Challenges of Sub-Conventional Warfare and response options

ABSTRACT

The focus of this part of research study is three-fold. This paper will attempt to define sub-conventional warfare, commonly known as unconventional. To examine the threat of SCW faced by World with a view to suggesting a comprehensive response to tackle this menace. Aggressive occupying powers that adopt characteristics and responsibilities of states currently abound throughout the world. Sub-state unconventional warfare is a viable policy option if strategic planners determine a potential to work with and through an indigenous underground, auxiliary, and guerrillas to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow occupying powers or non-state actors. Sub-state unconventional warfare must be scaled and tailored specifically to the operational environment, and when applied judiciously, can be utilized to oppose occupying powers.

1. INTRODUCTION

Most of country has applied Sub-Conventional warfare (scw) as an economy of force operation in peripheral campaigns within the context of a large conventional war, as support to insurgencies to overthrow foreign governments, and to oppose foreign occupying powers in nations unable to control and defend sovereign territory. The common thread that links these three approaches of scw is the application of military force with and through a population indigenous to the operational environment. Economy of force efforts, and support to insurgencies to overthrow hostile governments have been covered extensively due to a plethora of historical examples. However, the opposition of foreign occupying forces in nations with fragmented or segmented sovereignty through a sub-state scw approach is a poorly understood military phenomenon.

West’s Encyclopedia of Legal Terms provides a strict definition of an occupying power: Military occupation occurs when a belligerent state invades the territory of another state with the intention of holding the territory at least temporarily. While hostilities continue, the occupying state is prohibited by International Law from annexing the territory or creating another state out of it, but… may establish some form of military administration over the territory and the population.1 This definition narrowly describes military occupation in terms of traditional state against state military conflict, but does not describe current realities. Presently, occupying powers that adopt
characteristics and responsibilities of states abound throughout the world. Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIL, and the Taliban in the Middle East, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in South America, and Russian separatists in Ukraine are just a few of these occupying forces who have annexed territory and are operating as quasi-states. Sub-state scw is a viable Encyclopedia Has given rebirth to this form of war. As a consequence, every country in this world is facing this challenge and is combating it in one form or the other. However, its effects are more pronounced in the Third World and under developed countries, primarily owing to economic deprivation and distressing social and democratic systems. In Indo-Pak environments, there are vulnerabilities within the internal dynamics, offering paradigm opportunities.

SCW was introduced in the 1960's. It refers to a situation between peace and a full scale use of weapons in a conventional war. During such a situation there is extensive diplomatic, economic and psychological activity, but its primary feature is the covert or overt use of military force short of wars. A SCW for one nation could be a total war for another. Therefore the common perception of SCW in the West and USA may not quite fit the nature of these conflicts in the Third World. However, major forces that contribute to SCW are change, discontent, violence and instability. These interact to create an environment conducive to SCW. In our regional context with ethnic turmoil, religious intolerance, geo-strategic interdependence, multifaceted socio-economic problems provide a fertile ground for the SCW.

2. Understanding Challenges of Sub-Conventional Warfare and response options

a. Differences from Sub-Conventional Warfare:
Conflicts can be divided into three categories:-

1. High Intensity Conflict.
   It is an armed combat involving two or more nations and their respective allies, in which the belligerents employ the mass destruction weapons, including Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons, command, control, communication and services support.

2. Mid Intensity Conflict.
It is an armed combat between two regularly organized military forces in which the belligerents employ all modern weapons short of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare. A Mid Intensity Conflict may include terrorist incidents or even concurrent insurgents campaigns, but the main feature is the clash of two or more military forces.

3. Low Intensity Conflict.

All measures taken by one or both the opponents short of a conventional war would come under LIC and can be further categorized as under:

a) Intra State.

Intra State LIC is one in which the LIC situation in state erupts by indigenous factors and hostile groups of the state against the state and at later stage can be supported by other countries.

b) Inter State.

A state sponsors LIC in another country by sponsoring various groups, of the state against the government.

b. Definition of Sub-Conventional Warfare (SCW)

To start with, it is necessary to define the concept “unconventional warfare,” the subject of this paper, to clarify the points of argument contained herein. The antonym of unconventional warfare is conventional warfare, which means a battle between states’ regular armed forces. Therefore, unconventional warfare is a generic term that covers all military and quasi-military operations other than conventional warfare. More specifically, one dictionary lists under the heading “unconventional warfare” revolutionary wars and its constituents, subversion and guerrilla; command raids and other and special operations; terrorism and counter-terrorism. But nuclear war, and warfare in which biological and chemical weapons are used, are not included in the concept of unconventional.

