly adaptation to the new tasks and “multidimensional” and “decentralized and integrated” approach. In practical it means that the civilian activities should occurs in parallel and coordinating with military⁸, and that should be deployed around the governmental levels (Union, State and County level), stablishing bases with civilian-military components and some only military component.

The SC gave UNMISS a clear mandate to assist the Government ⁹ including military and police, in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians, increased in many other areas, expanding furthermore an ambitious nation-building propose.

UNMISS engaged with SPLA to identify areas of joint action, using his troops to act as FP, being difficulty by low standard patterns.

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⁷ SRGS UNMISS REPORT 2013
⁸ MUNSON, R, 2015
⁹ UNMISS SRSG REPORT 2013
The “comprehensive approach” at security projected wide range of activities related to POC, each sector, component and humanitarian actors with own perspective, but we can do a main list of threats and factors to POC at South Sudan and activities related to this task:

**FACTORS RELATED TO POC CAUSES**
- Intercommunal violence
- Cattle raids
- Ethnical conflicts
- Warlords violent actions
- Intra-nation political conflicts by violent means, including perpetrators from host country government
- Violence against vulnerable persons (woman and children)
- Safe transit, freedom of movement and destination to IDPs around country
- Food security
- Rebel groups violent actions

**TASKS RELATED TO POC**
- Information collection
- Security, risk and threat assessments
- Security environment developing
- Escort of humanitarian convoys and humanitarian actors/actions
- Grant safe transit, freedom of movement and destination to IDPs around country
- IDPs/POC camps management including security
- Key Leaders Engagement and liaisons
- Community engagements and liaisons
- Humanitarian supply, specially food and medicine
- Patrols and linkage protection between mission-footprints and Base´s surrounding area
- Preemptive actions by deploying troops at operational areas
- Search from road, air and river for IDPs isolated locations
- Support humanitarian action of evacuation and grant freedom of movement of IDPs
- Patrols to evaluate security and risk assessments
- Humanitarian support at crisis escalation provided by Military troops substituting civilian components and humanitarian actors
- Engineering works building, as protective sites to IDP Camps, shelters, Bases physical protection, mobility support to road movements, road improvements and building, bridges building, demining and engineering boats support;

**THREATS TO POC ACTIONS AND TASKS**
- Aggressions against PK troops and humanitarian actors
- Lack of information and situational awareness
- Lack of planning, preparation, readiness and reaction capability at all components and echelons of mission
- Complex, wide-spreaded, large, unclear and ambitious mandates
- Lack of central and unified chain of command at all components
- Lack of unity of efforts and different visions between actors (UN, humanitarian, host government)
- Host government incapacity or lenience of act as primary security actor at POC
- Lack of air, road and riverine mobility and capability
- Lack of military capabilities, echelons, troops, military material and armament and strength to react or conduct adequate preemptive measures and POC tasks properly
- Low level of leadership and commitment within all levels, components and echelons of UN mission components
- Low clarification about tasks and responsibilities at POC
- Crisis escalation without a proper planning and actions to deal with “worse case scenario”
- Unsatisfactory troops deployment planning
- Absence of intelligence system to produce reliable information, scenarios, COA and source-data evaluation to be used at decision-making processes and avoid “early warning” systems that not works efficiently
- Lack of English language skills between troops contingents, specially Officers in command positions at all levels
- “Under development” POC strategy
In May 2013 UNMISS footprint comprises 17 CSB, planning more construct 35, troops reinforced deployment to volatile areas to try strengthen POC using traditional presence strategy, focusing on put additional military resources and capabilities on those high-risk areas, by so-called “flexible approach” using TOBs, COBs and long-duration patrols, which proved later that it was spreading forces, losing strength and grants no flexibility as far forces were very spread, far from each other, isolated in small contingents without proper mobility or strength and capabilities.

Military component weren’t grouped into a Brigade or Sector, but located at SSB, attending the civilian component planning, that normally used the troops as FP to patrols and supply convoys to help food insecurity at comprehensive approach, without proper planning to grant security at those areas or integrated planning at SSB level. Patrolling (foot and vehicular) was extended focused in “change banner” at the areas of cattle rides and rebels-Government border areas, but was completely disconnected to the possibility of a most dangerous COA as the escalate of political-ethnical crisis between Dinka and Nuer that was already clearly ongoing, denoting lack of intelligent assessment and failure in risk assessments, having to improvise when crisis emerged.

One result of increasing patrols and the weak response to previous attacks and incidents was that continuing violations of the status of forces agreement by elements of the security sector of GoSS remained a serious concern, as they continue to stop, check, not allow passage etc, but this indicator of strength lost was not perceived adequately.

The cattle raid incidents entered also at the scope of POC tasks, as understood by the mission. However, it was many times discussed by our SPLA officer that this was a country security internal, and the government and not UN should act at it. The operational procedures to deal with this prevention was aerial recon, and preemptively send patrols to local where is supposed to happen. I integrated some of them, but most of time as far aircrafts fly too high, we just can’t observe small groups of riders at savannah, and they use to hide when listen helicopters before we can sight them, being a useless effort.

After some incidents, when we went to the local, it was also a concern, because the attacked people blame UN to don’t interfere or protect them, but it was almost impossible to prevent these activities in the way they occur, generating decreasing people confidence.

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The SSB operational activities to POC tasks worked, conducted by small SOC (State Operational Center) cell, the normal procedures use to be that each civilian or military component submit his missions requests (type, location, purposes etc) and the MLO cell coordinates flight assurances, risk assessments and coordination of military support of Force Protection, but this procedure generates lack of effort unity and did not follow an apparent proper POC strategy, but attending individually each component demand. Sometimes the missions came straight from JUBA FHQ, specially in large supply convoys organized by humanitarian sector in a very desperate way to prove that they are putting huge figures of food tons at unsafe areas, generating the frequently ambushes for being an attractive target.

The MLOs Office (SMLO: Senior Military Liaison Officer and cells for G1: Personnel, G2 Information, G3 Operations and G4 Logistics) works as Military Staff to the base, trying to connect the demands of missions with the operational needs, but don’t participating at planning level because of the so-called “decentralized” multidisciplinary style that was actually lack of unity effort and preeminence from civilian sector at any decision at UNMISS, even thought about security. Some SSB in the mission don’t had the same strength of MLOs, military or civilian components, performing at most compressed style.

The Tasks of MLOs to organize POC role was
- Gathering flight safety assurance for of the SPLA local command and destination military authorities to UN flights;
- Team Escort flight with SPLA MLO to any supply and troop-rotation flights,
- flights of recognition,
- Short Duration Patrols (foot or Motorized),
- LDR-Long Duration Patrols with duration of 7 to 14 days,
- DAP-Dynamic Air Patrol-inserted Patrols by helicopter with landings and short stops in more than one location per journey,
- Join IT Patrols: Integrated Teams (patrols consisting of civilian’s components for many different purposes),
- Join escort convoys for humanitarian actions or supply as Liaison Officers,
- join liaison activities to KLE (key leaders’ engagement) at city and all state area,
- rotation at CSB and COB-TOB locations and others. In the patrols the MLOs could be the leader, motorist, or auxiliary in case of road patrols.
As Force Protection (FP), usually was the available troops on the Base (INDBATT or NEPALESE COY), varying the amount according to the logistic and security situation.

The confuse mandate generated doubts if SPLA could be used as FP (most of MLOs disagree) and that also some tasks don’t need troops FP, as some Integrated Teams Patrols (ITP) as HR or civilian affairs. The patrol commander was from the sector which requested the mission, so sometimes we went to field under civilian’s command, causing many strange situations to support the “multidimensional” characteristic of UNMISS.

G2 cell produced security assessments, risk assessments, daily briefings and comprehensive briefings at Saturdays. There was a strong mindset that UNMISS should work with INFORMATION, and not INTELLIGENCE\textsuperscript{11}, to avoid any interreference at GOSS and keep impartiality. It costed a high price later. When arrived, we started to standardize the documents, assessments, briefing etc, as normal military intelligence patterns, at least to conduct a data system evaluation, ranking the information collected, establish a List of Information Needs to facilitate patrols, liaisons information collection and establish analyses of most probable/most dangerous course of actions (COA), which started to be presented at Sunday mornings to our team and send to SSB BOR SOC.

The Mission had tried also get riverine capability, but it was not successful, besides it was a huge necessary capability as far the Nile river and swamp areas are large, and it proves to be very dangerous to transport or delivery supplies by river without protection or proper vessels, and civilians use to gather onto bushes and swamp areas during conflicts.

Problems using FP provided by SPLA have as example a MEDVAC conducted at 2013 Oct, with myself as MLO, when cooperating with GoSS to evacuate SPLA soldiers that was dying by a uncertain disease at small JS village, supposed to SPLA provide FP HLZ, but during evacuation sick armed soldiers tried to invade helicopter, SPLA FP fled leaving us under trouble, with situation hardly managed by the MLOs, unarmed, discussing and repelling soldiers and civilians to grant safe lift of aircraft with sick people at risk condition.

In November SSB started recon areas outside or inside base to stablish POC/IDP camp, deciding to be inside, one of the corners with crossroads at bases outskirts near airport and main gate. MLO comprehensive briefing assessed that the “worse case scenario” of this was

\textsuperscript{11} MUNSEN, R., 2015
to carry unrests against UN to host IDP Camp inside because ethnical tension, but the decision remained, and in first time in History UN would host POC inside their bases.

At late November a Security Assessment Conference (SAC) gather all SSB G2 cells at J2 FHQ, dealing about security aspects and threats and the plan of action for the dry season, particulate to JONGLEI State, where I am allocated. Some issues and points raised were the redeployment of UNMISS troops in the country prioritizing JS area, the arms-related security threats for flights including SPLA, the need for increased riverine capacity, need of armored car under caterpillars and others. Also was strictly stated by J2 his understood of that is not suitable FP from GoSS, but it was interpreted at other hand by Bor SSB. UNMISS visit MONUSCO to check his successful activities was also related, but the use of drones suggested by them was denied by UNMISS for being against the impartiality or use of information besides intelligence. At no moment was mentioned other possibilities or activities in case of a crisis escalation, or even the perception that this was ongoing at political crisis with ethnic aspects. The Early Warning Matrix, complex but useless document, did not reach the intention of proportionate an early warning system, and as far mission neglected classic planning and intelligence systems to evaluate situation and future scenarios and threats, the crisis erupted just one month after a security assessment national UNMISS conference to analyses threats.

3.2.2 Implementations and actions after 2013 crisis eruption

SS 2013-14 political crisis led to an intra-estate war-conflict situation that threatened UNMISS capabilities on POC tasks and humanitarian support. His root origins may be seen at historical basis, long-term perspective ethnical tension and struggle for power.

The President of GoSS in 2013 was Salva Kiir, Dinka, chairman of SPLM/A, a close companion to Garang since war times until his death. His Deputy Riek Machar, Nuer, was an independent group fighter leader who had divergences against Garang leadership, joining them before independence, struggling be 2nd on party rank, remaining a personal rivalry.

Other component of the crisis was the many “factions”, including ethnical and regional groups, that had different views of country destinations, generating a political crisis in 2004 before CPA and elections regarding representativeness at Government, raised again in 2012 during SPLM party constitution reforms.

On march 2013 a meeting with possible candidates went crisis when Marchar accused Kiir of inaction against corruption, tribalism, lack of reform on security sector, economical
question, foreign affairs and loss of support of GoSS from international community and lack of vision in the direction of the Party (HILDE F, 2016).

On April 2013, Salva canceled the National Reconciliation Conference directed by Machar, and denied the requested meetings, suspending also 3th SPLM National Convention scheduled to march, and in June suspended ministers and high rank officers accused by corruption, but as opposition, they blamed on political reasons.

Many media declarations against President was done by deputy following months, escalating crisis. In July President appointed new cabinet, besides it was considered ethnic representative, only two remained from previous and no one from the two opposite factions, whole dismissing of previous cabinet considered as trigger to the following crisis, as the indication of a new vice-president, James Wani Igga.

In September public speech in Dinka region, president talked to people get ready to defend themselves again as 1990’s Nuer raids, considered by media as incitation against Nuer. In December some party leaders joined former deputy at press conference accusing President of unconstitutionally and calls for a National Liberation Council meeting at 14th Dec, when Kiir referred again to 1991 Dinka’s massacre, instead reconciliation speech.

It is uncertain to say if the firefight that erupted on 15th Dec was premeditated and planned by Machar or if it was a consequence of the speech, but fight brought up in Juba at SPLA HQ barracks at evening, with explosions and tanks.

UNMISS HOM tried talk both leaders, without get a consensus. The information was that fight initiate between Dinka and Nuer elements of Presidential Guards.

During this period, at Bor, JS, many incidents had occurred previously that was indicating reflections of the political-ethnical problems.

MLO liaison at SPLA troops, received by Div Gal PETER GADET, Nuer leader commander there was passed to deputy. There was trouble at him and government because transferring Coys of Nuer people and heavy assets to border and other regions, stating that it was for troops ethnical balance. At same time, GoSS substituted the County commissars and staff at Nuer lands, replacing with Dinka people at Pochalla, Akobo and other locations, increasing political and ethnical tensions.

On Dec 15th we lost contact with SPLA Officers and SPLA MLOs did not return, Gal Peter Gadet defected with half Division and heavy assets after HQ clash, routing to North Nuer
areas. At 17th Dec fight reached Bor, the following day, opposition forces took city control, fight continues on outskirts and base vicinities and we receive more than 12,000 IDPs.

As immediate result of the crisis and fight eruption, hundred thousand of IDPs start moving around many cities in conflicted areas, entering UN bases or trying to flee from violence, spreading people in vulnerable situation through roads and river to other cities, bushes and swamp areas running for the violence escalation. The impact was enormous, with Bor city getting completely empty and destroyed, many cities around country at same situation, including continuous fight at Juba, many deaths and ethnical targeted killings occurring, looting and devastation spreading and a huge role falling over UN Bases to receive wounded people and the IDPs to be protected without be completely prepared to this task, particularly at the dimension that it takes, which could lead, as said by S Sudan high authority, a new Rwanda massacre

At Pibor fight erupted at SPLA barracks, at Akobo Dinka County commissar and staff entered CSB to POC shelter, tensions were getting higher, requested a rescue flight, as it was a Nuer majority region and gathered the “white army” militia. Because heavy mortar and artillery fire, flights were not available by civilian contractors, and military aviation was waiting Air Ops FHQ authorization. On 19th Dec, a rioting Nuer “white army” militia overran CSB, killing two UN PK and 32 Dinka civilians inside POC site. The authorization flight to rescue them never returned from FHQ, troops, civilian staff and MLO was removed

Fig 18 civilians entering SSB BOR main gate straight to IDP camp, 18_12_2013, the author

12 HILDE, J. 2016
from Base, it was sacked, militia took all guns, ammunition and equipment, looting premises and personal belongings and harassing to kill them all.

In Bor heavy weaponry, mortars, artillery and RPG grenades, some falling inside the base, were no proper shelters to indirect fire, the IDP POC camp was not ready, only plain area demarcated inside base with small earth wall and fences.

Base physical protection was just small earth wall with fences and barbed wire, no trenches or protection holes, no machine guns positions at perimeter to cover the outer area neither indirect fire weapons or air gunnery to react to attackers or pursuit them. The armored BMP cars had no fire positions at perimeter also (it was done later).

**As MOST REPONSE, in December the actions suited like this:**

Most civilian UN had already been evacuated from the Base, MLO assumed the functions and tasks performed by civilians, such as air operations, flight and passenger transport, evacuation of refugees, civil protection, security, coordination the Base, liaison between the troops, operating the airport, combat casualty care, burials among others.

![Fig 19 “white army” Nuer militia](image)

UN helicopter was fired trying to rescue 15 Dinka from Yuai COB, which received permission to retreat by air, but helicopters had landed and abandoned face of shots.

In three days, we get about 22000 IDPs, among local civilians, merchants, residents, staff and members of international NGOs, as well as soldiers from both sides who desist from fighting. The private security employees that responds from main gate security refused to work outside, causing a large and confused line of refuges.
The arrival, access and control of refugees was organized, and observing the security conditions in the immediate vicinity, the situation became increasingly tense and dangerous, with approach of the fight, SC decide open doors before they were broken or totally lost control, a "corridor" to IDP Camp, and the civil security defected.

MLOs conducted some patrols with FP and armored cars to help some humanitarian actors being rescued, as far looting and violence started to erupt in the city.

Few flights were authorized, eventually, during fight breaks to evacuate civilian staff and some IDPs, all of them with armed FP from armored cars transporting to the airport.

On late December, almost all civilian staff, most humanitarian and NGO were withdrawn, leaving only military and police in charge.
There were no more flights, as far looting and shooting raised near the airport, and Base got isolated by air or road movement. Heavy fight took place on following days, with tanks, artillery and mortars, as far crossroads that leads to the capital and the airport was important military objective. Some shelling and bullets fell into the base frequently, generating dead and wounded IDPs and soldiers hurt by mortar grenades. It was not militia rebels, but South Sudan Army against Army defectors, both with heavy assets. There were international civilians spread all base while the preparing of his area on the camp was being conducted, the city was destroyed, and we were relying on troops supply and UN combat rations. MLOs were receiving, and coordinating wounded, burial casualties of combat and refugees. MLOs conducted patrols, sometimes whiteout FP as far there was no command chain to obligate troops to accomplish it, to rescue civilian personnel, material and medicines, which were in short supply due to the cancellation of flights. The body recovered for combats in front of Base was made by MLOs, in absence of humanitarian actors, and buried inside the base as security conditions not allow outside.
Fig 22 MLOs doing body recovering from combats in front of UNMISS Bor main gate and burial inside the Base

Fig 23 Cemetery inside Bor SSB UNMISS Base
SPLA regained control of Bor on 26 December, some UNMISS civilian staff returned.