Sub-conventional war is a violent conflict between official and non-official actors for legitimacy and influence on the population concerned. Preferential warfare favors unambiguous and indirect concepts while using the full range of military and other capabilities. In other hand sub Conventional warfare is a form of warfare conducted by using conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation. The forces on each side are
well-defined, and fight using weapons that primarily target the opposing army. It is normally fought using conventional weapons, and not with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The general purpose of conventional warfare is to weaken or destroy the opponent's military force, thereby negating its ability to engage in conventional warfare. In forcing capitulation, however, one or both sides may eventually resort to unconventional warfare tactics.

While surveying military literature on SCW, one often encounters following definitions to connote a variety of derivatives based on different perceptions and experience:

1) **SCW**- a confrontation short of full-scale war, but beyond the limits of peaceful political competition.

2) **SCW** is political-military confrontation between contending states or groups at a level below conventional war but above routine peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies, and its manifestation ranges from subversion to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a combination of political, economic, international, and military instruments. These conflicts are often in the Third World, but can contain regional and global security implications. SCW interests are contested, organized violence is used to affect or influence outcomes. All elements of national power are employed, the military dimension is employed primarily for its political, economic and informational effects. Military violence is employed indirectly or limited by time and objective.

3) Some countries have defined SCW in their various training publications as "a politico-military confrontation between the established authority (state) and organizations/groups of people with or without external assistance beyond the scope of legitimate, routine, peaceful contest/agitation. It is waged by a number of means employing political, religious, economic, social, cultural, psychological, informational and military instruments. Being on the lower end of the spectrum, it imposes an undefined restraint on the execution of military operations".

4) A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. It is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.
c. Historical perspective

War in the Age of Dynasties

1. Relations among states in the age of dynasties had a strong coloring of personal relationships among sovereigns and wars between them had the appearance of agama between sovereigns. The issues which principally gave rise to war were mainly royal succession, and sovereigns, the parties to the war, did not harbor strong hatred or enmity against each other. They weighed the importance of the object of war—the succession to the throne or territory—against the cost of continuing the war, and made peace with one another at an appropriate time. In reality, however, dynasties in those days did not have sufficient wherewithal to finance a war. In the 18th century, absolute monarchy appeared, but to view absolute monarch of those days as that who had absolute power as we perceive it today is misreading the reality. In those days, the power of a state did not permeate as far as the bottom of the social scale as it does today, and monarchical governments could not mobilize all the resources of the country. This is simply because the people in those days did not have the consciousness as a nation. Therefore, they viewed war as a struggle between sovereigns, remained indifferent to it and did not deliver of their own volition resources needed to execute the war. There were substantial constraints on military strength. Not to speak of military technological limitations, sovereigns had to contend with strong socio-political constraints more than anything else. Needless to say, monarchical governments had no way to conscript people into armed forces, and the standing army they maintained was largely composed of hired professionals, not native citizen-soldiers. Early in the 17th century, a professional standing army came into being in the Netherlands, and the country could create it with the wherewithal it had obtained through maritime trade.

2. A historical perspective since the end of World War II reveals a world with a high potential for violent conflicts. Since 1945 there have been perhaps 160 armed conflicts around the world, of those, perhaps three quarters have been of the so-called "low intensity" variety. Besides being numerically predominant, SCWs have also been far bloodier than any other kinds of war fought since 1945. Following casualty figures aptly illustrate the bloody nature of so-called SCWs and controversy surrounding the notion of levels of intensity:
| * | Nigerian Civil War (1966-69) | 1 million |
| * | Thirty Years Vietnamese Conflict Including rest of Indo-China, Cambodia and Laos. | 2 million |
| * | Algeria | 1 million |
| * | Afghanistan | 1 million |
| * | Central and South America | 5 million |
| * | Philippines, Tibet, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Indian Held Kashmir, Kurdistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Angola, Brundi, former Yugoslavia, and fifteen years of civil war in Lebanon | 10 million |