**Fig 24** Bor city destroyed at Dec 2013, the author

In **INITIAL** response to the IDP influx and the heightened threat environment ENGCOY quickly carry out basic improvements to the POC site and base defenses, raising berm walls, build armored cars posts, moved all supplies containers forming a second line of defense inside Base, shelters to indirect fire improvised, between other measures, and military component also reinforced improvised protection in their areas.

**Fig 25**, improvised shelter made by ENGCOY with the author inside, and Protection measures at offices, Bor, dec 2013, the author

Base’s football pitch was converted into helipad, allowing IDP evacuation by air without leaving to airport outside, and UNPOL assist in weapons search at POC site.

The estimated strength of SPLA-IO troops with Gal Peter Gadet was about a Brigade (6000), with heavy weaponry, artillery and heavy mortars, and that they were assembly with the White Army militia (estimated in 10000) to retook Bor, and information’s indicated they have intention to attack UN Base, “liberate” the Nuer people inside and kill the troops.
As response sentry posts were double, armored cars column was put in readiness at main gate and we had terrible days of waiting the next movements. Akobo UN Staff was still under arrest, Pibor SPLA is at government control, Gumuruk TOB and Yuai COB planning to be evacuated. All CSB and troops deployed were without conditions to conduct any kind of operational procedure and are receiving IDPs. The rebel Murle area was silent.

As SUBSEQUENT situations,

Bor city was change hands between Government and rebels in 4 occasions with hard fights. During all the combats we conducted the triage of wounded people that arrive at our base after combats, and some soldiers from the defeated troops abandon their weapons and entered the camp as no more combatants, raised several problems of tension.

We redistribute the tasks of MLOs, attaching people to help coordinate the IDP camp, the sanitary and health and medical actions, the airport movement and others.

The SMLO and other authorities went to liaison with rebels and government all time city control changed to to state the presence of the UN, the sanctity of the POC site, grant the safety of our installations and mandate and to request rebels to control the white army to not attack the Base, and that violent actions against could be considered war crimes.

The airport remained at government or rebels’ control, depending period, some evacuation of civilians was made by road and air, besides tensions caused by troops that want to search and inspect the civilians.

In January 3, government troops were ambushed by rebels, killing the command General, and it was filmed by BBC. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ol5r2ls46Bs
At Jan, no more ICRC or MSF presence, all medical care was made by troops, as triage, recovering and burial. Death toll was 12/17 daily for stray bullets, combat casualties and diseases, being established a daily basis recover and bury corpses at POC Camp. Is important to stress that one of the composition of troops that should be included at UNPKO is a Logistical battalion at each Brigade/Sector, with proper capacities to attend demands of supply, burial, maintenance transport etc to the troops, as doctrinaire in any military operation, attending specially crisis situations but also assuring the troops logistical support linked to their chain of command and in military conditions to field missions.

Fig 28 casualties arriving, medical control and burials conducted by MLOs in absence of humanitarian agents.
In January many patrols in the city were conducted, some with or some without FP, as rescue civilian medical personnel were threatened and medicines in a clinic in town, in order to be used on POC Camp.

- rescue fire-fighting truck from the airport, which had been stolen during the fighting, making possible the resumption of the flights with the appropriate fire-fighting protection.

- rescue parts of generators, in order to allow the operation of water purification of our Base and other energy demand at the WFP (World Food Program), 6 km from our Base, which was sacked and occupied by civilian teams to support rebels, and garnished by rebel troops in the surroundings.
Fig 31 ransacked WFP compound

- rescue, with the permission and monitoring of a representative of NGO, remedies and medicines to be used at IDP, retreating as fire fighting erupted besides, 

Fig 32 patrol to rescue medical supplies on Jan 14 2014, the author

On Jan 17 rebels captured heavy tanks move Juba, being bombed by Uganda aviation, Uganda troops and SPLA moved towards Bor, artillery shots fell close Base. MLOs continues to provide assessment at COA to plan our movements and get situation awareness on the crisis ongoing to identify IDP locations around the State area to further support later.
Fig 33 briefing and map updates about the combats and probable IDP locations to be assessed to POC

Fig 34 tanks neutralized by bombing near the Base, remnants of aviation’s bombs, the author

More than 12 thousand troops, from government and Uganda entered the city, with armored Brigade from UPDF (Uganda people Defense Force) with artillery, armored cars, rocket launchers and heavy weaponry, and strong engineering machine support.

Fig 35 UPDF and SPLA forces arriving at Bor, armored troops and heavy assets, jan 2013. The author.
MLOs liaison with UPDF commander, were very receptive and according to receive us later for liaison after establishing their positions, but the SPLA General refused to talk to the Acting SMLO and treated in very badly manner.

![Fig 36 the SSB BOR chiefs doing the liaison and KLE with UPDF commander, the author](image)

On 19 January, the GoSS South Sudan Minister of Information, with armed bodyguards attempted to enter the base to “check” POC camp without giving up their weapons and cameras, but were denied entry by SC, they tried to force accusing us of protect rebels, to bury the dead inside the base to hide the identities and other charges. SC denied the input to the field, remembered the humanitarian and protection by international law, and the representative of the Government threatened him personally, his cocked rifles security and warned that if they don’t allow to enter can’t be responsible for what happen next. SC was evacuated to New York, after having suffered this personal threat against your life. This situation are available in video at web [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24beumCwpk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24beumCwpk), confirming that in some cases even against the host nation the UN will should have to act to protect civilians\(^\text{13}\), generating hostile consequences as will be showed.

The SPLA and UPDF remain in control of Bor, with approximately 5,000 mostly Nuer IDPs are still in the POC site, down from 17,000 IDPs in late December.

\(^{13}\) UNITED NATIONS. HOLT, V. K.; TAYLOR, G.; KELLY, M., Protecting Civilians in the Context of UNPKO: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges. Independent study jointly commissioned by the DPKO and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 2009.; p.93
The SPLA moved N to combat rebels, and UPDF stablished defensive positions N of town, in a “expectative dispositive” very well suited, with active-defense tactical, and rebels didn’t take control of the city anymore.

![UPDF defensive positions by author photo and google maps.](image)

**As POS REARRANGEMENT,**

Still in January, President made press statement that UN were supporting rebels, inciting the mood against UNMISS members, which take care of combat casualties and refugees regardless of ethnicity or side, as POC tasks, generating high level of risk.

Patrols was threatened at the city but anyway was sent to liaison troops at the airport in order to alleviate problems in the evacuation of POC, inn negotiating the POC evacuation, the attitude of the soldiers who controlled the airport was very aggressive, and they were not allowing the departure of refugees without them verify their identification and ethnicity, and
in some cases forbidding, removing and even seizing some people, what constitutes 
violation of human rights and war crimes, and the patrol was stopped and searched by 
soldiers at return.

Fig 38 reasons why they restrict our movement: extreme violence sites against defeated 

Patrols to rescue medicines to be used at the Base continues, SPLA in the city have not 
authorized us to do more liaison with them, threatened acting MLOs chief, causing his 
request to be repatriated, Government announced that it was at war against the rebels, but 
also against the UN, generating aggressive reactions against our patrols and staff. 
To continue POC tasks, we negotiate with SPLA, according to the authorities who arrived 
after the fighting in the city, UN movement could be undertaken only with the authorization 
of GoSS, and we started to brief them our destinations, besides it be against the agreements.
We used improvised boats river searching for IDP concentrations for take to POC, suffering contentions at check points. GoSS Minister stated in media that rebels would be using arms and UN vehicles, leading to incidents such as the retention of supply trucks heading for our base, causing us to have to intervene by negotiating for releasing them.

SPLA LO join our patrols again, and to facilitate POC tasks to allow IDP return to city we start assessing damage in town, cleaning, removing destroyed cars that was blocking streets and collect and bury dead bodies all around city, founding many sites of crimes against humanity. UNMISS conducted HR patrols with GoSS mass killing locations, digging 5 big mass graves to bury all corpses collected around the city.
Fig 41 Patrols at January 2014, Bor, the author.

Fig 42 Mass grave empty and fullfilled
Fig 43 assassinated persons, including child, with strong signals of violence, and burned households with corpses inside reduced to ashes at Saint Patrick Church Site, Bor, 2014. The author.

In February military material from abandoned bases of Gumuruk and Akobo were assessed and rescued after long negotiations at governmental level.

Fig 44 patrol to rescue Akobo military assets. Fig xxx civilians’ barges with improvised protection to QRF sailing to MALAKAL by Nile river

As UNMISS don’t have riverine troops and vessels, beside the importance of the Nile river route, improvised it at civilian barges to delivery supplies to Malakal base POC camp, that now were facing same threats that occurred in BOR. The convoy was escorted by
MLOs and Nepalese QRF. The worse case course of action happened, and it was ambushed by government troops, 4 wounded, but they retreated after strong reaction from QRF. The MEDEVAC and reinforcement took almost 24 hs, face administrative issues and processes/duplicity of decision responsibility to fly to destination.