The total number of those who died has been put at 20 million or more, much larger than those caused by any post 1945 conventional wars barring the Korean War and eight-year Iran-Iraq War Martin Van Creveld in his book "On Future War" while commenting on the nature of future conflicts writes. "Assuming that politics is what wars are all about, then SCWs have been politically by far the most significant form of war waged since 1945. Out of several dozen conventional conflicts waged since 1945, almost the only one which resulted in the establishment of new frontiers was the 1948 one between Israel and its neighbors, and even then the outcome was not an international border but merely an armistice line. During the same period the consequences of SCWs, numerically about three times as strong have been momentous. From South Africa to Laos, all over the Third World, SCW has been perhaps the dominant instrument for bringing about political change. Perhaps the best indication of the political importance of SCW is that the international community has usually recognized its results, unlike those of conventional wars. Often, indeed, recognition preceded victory rather than following it".

Significantly, the SCWs produced high-yield results. With all the coercive powers at their command, the counter-insurgency forces failed to save the colonial empires. The people’s power prevailed. The British lost India, Kenya, Palestine, Cyprus and Aden. Defeated in Indochina and Algeria, the French surrendered the bulk of her remaining empire without a struggle. The Belgians lost Congo and the Dutch, Indonesia. The Spaniards yielded Sahara without a fight. The Portuguese capitulated in Angola and Mozambique and South Africa withdrew from Namibia. The Chechens
and the Moro National Liberation front have recently signed peace accords with Russia and the Philippines respectively. Malaysia is perhaps a solitary example where the British forces successfully crushed an insurgency. However, two factors may be noted concerning this success. One, it was a minority inspired communist insurgency. Secondly, Britain had announced in advance that on achieving normalcy she will withdraw from Malaysia.

d. Characteristics

Low intensity Conflicts may differ in intent and form but in certain unique characteristics as discussed below:-

1) Political Control Greater political control behind a military shield turn this into another kind of war. In this kind of conflict, Armed forces may not always be allowed freedom of appropriate military action. Thus face reverses and loss of reputation e.g. in Sri Lanka Indian troops were placed at a major disadvantage because use of armed helicopters required permission from higher government authorities, which was not forthcoming.

2) Restricted Level of Combat. A low intensity of combat due to non-military considerations, limits the choice and use of weapons, area of combat and technique of operations. This severely restricts military options and chance of quick success. In Sri Lanka, the requirement to limit collateral civilian damage severely handicapped peacekeeping tasks.

3) Absence of a Recognizable Enemy. The enemy is either invisible or shadowy. There may be no rear or front not even a (visible) host country support. His organisation and tactics may never be clearly discernible and may show consistency or uniform pattern.

4) Emphasis on Psychological War. The enemy in order to win support and sympathy of the population and to demoralize regular forces wages a relentless psychological war. Propaganda may be carried out even from neutral countries in which the actions of security forces are invariably depicted as barbarous and inhuman.

5) Protracted Nature of Conflict. Being low cost war it can be prolonged for indefinite period. Defeat or victory is never clear cut or decisive. A long seemingly meaningless war, which alternates between periods of calm and intense operational activity, can sap the morale of even best armies of the world.
6) Initiative. Insurgents and terrorists invariably retain initiative. Tactical advantage is generally with them as they can change aims, modus operandi, call off action for prolonged periods when cornered or dramatically increase activity when the pressure of security forces slackens. The terrorists, in particular, choose targets at random and follow no civilized conventions.

7) Objective. Another distinguishing quality of all forms of SCW, as quoted by Loren B. Thompson, is the objectives or final ends. The main objective of both sides in LIC is to influence the perceptions and loyalties of the civilian population. This may be achieved through persuasion or coercion but always with the goal of depriving the opponent of popular support. Hence, the role of civil military relations and psychological operations in combating low intensity operations assumes special significance.

8) Peacekeeping. It is a unique operation, the purpose of which generally is to prevent one group of people from fighting another, holding elections, provision of humanitarian assistance, protection of certain segment of society, prevention of violence without recourse to warlike actions or as required by the mandate of the UNO. Although many of the techniques involved are the same as those practiced in other forms of SCW, it is a fundamentally different occupation. The term covers a wide variety of functions as explained above, not all of which include the use of military force. The terms under which the force is required to operate are generally imprecise and, therefore, the commanders having great freedom of action have a very intricate role to play. The influence of the political intricacies is so over-riding, sometimes even running counter to military culture, that it leaves negative effect on the state of training of the troops who may even have to be re-trained in their conventional role after the peacekeeping assignments.

Third World is likely to remain a conflict-ridden region. The major powers have frequently demonstrated the political will and possess the means to interfere in a targeted Third World country for self-serving reasons, as it is easy to find a fault in any targeted country.

The limitation imposed on higher forms of conflict by the development of nuclear weapons in its simplest form results in that, major powers cannot afford to risk overt warlike operations against each other. It has also shaped the behavior of many of the other nations of the world because in the past major powers have been obliged to damp down any conflict which might have escalated in such a way as to bring about a threat of war between them. It would also be wrong to
suggest that nuclear balance has made all orthodox wars impossible. Several have taken place in the recent years. With the development of nuclear deterrent, nations have been, in most cases, successful in averting major wars, yet, while the deterrence has worked at the upper end of the conflict spectrum, wars and the resort to force at the lower end of the spectrum has not been deterred

Nuclear parity, the dynamics of modern revolutionary warfare, and economic interdependence have significantly reshaped the international arena over the last four decades. New players have begun to take advantage of SCW as a means of advancing their foreign policy objectives. The better the deterrence works on both the nuclear and the conventional levels, the more strongly will states be inclined to use surrogate, unconventional strategies in the threat or use of force for either promoting or containing policy objectives. Thus LICs are likely to become more frequent in interstate power relations.

The speculations made in the 1970s that conventional warfare was becoming obsolete have not been borne out. However, the constraints imposed by the increasing destructiveness and costs of modern weaponry, the requirement for military personnel with advanced training, the complex role played by the major world powers, and the limitations imposed by the world and domestic public opinion have led to greater reliance on indirect forms of warfare and the employment of proxies. Not only warfare in the future will be less destructive than that in the first half of the twentieth century but also less coherent. The distinction between war and peace may dissolve. With constraints on the total application of military force, wars would seldom end in conquest or capitulation.

3. Threat and vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities.

a. Internal. Possible causes related to our national environments which make us vulnerable to SCW are:

1) Socio-Economic Unrest. The current state of our socio-economic conditions is causing fear, dissatisfaction and disillusionment to a large number of people. There has been a perceptible shift in the social values of our society since the last three decades. The society has
transformed from a value based to materialistic one. This shift has caused deterioration in our social and moral fiber, resulting in social unrest. Economically is passing through a difficult period of its economic history. the economy appears to be under the total control of international donor agencies.

2) Lack of Justice. Lack of justice and presence of evils in the society have further aggravated the situation. People when unprotected and insecure, with basic right of justice denied feel highly discontented thus provide fertile masses to breed the cause of SCW.

3) Self-Governance. An important factor, which is lacking is the objective involvement of local population in management of their affairs. Local bodies need to be functional and effective so that there is rightful participation of masses in the governance of society.

4) Increase in Population. Deliberate effort is being made by the Government to control the increase in population. However, the population growth rate has further aggravated the problem mentioned below which are a great cause of discontentment and can be exploited to create SCW situation:
   a) Lack of job opportunities, which make the youth vulnerable to illegal and illegitimate temptation.
   b) Lack of civic facilities.
   c) Poor quality of life.

5) Sectarianism. This threat has assumed menacing proportion in our society. Since the past decade or so the country is reeling with the intractable problem of sectarian hate, which has weakened the very foundation of our country. The sectarian cleavages have become so pronounced that the extremists of one sect are determined to annihilate the other. Militant sectarian parties are enormously powerful, armed and these parties are being funded by foreign agencies. The threat on this account is substantial and formidable.

   (1) Ethnic Polarization. Unfortunately the under currents of this threat do exist in our country. A sense of deprivation among the small provinces, feelings of social injustice and discrimination among certain classes of society are manifestation of this threat. Some of the indicators which point towards the threat are Acrimonious statements by some political leaders.
(2) Prolonged Political Instability. The political history presents a sorry state of affairs. Over the year's people appeared to have lost faith in our political system, which has lead to feelings of regionalism and provincialism. Although, the country seems to be on the path of democracy but frequent interruptions have lead to undermining its political culture.