Ethnical tensions reached peak on 17 April, when BOR SSB POC Camp was attacked by a mob gathered in front of the gate of the refugee camp to protest against Nuer people inside IDP area in a Dinka region, berm was blown up by RPG 7, and protesters entered the POC camp, shooting indiscriminately, killing 48 civilians and wounding plus 100. Thousands of people runned around the Base, bringing chaos and confusion, raiding offices and shelters, until FP could organize a reaction against the attack.

This incident raised tensions and patrols and get out Base was restricted to airport, generating problems to manage POC tasks.

At late April, African Union (AU) sent a monitor team, being criticized for take it so late. Early may an attempt to attack POC Camp was repulsed by GoSS troops at the airport.
On 27 May, UNSCR 2155 (2014) reinforced UNMISS and reprioritized its mandate towards POC, HR monitoring, support for delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

In July initiate mission restructuring for new mandate, dividing areas of responsibility in sectors, not anymore in SSB, on Aug a UN helicopter fell shoot by small guns by rebel troops when landing in BENTIU, UNITY STATE, left 3 civilian crew killed.

Late August FHQ issued a Preparation Order with Goals, targets, tasks, intent of the Commandant and orders to mission new mandate configuration. This was well crafted and produced, with a good evaluation of the origins of the crisis, current situation and future opportunities and threats. The Sectors should be Brigadier-general Commander, with Sector HQ and Staff FHQ. An Ethiopian battalion arrived reinforcing Bor SSB, IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), a regional organism, sent representatives to work together to UN to hold field meetings and peace negotiations, working closer and conduction patrols and KLE with us. Some small incidents occurred, but the conditions get better to conduct the tasks.

At early October this author had his End of Mission period and returned to Brazil.

During the crisis of 2013-14, the town changed hands 5 times between the Government and the rebels, fighting and violations of human rights alongside UN Base, being the city destroyed and isolated, with no flights or road access. UNMISS Bor SSB endured hard tasks to continue his role during this periods, with his integrants and MLOs developing many tasks under risk and assuming the roles of many sectors that was evacuated from the Base, but for sure ensuring the continuity of humanitarian tasks, POC, and collecting lessons learned and reflections.

As ASSESSMENT at 2013-14 POC crisis in UNMISS, South Sudan we have this data:

UN protected around 80000 civilians at 8 POC sites. Under UN protection sites about less than 100 civilians died at violent actions but is quite imprecise evaluate how many died outside around country, that could reach dozens of thousands. Anyway, considering the insufficient troops figures and capabilities, lack of mobility (air, riverine and tracked armored cars), the lack of preparation and knowledge about POC activities generating no consensus about this quite new imposed role, UNMISs was relatively successful, because otherwise, a new Rwanda would had happened.
As previous EVALUATION,

Can be stated that UNMISS did a relatively good job on facing terrible crisis situation comparative to Rwanda genocide at beginning. The mission was fruit of a previous success at UNMIS, embarked an ambitious mandate at a complex, new and inefficient “multidimensional” way, committed many failures during crisis, but the almost hundred thousand of protected people during crisis attest that at least partially, UNMISS reached objective of POC, but not in a reactive way, and not preemptively, which could had saved many more lifes.
As main figures, we have at UNMISS:

- Almost 500,000 IDPs in four weeks in urgent need of food aid;
- At 2017 displacing internally reached 2 million persons, some 2 million crossed into neighboring countries.
- Number of civilians into “acute” or “emergency” categories of food insecurity reached 3.2 million;
- 85,000 to 230,000 civilians protected in eight UNMISS compounds across the country;
- Dozens of mass graves executions on ethnical basis without figures of casualties feasible to be done;
- Thousands of arbitrary arrests and detentions for ethnical or political reasons;
- Looting, occupation and destruction of residential and commercial property reaching wide areas of cities or sometimes entire cities, as Bor and Malakal, almost totally destructed;
- UNMISS estimates that thousands of people have been killed during the hostilities.

Both parties to the conflict have been responsible for ethnically targeted attacks on civilians and have failed to comply with international humanitarian and human rights law. There have been reports of extrajudicial killings, conflict-related sexual violence (including rape), torture, looting, the destruction of property, the recruitment of children and other violations of major concern.

- From 6 November to 21 February, 60 cases involving threats against and the harassment, physical assault, arrest and detention of United Nations staff and the seizure of United Nations vehicles were recorded.
- treated 14,745 people in 13 medical clinics, including 1,849 for gunshot wounds, and evacuated hundreds of casualties from areas of heavy fighting. Wounded combatants from both sides have received medical treatment in UNMISS bases. During the period from the onset of the crisis to 10 February, 183 babies were born in sites for the protection of civilians at the UNMISS bases.

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15 https://unmiss.unmissions.org/background
- About 400,000 civilian people, dozen of UN civilian contractors and soldiers, are estimated to have been killed in the conflict; including around hundreds wounded and almost hundred killed under violent actions against POC Camps at UN premises
- 2 UN helicopters shoot down;

The influx of so many civilians into United Nations premises and their settlement there is an unprecedented development, one that has presented unique challenges and placed a huge strain on Mission resource, as said by UNMISS HOM\(^\text{17}\)

On the other hand, many failures were because lack of Policy on POC by UN and no Strategy on POC at UNMISS, the aversion of intelligence system and rely on a not-tested new early warning system that not worked, which contaminated all actions above on operational and tactical level.

Also is almost impossible contabilization of death tolls, as far was coitted by rebels and Government, jeopardizing the access of calculation.

### 3.3 EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS LEARNED

#### 3.3.1 Policy aspect

UNMISS can be analyzed by his mandate as:
- A nation-building mission, not an easy task, as perceived by Officers that worked at similar situation as Iraq and Afghanistan\(^\text{18}\);
- A ambitious mandate, as:
  a) absorbed some host country responsibilities;
  b) Relied in the short-term success (reduction of troops at mandate under low pattern of figures) for a long-range mission (nation-building), with low figures to attend high levels of final desirable state and lack of capabilities to accomplish,
  c) tried to substitute classical intelligence assessment by new unexperimented and not ready “early warning system” and other new methodologies not tested to stablish course of actions (COA) and future scenarios;

\(^{17}\) HILDE, J., 2016
d) Was extremely optimistic about the successful violence raise prevention that did not establish measures to implement quick changes at a high volatile and aggressive environment;

e) Replicated some host countries tasks, dividing efforts and generating duplicity of responsibility;

f) Provide a wide, large, diverse and complex mandate;

g) Tried to produce “social engineering” building an entire new country.

h) Did not reach his initial objective of preventing violence, develop nation-building capabilities, and many others complex tasks at his first mandate listing.

- A mandate that could be judged by interference at host country sovereignty at some angles;
- A mandate that can be pointed as almost created a parallel government at South Sudan, intending to participate at host nation decisions in many levels and areas. It can be attested as related to the failures as by many occasions UNMISS was accused by host government, hostile acts against UN personnel, many situations that South Sudanese people blamed them as a “sovereign nation” when discussing with UN personnel, and even reading the mandate, where clearly some state tasks were cited as guided or supported by UNMISS staff.

The 2nd Mandate did same, adding

Use all forces within the limits of its capacity and added “in the areas where its units are deployed”, to carry out its protection mandate, but did not define which is his definition of area or his limits, expanding the attribution without clarify it.

The mandates should be more specifically, containing more details about Protection Of Civilian role, defining which, when, how, in which areas should protect, increasing the change of mindset at all levels, otherwise will repeat incidents generated by impossible mandates to be accomplished, as happened with Danish troops before in Serbia 19 or at UNMISS post-crisis, when civilians humanitarian isolated at an entire city taken by chaos requested support in Juba and where not possible to be rescued.

Also, could define troops constitution, defining characteristics, capabilities etc, facilitating the operational planning to establish the troops organization.

International cooperation at humanitarian actions also need to be more detailed, for instance, instead only determinate it, could indicate that UN should contribute to coordinate which kind and where (areas) of the country have the safety conditions or assess the main demands (f.e: where need food supplies, where need people´s capacitation, where are the areas of main health attendance etc), as far UN collect many information about those social and threats conditions inside the area, helping to grant unity of effort at humanitarian actions.

The “decentralized and integrated” approach in UNMISS actually was against the preconized doctrine, that argues “POC requires a joint mission approach: …requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components … and must be mainstreamed into the planning and conduct of its core activities. UN humanitarian agencies and NGO partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of POC. Close coordination with these actors is, therefore, essential.” (HOLT, V. K.; TAYLOR, G.; KELLY, M., 2009 p. 95 P. capstone doctrine 2008), but instead it was conducted as “parallel” and “decentralized”, with all (terrible) collateral effects that was studied previously by this work.

Regional troops from AU under UN umbrella and monitors from AU and IGAD should be included in the resolutions, as occurred with successful results in MONUSCO20.