(3) Corruption. It cannot be denied that corruption is rampant in our country. The Prime Minister in his address to the nation accepted wasted due to corruption and mismanagement.

b. Media. The role of news media continues to expand. The number of news organizations and their means to gather, process and disseminate information has increased manifold. The younger generation is unduly attracted by the glare of Indian media-film, electronic and print. They are unaware of the raison d'être of the country. Own media even if it is conscious of the challenge, has delivered miserably on this score.

4. Role of the Armed Forces

a. Experience in different Armies. Contemporary armies trained on Clausewitzean and Liddle Hart theories, either failed or refused to adjust to the demands of SCW and thus suffered defeats most of the times when confronted with SCWs. Though most of the modern armies study SCW but none have come up with a clear doctrine like “Air Land Battle” to combat it. However the US Army has managed to develop a comprehensive publication dealing with SCW situations (FM 100-20). Experience of some Armies involved in dealing with such situation is discussed below:

1) French. The French Army after their defeat in Indo China in May 1954 was determined to win in Algeria. The French despite their experience in Indo China, took it as a normal war and entrusted their regular army to fight it.

2) US In Vietnam. In pursuing the war, the US initially took the right tack by providing members of the ‘Special Forces’ as advisers. Highly trained in the precepts of Guerrilla Warfare, Special Forces did an excellent job of forming local defense forces and indigenous counter guerrilla units. Once the US began committing conventional forces, however, this
self-defense effort was neglected, as the ‘Special Forces’ trained irregular were used as scouts or intelligence sources for US or Vietnamese heavier formations. The US also tried to substitute high technology for light infantryman, attempting to kill guerrillas by bombing jungle areas. Perhaps the biggest enemy the US and South Vietnamese faced was the US press which tilted the public opinion against the commitment of US forces. The war dragged on for longer than any recent conflict, which made it unpopular. The Americans very closely followed the major insurgencies of post Second War era i.e. in French Indo China, Malaya, Philippines, and Algeria etc. The insurgency as a subject was researched in “Special Operation Research Office”. Despite an efficient counter insurgency doctrine the US Army failed in Vietnam.

3) IRA. The origins of the conflict in Ulster date to Elizabethan times, when English Protestants conquered the country. However, the most recent serious outbreak of violence can be traced more directly to 1969, when protestant violence against Catholics and the resulting retaliation reached a point where British Army units had to be deployed to help restore order. Almost a quarter of a century later the British Army is still serving in Northern Ireland. The IRA has been a remarkably successful guerrilla movement, partly because it won great popularity with the Catholic population owing to its initial defensive mission. Particular IRA targets have been members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), the locally raised army unit. The British Army has suffered over 3,000 casualties in Northern Ireland, making it a more costly campaign than the conflicts in the Falklands and the Persian Gulf. Over the years, however, the Army developed an effective combination of intelligence operations, ambushes, checkpoints, surveillance and foot patrols. Reasonable co-operation has been received from the Irish Republic, though it has remained necessary to maintain security operations along the borders to prevent arms smuggling and infiltration. It should be pointed out, too, that, despite the heavy British army presence, the RUC has remained the principal security force. Perhaps the most effective aspect of British Army operations in Northern Ireland has been the deployment of the SAS, who are viewed as trained killers by the IRA. The SAS was initially deployed to Ulster in 1969 and they did not return until 1976. The SAS has been used to train other units to carry out the type of undercover tasks at which it excels. As a result, the RUC and Military Intelligence have developed units, which now perform tasks initially carried out by the SAS. The Mobile Reconnaissance Force was one such unit, which worked with ex-terrorists, who pointed out former colleagues. Perhaps the best intelligence operation, however was the establishment of the
Four Square Laundry, which operated a successful laundry service in the Catholic areas of West Belfast, collecting laundry and testing it for traces of explosive in order to locate IRA bomb making facilities. The use of communications intelligence units to scan frequencies and detonate bombs has also resulted in some IRA members being blown up by their own explosive devices. Owing to SAS successes, the RUC formed their own special units, such as E4A for surveillance and Special Patrol Group, Bronze Section, for ‘active measures’. This unit was later known as the Special Support Unit.

4) SRI LANKA. After the country had achieved independence from Great Britain, Sri Lankan majority, the Sinhalese Buddhists, passed various laws, which were highly distasteful to the Tamil Hindu minority. These laws included the establishment of Buddhism as the state religion and the specifying of English as the state language for those holding positions in the government. Tamils were thus deprived of the chance to work in the civil service and in most cases, the opportunity to attend universities. Anti-Tamil riots in 1983, combined with the discriminatory policies of the government, resulted in the rise of various guerrilla groups, the most effective of which was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Tigers and other guerrillas had received extensive support and training from India, which felt that Sri Lanka was proving too pro-Western, and has 50 million Tamils in India applying political pressure. India’s intelligence agency, the RAW had helped train many of the guerrillas in the Tamil regions of India. In July 1987, however, after concessions from the Sri Lankan government, an Indian Peacekeeping Force was deployed to help enforce peace between the Tamils and the government. The Tamils wanted a separate state known as ‘Eelam’, but this was unpalatable to India as well, as it was thought that it could have a destabilizing influence on the Tamils in that country. To counter the various guerrillas, the best Sri Lankan army unit was the Special Task force, which had been trained by the SAS. When a group of Tamil leaders was captured while running guns, they committed suicide, a standard Tiger practice. The Sri Lankan forces were quite well organized for counter-insurgency, having adopted a reinforced battalion organizational system in which each battalion comprised seven companies, each company consisting of five 30-man platoons each platoon was divided into three sections, each led by an officer. This force proved highly adaptable for counter-insurgency operations and was adept at cordon and search, raids, ambushes, roadblocks and other standard tactics. Once again, the conflict in Sri Lanka illustrates the precept that, to counter a guerrilla movement, some attempt must be made to separate the guerrillas from the population and to accede to the political aspirations of the population. In the case of the Tamil minority, present government abuses, religious differences and bad feelings concerning the
past continue to fuel the conflict. The added dimension of the presence of the Indian army, which no one really seems to want, creates even more potential for a protracted conflict.


6) AFGHASNISTAN. Both Afghanistan and its people seem to have been designed by Allah for guerrilla warfare. The Afghans have a long tradition of resistance to central authority, even if it is their own duly elected government. Add mountainous countryside and rugged individualists whose language lacks a word for ‘submission’, and it becomes obvious that even the mighty Red Army would face a formidable challenge. The people of Afghanistan are unified by their religion, Islam. It was this religion, which the communist Afghan regime and the Soviet Union tried to deny, thus making a counter-insurgency campaign a ‘counter-jihad’ campaign as well. Trained for decades to fight a land war in Europe, the Soviets were not proving adaptable to counter-insurgency operations. Their principal tactic at this point was large-scale mechanized sweeps, which the wily Afghan guerrillas easily avoided. More successful was a scorched earth policy, in which they destroyed as much agriculture as possible to deny the guerrillas food. The aerial deployment of PFM-1 ‘butterfly’ mines also interfered with guerrilla movement to some extent. These tactics resulted in a substantial flow of refugees into Pakistan, refugees whose stories helped rally world opinion against the Soviet Union. This concentration of Afghans in refugee camps actually helped the resistance to get itself organized, as well. The Soviet Union began to rely more on air power in 1981. Although the open spaces of Afghanistan were seemingly well suited to aerial counter-guerrilla operations, the effectiveness of these operations was minimal. In fact, despite massive air support, ground offensives whether by government troops or Soviets, were normally unsuccessful. The Soviet troops and Kabul troops were normally deployed in heavy columns to secure roads leading to Kabul or other cities, but they really only controlled the ground they sat on. As they moved along in heavy columns, the Soviets often fired randomly along the route in the hope of catching guerrillas lying in ambush. The Soviets made their supreme tactical error, however, in conceding the Mujahideen the high ground above their routes, allowing themselves to be ambushed from above. Continued depopulation of areas, which might support a build-up for an attack on Kabul also proved effective, if draconian. The Soviets had now adapted their combined arms/airmobile tactics well enough to score some marked successes in 1984. Airmobile troops were landed to secure the high ground ahead of advances, helping to eliminate
many ambushes, while elite airborne troops were used to advance over inhospitable terrain to harry the guerrillas. However, the guerrillas normally refused to fight when the odds were bad, and faded away. In fighting the Mujahideen, the Soviet Union found that an army trained for a conventional war in Europe was not particularly well suited to guerrilla warfare. The Red Army did adapt, however, using specialized air assault, airborne, ‘Spetsnaz’, and mountain troops to take the war to the enemy.

b. Lessons From Analysis of Experience of Different Armies.