The mandates are annually based, and do not have a “desired final status”, as strategic planning. Should be presented this long-term view at the mandates, indicating, the more complex actions that could be developed as far the security conditions allows, a progressive aproach in phases, permitting includes something as in military planning “commander intetion”.

State-building tasks are complicated, long-term, may sounds as intererference during crisis periods; if desireble or necessary, should follow at small scale in parallel to the security conditions and development-building, progressivly. None state in history was build up over chaos and turmoil, but after solve this security issues first as priority.

Contingence measures and crisis escalation prospectives should be considerated, allowing a previous stablished increasing of strenght and capabilities at te mandate, avoiding the gap when worse case scnearious occurs until a new one.

20 ELICITE , 2018
3.3.2 Strength and capability aspects

UNMISS started with lowest number of troops and capabilities to the area and tasks received. The troops don’t have specialization to the diversified terrain and environment where they conduct operations (jungles, savannahs, swamps, riverine and semi-desertic areas), and where mostly standardized troops (as noted on CRUZ\textsuperscript{21}).

Infantry battalions deployed with armored transport cars or over-wheels armored vehicles aren’t the same as mechanized Infantry or Light Armored cavalry Unities. They don’t have the same capabilities, techniques, doctrine or tactical posture than specialized ones.

Even with the new Sector HQs Brigade style, there are voids in the proper echelons support. A Logistic Battalion Unit is necessary to complete their needs at operations and support this activity specially in crisis time (supply, transport and health support between others).

Protection of civilians – and Bases- in physical level is straightly related to engineering capability under Sector troops, mobility by road maintenance around their areas also increases security at comprehensive approach, but also should be Units at this type, preferentially Battalion level, at FHQ attachment to attend mission strategic tasks. Both should have demining capabilities to allow continuity at tactical movements, and same related to engineering troops detachments to support convoys and patrols at the terrible road conditions during supplies convoys, patrols and movements.

There are no anti-material weapons capabilities, selective fire detachments (anti-personnel and material snipers) and indirect fire (medium and heavy mortars) available. They are necessary to effectiveness in response and deterrence capability at high threats environments as South Sudan.

Military air units are necessary at Sector HQ level, allowing the commander autonomy (of course under air operations and technique measures controlled by the mission) to attend transport and supply demands in operations. Also gunned aircrafts are necessary to strong response as QRF at that unfriendly road movement environment, permitting commander interreference at this dimension of combat response.

\textsuperscript{21} CRUZ REPORT p. 20
Uganda Armored Brigade, with heavy assets, machine guns, air support, indirect fire support and mechanized recon troops, using active-defense tactical was the only strength which stopped the crazy spiral of handover of conquers in Bor town by the contenders, demonstrating this measures readiness and effectiveness, as

“Fatalities are rising in United Nations peacekeeping operations because the United Nations and the Member States are failing to adapt and take measures needed to operate securely in dangerous environments.” (CRUZ REPORT p. 9)

3.3.3 Operational procedures aspects

UNMISS acted under a Complex and different environments depending on each region, it is as if each State and consequent SSB was a different mission, and planning all SSB or states as same troops composition without respect the terrain characteristics to organize the troops did not approach a solution.

Spreading troops as COB and TOBs at Company level and isolated was a terrible measure, as can be seen that during the crisis those in AKOBO, GUMURUK, PIBOR and YUAY were attacked, stucked, evacuated or abandoned, and did not reached the task of protect civilians completely.

At command level, troops linked straight to civilian component as the engineering and others let the Battalions commander arrested at lack f capability, and the FC without independence of action, as noted by CRUZ (2017, p. 20) “Missions should ensure that all personnel inside the area of responsibility of a Sector report to the sector commander, without exception”.

Besides escort of convoy be a usual task, there is no specialized troops available. The most indicated to this effort are like the Brazilian Army mechanized cavalry, troops with training, capabilities and material to react promptly with deterrence and proper weaponry, acting at recon tacticals during road axis operations. Those missions should be planned as military escort-recon tasks, integrated with the supports needed (engineering mobility support capability jointly acting) and air assets to grant effective QRF reinforcement.

Adding AU regional troops grants UN troops to more significant tasks, allowing deploy the previous at secondary and static security roles, saving strength.

All the capabilities demanded should be granted, planned accordingly the terrain and particular characteristics of the regions at each Sector.
So, troops should be selected and distributed by their capabilities, according with the terrain and operational conditions demanded, and not at padronized style.

If don’t available, could be trained at some specialitiyes, as was done in DRC , were jungle warfare training was conducted, and recently guided to deployment of brazilian jungle warfare specialists to trein troops there²².

At UNMISS during crisis period in Bor, some troops did not attend the demands of FP to MLOs patrols, interpreting their own concept of POC as static mission at Base, as far there arent a SHQ to ensure the planings and unity of command chain. As at thet time there were no integrated planning, each troops deployed tried to accomplish or attend the missions as your own comprehension, decreasing unity of effort.

The missions were not planned at an operational way or procedures, but normally the military component acting as security force for the tasks determined by civilian component. Later, SOC integrated Operations and intelligence Officers from MLOs and troops as representatives from civilian component, but still allowed civilian sector personnel, sometimes UNV with no much experience to command patrols, and it was a concern to security measures.

The defensive posture should be more active, granted in movement and information gathering, deterrence actions, capability to use force according , with military style planning and operational behavior, and not only acting as “force Protection”

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The mission footprint was separated, fragile, without unity of effort guidance. The bases didn`t have proper strength in figures and equipment to adequate use of force. The dual leadership system (civilian, political and military), command voids (no Sector/Brigade command), turned integration of efforts quite complicated and sometimes unfeasible. The operational success is strongly related to the POC tasks. Whiteout deterrence and necessary strength, the mission of POC is jeopardized and lost effectiveness.

3.3.4 Intelligence, Logistical support aspects and others

UNMISS had lack of capability to evaluate threats, do strategic planning and predict crisis situation because non-use of intelligence properly and confuse early warning evaluation. There was no data evaluation table/technique, confidentiality classification or proper flow of information. The main example of this was being dealing with internal communal security problems as threats meanwhile a entire revolution was occurring under his sights. protection of civilian tasks. The early warning matrix used was dense and manage individually incidents straight to actions measures, without a traditional intelligence analyses and evaluation, not composing scenarios or course of actions at strategic level, spreading the measures taken in small pieces instead find a great landscape of situation, tendencies and probabilities.
Besides it, every level/echelon/unit must have its own means of human intelligence and assessment, producing knowledge, to estimate the most likely, most probably and worse case courses-of-action in order to allow a proper operational planning.

Doing this doctrinaire methodology, the MLOs office was able to correctly assess many situations that finished to occur, some of them, unfortunately, as the barges ambush, IDP camp attack etc, however, the decision-makers and capabilities available at that period did not reach so good results in avoid some of them. But anyway, it attests that, at least at those Office which should work as substitute of a non-existent Staff personnel to Bor SSB did the later preconized at CRUZ REPORT (20017, p. 13):

*The United Nations should generate intelligence capabilities that are well-suited to the environment, particularly low-tech solutions that generate tactical intelligence. All mission components should focus more on human intelligence.*
Worse situation actions always should be assessed, and measures and actions to avoid/react should be taken. In stable environments like those, the most worse scenario many times is also the most probable one, and will happen earlier or later, but will, as far the internal contradictions of the environment are very strong.

To do a lower level threat assessment and divulgate security measures and situational consciousness MLOs Office G2 produced a “weekly stability assessment” that stayed exposed daily to be checked promptly by teams assigned to field duties.

![Weekly Stability Assessment](image)

**Figure 51 MLO Bor weekly stability assessment.**

It proved very practical and useful and was later produced by SOC with adaptations to upper level.

Previously the deployment, this lack of intelligence jeopardized the beginning of the mission, which entered, planed without full appreciation of security and risks in the field and the operational approach to address with them, in a typical “Chapter VI Syndrome” - and it is completely confirmed as far the new mission kept almost all the old troops deployment, repeating the previous mission positions (alias, some of them are same Gold, tusk and slave trading posts positions, since the beginning of those area occupation by Zaribas).

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23 CRUZ REPORT, p. 10
Logistic at large, diversified and complex environments like South Sudan and UNMISS should be strongly planned.

Transport is a huge matter regarding road conditions, weather, terrain, seasons and others. At dry season roads are difficult and need engineering continuous support following, at rainy most of it is made by river and air, so air and riverine transport and escort are extremally necessary to the mission efforts.

Health conditions are hard, tropical diseases specialists are indicated, air ambulances (not only air transport to medevac) are indicated to ensure survival chances in case of injury regarding long distances to hospitals. Military medical units are necessary to prompt attendance, not only static hospitals. Humanitarian casualty’s attendance and burial should be into the capabilities and tasks that should designed teams exist in case of evacuation of humanitarian actors.

Maintenance units are is necessary, specially due bad road conditions, avoiding let all this kind of support to UM civilian component administration, that will have difficult to attend at operational tasks panes in far distances. The use of armored cars calls for specialized mechanicals at logistical battalion level, otherwise all availability of vehicles will be decreased by don’t use preventive maintenance but only corrective by the own troops.

Figure 52 damaged vehicles at isolated operational tasks being fixed by own crew

About Supply, there should exist storage of medicine, food and rations and ammunition stocked at operational level to deal with crisis to allow troops isolated deployed receive them. The stocks of humanitarian actor’s food and health items to POC should be
safeguarded to worst case situations without decrease troops numbers at guard duties in isolated targetable deposits.

Equipment is other main issue at that area of operations. Some number of vehicles to Staff and MLOs should have bullet proof protection to deal with risk situations. Night vision googles and other as thermal vision assets are necessary to take advantage at night occasions and even posts and Base guard tasks. Vigilance radars to base security and patrol night-stands are also necessary to elevate warning and threat-sensitive footprint. ENGCOYs should have a small boat section (inflated and metallic) to support mobility at short troops movements under the flooded areas for transport and patrols.

Tracked armored cars are necessary to grant effectiveness at reaction forces that had to pass to off-road terrain to react threats.

Drones from tactical to upper levels are necessary to improve imagery gathering and raise threat-sensitive operational behavior and not only defensive posture.

Most of those lessons learned indicates the need of a Logistic Battalion at Sector’s level and FHQ level.

Infrastructure conditions decrease logistic capabilities of troops. Strategical and tactical planning and echelons of engineering should exist and be coordination of efforts between military and civilian components. HLZ maintenance and building, building airports, demining LHZ and roads should be panned and executed at those levels, integrating the mission footprint.

Strong engineering is necessary, attached to each echelon and battalions to FHQ, and is directly related to the capability of POC. Engineering battalions should exist at FHQ and civilian component levels, complementing and integrating the tasks of the ENGCOYS. Both should have demining capability to work complimenting the civil demining sector, saving them to other tasks and letting the emergency occasions that occurs at missions and could interrupt them at military component responsibility. Is indicated that engineering battalion have experience of road building at tropical areas and permanent bridge-build capability, and ENGCOYs emergency bridges and personnel bridges equipment.

The Bases should be sighted as defensive positions at protection level, developing this mindset onto active-defense posture, mission footprint and use of force, integrating these factors.
Mobility should be granted to the road movements by attaching small engineering detachments at the troop’s movements.

Air support is a core to take successful results. Air transport with civilian contractors should be used only to cargo or passengers not on service, not to operational evacuation, insertion etc. They are NOT prepared and equipped to it and will NOT attend in case of risk conditions.

Military helicopters units should exist at Sector levels, with protected aircrafts (flair and armored plates) and available gunnery to be used at QRF actions.

Satellite Communication is a must at every small fraction that leaves to the field. Portable internet antennas to Coy level operations/ TOB are also needed.
4. FUTURE CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATION

“In past spikes of peacekeeper fatalities, the UN closed the missions. In today’s environment, closures of the high security-risk mission are unlikely. Therefore, the UN must adapt to the modern operational environments and adopt strong and effective measures to reduce fatalities” (CRUZ, S., 2017, P.9)

4.1. FUTURE CHALLENGES

The deadliest single year for PKO since 1994 was 2017 (56 fatalities), indicating that the peak of most calamitous times was reached, and tends to increase if no actions are taken. Most of fatalities occurs at military personnel, and the need of improvement and security of troops have influence at overall mission security levels.

4.1.1 Political field

UNMISS will continue on the ground, and South Sudan remain unstable and with probable periods of crisis. China and Brazil keep personnel and troops working at PK tasks over there. The region comprising neighboring South Sudan have some instability that compromises the internal stability, as far some threats are independent of boundaries (refugees, migrant armed groups etc). There are two UN missions at neighbors, in DRC and CAR. At the first, the FC is a Brazilian General and some military Staffs, the second have military staffs from Brazil also. Brazilian government was consulted about sending troops to both the three missions at region, it was not completed as far after military commission and presidential approval it was blocked by economical ministerial area because of close to presidential elections on 2017. We can expect both increasing of participation at missions in the region by China and Brazil. In this perspective, some challenges can be sight at political level.

The success of UNMISS also depends of successful procedures at MONUSCO and MINUSCA, and cooperation at other areas than PKO and to all region countries could reinforce the successful of UNMISS.

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1CRUZ, 2017
Mandates clarification will continue to be necessary, avoiding the grey areas that jeopardize POC tasks, and the standardization of concepts regarding POC, humanitarian action and actors is necessary to effectiveness.

Regional organisms as AU and IGAD positioning at those missions should continue to be a reactive action, indicating political coordination level to ensure their presence at those areas in cooperation with UN.

Countries like China and Brazil both has experience and interests ate the region, and could expand actions to improve the successful of this UNPKO, with large results at POC tasks.

4.1.2 Economical field

The economical development is a tool to produce good results and facilitate the stability of South Sudan, but can’t be forgotten that the region needs integration, and their development is highly connected to other neighbors countries. Isolated measures tend to be less effective, as far there are big dependence between those countries and instability in one jeopardize all of them. As template, can be observed the Uganda’s military help during the crisis of 2013-14. A massive migration wave (one of the only asphaltic roads leads from Juba to Entebbe) and spreading of armed groups and violence at borders would create conditions to destabilize their country, motivating, also, his military support at that period.

Other aspect is the huge dependence of South Sudan budget in oil revenue.
The path for economical sustainable environment there pass through variety of economical activities, and this necessarily over infrastructural development, guiding to the increase of engineering capability and Quick-Impact Projects implementation at UN components, but also should be improved by other investments in those areas outside UN umbrella by the countries involved at those operations.

To improve economical capacity on acquirement of equipment and training of troops during pre-deployment activities, is suggested by CRUZ (2017, p. 22) that DPKO should advance part of the troop reimbursement.

### 4.1.3 Military field

Strengthen the military capability in different areas is a must, and it has been done by UN (in figures, nowadays there are 12000 blue helmets deployed at mission), but still there are room for improvements.

Most of casualties are related to convoy ambushes and attacks to bases and troops positions (CRUZ, 2017).

TCC selection and composition should look for the capabilities demand of the terrain and threats plus composed by capabilities and capacities related to mission terrain and characteristics, (jungle, semi-desertic warfare, riverine logistics and patrolling etc), and the countries involved should act on this directions of preparing.

South Sudan have a quite similar environment of many of Brazilian areas, and his armed forces has this capabilities, trained troops and training centers.

Regarding this, Brazil has many similar environments as the Amazon river, where the Armed Forces conduct supplies and security operations, with trained and proper cargo and patrol/ troop transport vessels. Brazilian Army have a Center of Amazon riverine vessels (CECMA, in Portuguese) where pilots and troops are trained in logistic and operational procedures in tropical riverine environments.

Including the Nile river environment at operational and logistical will continue to be a challenge, and only will be possible if manning the mission with proper troops and assets. The Nile is the spinal cord of South Sudan.
Fig 54 Brazilian Army boats and Navy vessels operating at Amazon River

Fig 55 Brazilian Navy tropical diseases naval hospital at Amazon River
These capabilities includes Navy vessels, jungle warfare troops specialized in riverine and jungle actions, logistic units manning barges that operate at Amazon river and gunned patrol boats. In particular, Navy hospital ships manned with tropical diseases medical doctors are are used at Amazon river, and all those capabilities would be very useful at South Sudan UNMISS but faces some economical and logistics issues to deploy that could be suppressed by a China-Brazil cooperation.

The swamp and semi-desertic areas are other environment that restrict operations, but as far Brazil also have same environment and specialized troops, it works same way. warfare troops with riverine capability and swamp-fight specialized troops.
All these capabilities go to the Cruz report assertive that

“We should take action to limit the freedom of movement and freedom of action of the armed groups. ... We need to reverse the tendency: they should run from us, not us from them.” (CRUZ REPORT, p.11)

In the area related to Bases, troops movements granting security and physical and operational protection, engineering capabilities to integrate and develop infrastructure (roads, bridges and airports-heliports) could be seen also reported at CRUZ (2017,p.13) as “The United Nations must invest in physical defence structures at camps, but these are no replacement for troops taking basic measures to defend the camp and take a proactive posture to turn the base into a point of irradiation of security”

And continuing stating that

“Physical structures for protection are deficient even in bases that have been well established for some time. Sensors, gates, walls, and bunkers at camps are outdated, inadequate, and sometimes simply non-operational or even absent. Yet this provides no excuse for troops who do not take responsibility for their own security, including by taking a proactive posture to create a zone of security around the camp.” (CRUZ, 2017, p.14)

It leads to an integration of two types of capabilities: huge engineering and strong protected, and versatile mobile troops. Brazil have engineering battalions that construct roads and bridges at all country, including amazon and semi-desertic areas, and Mechanized Cavalry Regiments that integrates mobility, protection, strength and multiple tasks, being specialized in axis and area recon and convoy escort.
Recently, Brazilian Army authorities went to China in late 2018 to assess possibilities of cooperation in developing a new family of over-wheels armored cars to manning this troops. This kind of troops can provide the flexibility and capabilities to act as convoy escorts, patrolling bases outer areas and liaising with others deployment troops in best conditions than other ones even that ones that have armored assets, regarding their doctrinaire basis is guided to this.

The integration of troops in sectors would continue to be a challenge and compose them by gathering some from same nationality would help the integration effort and enforce the unity of effort, facilitating procedures, standardizing pre-deployment training and act against impunity sensation.

Bi-lateral pre-deployment training including Member States countries is a proposal that also could boost the ability of personnel to respond to attack and project their security zone and is an opportunity for China-Brazil international military cooperation (CRUZ REPORT, 2017. p. 13).

AU troops provide extra power, saving UN troops to work at more active tasks and being very receptive by locals.

Intelligence will continue to be important as ever and adapt to understand the environment and threats depends on conduct this assessment at every troops echelon. Traditional doctrinaire procedures proved to be more useful than new complex assessments that get stuck at a swamp of information with no evaluation or guidance to strategic objectives. Building local support and fostering networks of informants is necessary, and human intelligence is more important than technological assets at volatile environments, otherwise

"Intelligence is often unable to provide timely information that could help prevent, avoid and respond to attack. Intelligence in peacekeeping is overly reliant on technology that is ill-suited to the operational environment, information is not shared among key mission components, and human intelligence is underdeveloped or non-existent. The intelligence cycle is incomplete, with
information rarely translating into operational/tactical activities. This leaves missions liable to surprise attack, hesitant when embarking on risky operations, and unable to attack the source of threats in advance and in self-defence. Missions are therefore unable to compensate for the natural advantage of hostile actors, including knowledge of the terrain and situation within the population.” (Cruz Report, 2017 p. 14)

Air operations and assets will continue to be necessary to reach successful tasks and develop capacity of air strikes by helicopters as QRF will be on demand permanently, as far separate administrative transport from operational tasks.

4.1.4 Science and technological field

Basic technology assets are more important and effective than sophisticated systems or high technology and would be improved to provide advantage against hostile actors, helping establish a safe environment to Protect Civilians.

“Appropriate vehicles, special rifles for snipers, special ammunition, night vision capability to operate during the night, and laser aim, among other forms of technology, are needed “Cruz Report, p. 14

Terrestrial movement radars, etc Completing those equipment tables with improved basic tech assets will provide necessary superiority to grant security conditions and act better at protect themselves, being proactive and in consequence act at POC.

4.1.5 Psychosocial field and others

“To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence” (SUN ZI, p. 267)

Civilian components role has huge importance, but should expand their actions, preferentially by Civilian-military coordination (CIMIC) activities, getting more integrated and cooperation with intelligence procedures (Cruz report, p. 15)

Public relations and Psychological Operations were poorly or even non-used, and develop those activities at mission is a challenge to be suppressed.

Make South Sudan´s people understand that united efforts, integration and economical development are only possible by ending ethnical and political aggressions should be transformed in “moto” quotes to conquer people´support.
4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

“The UN has not fully adapted to modern hostile, operational environments and SC mandates. The UN lacks a conceptual approach as certain missions operate outside the governing principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and use of force. The UN also lacks required supporting skill sets, and resource processes and mindset for delivering peace operations in modern, complex conflict environments and forceful SC mandates”. Cruz Report, p. 18

4.2.1 At Political level

To summarize, to reduce fatalities and enhance mandate implementation, posture, behaviour, leadership and initiative needs to change, at all levels from New York to the most remote places in PK missions. Emphasis and resources should be towards the civilians, military and police on the “front line”; mission HQs should consume the minimum personnel and resources” (CRUZ REPORT, p. 12)

Countries contributors should enforce the perception that UN must update the principles of peacekeeping to reflect that the blue helmet and flag do not offer natural protection, they are a target, requesting proper updates to avoid it at UN policies production.

The mandates could have not only the numbers, but define operational strategical guidelines, indicating that troops should be composed in echelons (Specifying Division, Brigade etc) and the main capabilities that they have had. They also should specify explicitly “when, where, how etc” act at POC tasks.

As “Civilian leadership has often reacted only after attacks occur rather than taking necessary preventive measures. All commanders should be present at the front line to stimulate action among personnel and demonstrate the qualities needed to meet threats, while civilian leadership should treat security threats as if their own lives were at stake. If they do not, they must be held accountable for their inaction, which encourages repeated, fatal attacks on peacekeepers “(Cruz report, p. 16).

The Countries contributors should take measures to request this civilian responsibility as far take proper measures to point their military personnel that fails. Is indicated that they stablish representatives at regional (AU and IGAD), local authorities, national judiciaries etc as liaison officers to support political contacts and judicial procedures.

China and Brazil should increase political relations with South Sudan and neighbors countries, in order to facilitate the mission development. China and Brazil also can improve, acting by CHINA-CELAC plan key area of international military cooperation, their political agreements to implement future actions of PKO cooperation at that areas.

South Sudan and neighbors can receive prioritization at BRI investments, allowing economical development that will increase the possibilities of success in the mission.
Contribute with troops, Staffs and MLOs at MONUSCO and MINUSCA will increase the knowledge of the regional environment, and produce a reference of comparation to Chinese Officers to improve their UNMISS deployed troops procedures, as far helps ensure a strategical security at region that will reflect at South Sudan.

4.2.2 At strategical level

The aim of strategical planning at higher-risk environments, where opposition’s tools include ambush, terrorist attack, and open combat should be grant security conditions, and it is related to employ overwhelming force, otherwise more personnel (UN components and civilian to be protected) will die. Contributors countries should look for initiative at their proposals, studying the environment and engaging in provide solutions and not only wait for requests.

The nation-guided composition of troops may contributes to increase the accountability, as far a huge country based contingent leaded will be more worried about discipline and criminal and unsuccessful situations, allowing them to by themselves promote repatriation and proper measures to involved military back home.

Offering not isolated troops, but a complete set of demanding capabilities is a good measure to reach a Threat-Oriented Mission Footprint.

Missions must match their footprint at high-risk locations with the strategic objective of their presence there\(^2\), and avoid long, slow-moving convoys traveling extreme distances to large, remote field presences present easy targets, and the presence strategy should be re-assessed to be done with lower risks.

Strategic planning on threat assessment should rely on the specific environments needed, so deploy Staff Officers with capacitation to understand the environment (veterans of previous missions there, specialists on jungle warfare or mechanized troops etc) should be targeted by contributing countries.

Strategic-planning exercises, like conducted at NDU-ICDS, are a good tool to assess the adequate planning at Staff level.

\(^2\)CRUZ REPORT, 2017, p. 15
A compilation of environmental characteristics, geo-historical aspects and lessons learned from previous mission at South Sudan should be produced and distributed and integrated to the curriculum of pre-deployment troops over there.

Since 2005 Brazil deployed MOs, MLOs and Staff Officers at South Sudan, accounting hundreds of them in total. Increase cooperation with Brazilian Army Peacekeeping center (CCOPAB) and China similar center would bring good results. There are staff planning courses at Brazil CCOPAB, and also Officers that worked at UNMISS can be invited to cooperate at those centers in both hands.

Brazil and China has many opportunities to work together at UNMISS, that will be complemented at other levels of this study.

4.2.3 At Operational level

In 2015, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations /Department of Field Support launched the Policy “The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping”, followed by the “Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Training Materials, military version (2017)” ad the “Guidelines, Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2017)”, which details some procedures to be taken, updated conceptions and guides the reparation of troops to be employed at this tasks. Those documents should be studied deeply at pre-deployment training and PKO trainings.

Logistics Battalions are a demand to separate administration (at civilian component responsibility) to military supports, allowing troop commanders a wider range of action capability, decision-making and quick reactions.

At Operational behavior, best clarification was done by CRUZ REPORT (2017, p.12)

“should be dictated by risk assessment and not by standard procedures. A strong posture on the ground will create a more secure environment for mission personnel and the local population. Within a proactive posture, bases become a point of irradiating security. All bases should be surrounded by a clearly defined security zone including few kilometres of roads, villages and IDP camps in the vicinity, where all the population should know that it is an area with “zero tolerance” for the presence of armed groups. United Nations troops should use all tactics to dominate the area, including night operations, foot patrols, occupation of hidden/dissimulated static positions during the day and night to impose restriction of movement on criminal groups. We are defending our premises from inside the perimeter. This means the opposition is at the gate. Instead, we have to defend the perimeter from outside!“

To reach this, a proper organization in military style, to the troops, at the level Brigade-alike is necessary. Is quite interesting, despite the necessity to keep the diversity, to maintain some liaison between the troops, and it can be made allowing a more close
proximity at some percentage of origin of the troops. The Sectors should be manned as a Brigade, with all capabilities adapted to the region characteristics. At each sector, FPU and MP should be Battalion level, and the ENGCOYs should have demining and small boats sections. A Mechanized cavalry Squadron reinforced with a tracked armored Infantry platoon can reach the mobility and patrolling and mobile operations outside base, as far convoy escort. A Logistic Battalion for the Sector is also necessary, and other small units to complement. The main Battalions should have jungle warfare, riverine and semi-desertic capabilities. The sector also need a small air unit to grant their operational capacity, with transport and attack capabilities, a Heavy Mortar battery, and a small special unit Coy (snipers, anti-material and special operation detachments) to conduct strategic actions.

At FHQ levels, Engineering Battalions, Riverine navigation Unit (barges, vessels and escort boats) and Special riverine Battalions (jungle and swamp warfare capacitation) and others units are necessary, as far other troops that were related at previous chapters.

The troops rotation should be divided to grant keep at least 20% of the contingent with experience in the operational context.

4.2.4 At tactical level and others

Many aggressions occur against mobile convoys, supply convoys, QRF and patrols. They are related to bad geographical situation, bad planning (large convoys, lack of protection type and quantity etc) and bad road conditions. Ambush Threat Mitigation should be implemented by integrating the troops capabilities and engineering support during missions’ movements. QRF by air assets should be planned at this level. Depreciate the “hit and run” technique by attackers should be increased by:

- Indirect fire (medium and heavy mortars), platoon and battalion level
- Aircraft support with attack assets (medium MG and small rockets)

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3 The quality of leadership at the sector-level, battalion-level and below is essential to the maintenance of security of peacekeepers. It is at this level that the majority of operations are planned and executed, and it is here where peacekeepers often fail to take the initiative and neglect to implement basic regulations that would keep them more secure. Furthermore, the presence of several small contingents from 20 different nationalities in the same base can reduce operational strength needed to proactively address security threats. Under these conditions, personnel dedicate themselves to the sustainment of their own small contingent rather than contributing to overall operational effectiveness in the area of operation. Cruz report p. 20

4 The United Nations and TCCs should generate units and equipment that permit flexibility, mobility, and operational performance. Cruz report p. 19
- Tracked armored cars to react properly over off-road
- Heavy and medium machine guns at vehicles
- Drone previous recon at axis, parallel areas and main another transversal to road
- Mechanical and engineering teams to follow convoys
- Axis and area Recon ops techniques, tactics and procedures
- Sniper antipersonnel and material teams to grant selective fire.
- Thermal and night vision devices, terrestrial movements radars;

This procedures, implemented also at base security, could provide better protection of civilians inside or near Base areas, by establishment a secure environment irradiating from the bases, generating safe environments to POC camps and preemptive measures and proper reaction conditions.
CONCLUSION


Fig 53 UNMISS troops deployment, 2019

This research aimed to study what are the most significant challenges and difficulties occurred at UNMISS 2013-14 in South Sudan national crisis. Moreover, the objective of this research was point out ways forward and new solutions to manage this kind of operation.

In order to achieve those objectives, this work started showing how is the situation of the evolution of Protection of Civilian Policies. The most important problems and challenges regarding this type of were presented, placing the reader regarding the current situation of his evolution.
After studying the main aspects of this, the study about was deepened by approaching South Sudan history and UNMISS background. Subsequently, we could understand superficially the forms of employment of the POC tasks at UNMISS previously the crisis.

Thus, the emphasis of this research was obtaining experiences and Lessons Learned, through studies made, to provide ideas those could be useful on future situations. Besides, to present the main observations to all levels, national, regional and international, providing suggestions to contributing countries, in particular China and Brazil.

The work done showed that the experiences at Rwanda, Somalia and Balkans showed that assessment of ambitious objectives is not a new perspective and happened at UNMISS. The difference is that at 1990s the political level did not realize (and it were a hard task of course to believe that it could be perceived easily) the worlds changing from new kind of internal problems, intra-estates and rising of civilian threats. The difference was at that time, the fail point started with the blindness to this new situation, who were sighted when at the field, leading to a enlargement of the scope of the mandates. At UNMISS, it already started ambitious, with a nation-building clear proposal.

The initial structuring of UNMISS before the crisis and the Civil War of 2014 wasn't enough to deal with peacetime activities (even with the instabilities and regional rebellions) and almost collapsed after the crisis of 2014. Effective insufficient, poor planning, lack of integration between the various sections of the FHQ, lack of integration between the civilian and military sectors of the mission, the lack of a structure and a well-defined Command Unit, low intelligence activities and threat and risk assessment insufficient to deal with escalation of crisis, reflecting in the POC task.

The UNMISS was re-structured after the fails, but many improvements still are in need and can be followed by the country contributors.

Brazil and South Sudan (also DRC and CAR) have many similar environments, and Brazilian armed forces has troops, assets and capabilities related.

China and Brazil have experience and military personnel deployed in the area and should look for improvements to adapt their tasks to security conditions in order to achieve good results.

The success of UNMISS depends on the success of other missions surrounding the area, indicating that participating of them could grant results and add good examples to be used, indicating the deployment of personnel and troops there are desirable.
At economical level, development of region also facilitated the mission successful achievement, guiding to investments (like BRI) to infra-structure connecting South Sudan to other countries and also improving it internally.

Cruz Report is a good guidance fulfilled of deep research to be studied by whom will be acting at any level of UNMISS. The four broad areas stated by CRUZ REPORT (changing mindset, improving capacity and threat-sensitive mission footprint, enhance accountability) should be followed in order to reduce fatalities, improve secure conditions to implement the mandate.

UN policies needs to standardize concepts and clarify mandates, allowing better results at POC tasks.

Physical protection and security environment, is the primary issue to grant safety to the troops, reduce casualties and have good results at POC. It guides to strategic planning on troops composition, organization, capacities and deployments, leading to strong engineering support at many levels.

Jungle, semi-desertic, riverine and swamp troops, as navy vessels, barges and escort and combat boats and training is necessary. Mechanized cavalry troops are most indicated to active-defensive employment at base irradiation security, mobile operations and convoy escorts. Those capabilities all are present in Brazilian Armed Forces, and a close approach between China-Brazil international military cooperation at PKO could lead to good results at UNMISS, projecting the importance of win-win activities at military efforts to develop a mankind of shared future. It can be achieved by implementation of CHINA-CELAC cooperation plan at international military cooperation key area, by integrating efforts with Brazilian Armed Forces to deploy, for instance, Brazilian troops with Chinese support (china-Brazilian future armored cars etc), Chinese support at logistic transport or subsides to equipment, and Chinese troops with Brazilian support for training in similar areas of environment that South Sudan and Brazil have. Many perspectives can be studied to turn this operational, for instance, a Navy Tropical disease hospital vessel fabricated by China and manned by combined tribulation navigating and reaching humanitarian health treatment at Nile river, introducing a huge new perspective of international military cooperation at PKO that could be an template to the world.

Logistic, engineering, MP and FPU battalions at any levels are also needed to connect subsidiary actions under strategic military planning.
New policies of intelligence in PKO are under development, but any troop level since isolated Coy should have capability to have a Intelligence Sector to provide human intelligence from the area of operations, as also CIMIC cells at all this levels and strategical ones to integrate properly civilian and military components to the society.

More better conditions regarding to this will conduct to less casualties, more secure environment and lead to a effective POC role.

The Bor town was only secured after a strong force from Uganda army controlled the region and deterred other conquer tentative (armored brigade, indirect fire weapons, heavy weaponry, good training and assets, aviation support for attack actions). Sector should have conditions similar of deterrence and includes, besides those capabilities, indirect support fire at battalion and Base level, sniper anti-material and personnel teams, and small special operations teams to provide strategic actions.

Equipment of basic technological should be integrated to all troops, as night vision material, terrestrial vigilance radars, thermal vision assets and others which can provide advantage over threat agents.

Planning UN PKO should follow a kind of strategic design, like the strategic decision-making exercise at ICDS NDU, which allows a better understanding of complex strategy problems.

Mechanized cavalry troops also are most indicated to do strong axis patrolling and Liaoning between Bases and deployed troops, granting a good deterrence and making Bases as spreading security as stated at a demand to improve missions, ensuring a secure footprint, appropriate use of force and active-defense posture.

AU and IGAD monitors should be integrated at the mission composition, as far AU troops helps saving UN troops to focus at more active duties.

Bases should be planned as defensive positions (with physical protection, protection plans, shooting positions, MG spots, indirect fire support, etc) and integrate an active-defense posture irradiating security by deploying troops on terrain and around, patrolling with huge strength and granting security to IDPs areas.

China and Brazil should increase cooperation at PK training centers, plan joint visits to this troops and initiate strategic cooperation enabling to present combined and joint approaches to the missions on the region, opening a new path to PKO cooperation.

As conclusion, lessons learned from UNMISS crisis in 2013-14 indicates that the solution to improvements at POC tasks are complex, pass trough all levels of planning and action, but
open a wide range of opportunities to China-Brazil international military cooperation that can be used as example to the world as united efforts can help the development of secure conditions to implement Protection of Civilians at UNPKO.

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