1) Political Nature of War. SCW have a strong and large political component, which remains invisible, and a small but very visible military component. Defeating the political component is more important than going for the military component. As the basic nature of SCW is political, therefore, it should be ideally handled politically.

2) Clarity of Aim. The national aim must be clear. The policy, strategy and tactics to achieve the aim should be in harmony. The plan should be prepared in its entirety till achievement of the aim. Stop gap measures and haphazard decisions should be avoided as done.

3) Unity of Effort. As SCW is multifaceted i.e. economic, political, diplomatic, psychological, intelligence, and military, it has to be countered in all these fields. The response in all these fields should be coordinated at all levels. From highest to lowest levels, one person should be responsible to direct the response while remaining within the ambit of national policy.

4) Psychological Warfare. It is a war of minds. Winning the battle of hearts and minds is equally important as killing the guerrillas and terrorists. Governments should take steps that minds of their people are not subverted through negative propaganda.

5) Importance of the People. It is the people whom the government represents and if is on their behalf that government fights. Therefore, instead of suspecting them to be in league with insurgents and terrorists, the general population must be involved in counter operations.

6) Role of Armed Forces. Regular armies though trained to destroy the enemy and capture an objective, are generally not very well trained to under take counter guerrilla or counter insurgency operations in SCWs. However, the experiences of SCWs have shown that military forces generally participate in such operations in five main ways as follows:-
5. Response / Recommendations

Government Response

Response Parameters. The dangerous dimensions of SCW have not been fully appreciated. At the national level, we do not have any long-term strategy to combat the situation of strife, unrest, terrorism, and open insurgency. The belated reaction, misdirected initiatives, and petty politics, further aggravate the situation. Our response therefore should be governed by the following parameters:

a. We need a comprehensive national strategy and policy involving diplomatic, political, economic, administrative, and military measures.
b. Owing to the socio-political nature of the conflict, there is a requirement of an overall political strategy out of which military strategy or responsibility will flow.
c. Joint action is the key to success and must be executed under single command as the concept of unified command.
d. A timely state effort is a must to counter SCW before it proliferates.

Overall Strategy. SCW is neither a simple nor a short-term affair, these operations must be viewed from the perspective of the total environment. SCW cannot be dealt with, by military power alone, it requires synchronized application of all elements of national power, a perspective that focuses on the broader problems and challenges of SCW. In this regard following is suggested:

a. National SCW Policy. A well thought and transparent National Policy on SCW is a prerequisite for undertaking any such operation. Our existing system provides Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) as the highest forum to deal with matters related to defense
policy. This body should regularly review national defense policy and strategy to assess SCW situation and formulate policies regarding SCW on internal and external fronts.

b. National Strategy. SCW must be seen as a national issue having grave repercussions and the ultimate solution lies in determined and sagacious political initiatives at the national level. Every field of national activity needs to be addressed concurrently for an effective response. The response should be developed with a view to prevent, per-empt contain defuse and eradicate SCW, and regain/retain support of people by winning their hearts and minds. There is therefore a need to orchestrate all the agencies under an apex body.

Political Stability. To this end following measures are suggested:-

a. Strict adherence to the constitution.

b. Granting of full provincial autonomy to provinces within the parameters of Constitution.

c. Introduction of democratic institutions at grass root levels to plan and execute development projects having bearing on the welfare of people.

d. Politicians should sort out their own affairs and military must remain away from politics.

Economic Stability. Following measures are suggested in this regard:-

a. Grant of legitimate share from National Resources to all provinces.

b. Correct economic management and formulation of economic policies at the macro level.

c. A well thought out and transparent privatization policy particularly of those institutions, which have become white elephants.

d. A progressive reduction of unemployment and poverty alleviation program should be introduced. Speedy development of indigenous sources of energy and curtailing the non-development expenditures.

e. Levying of agricultural tax on people with large land holdings and at the same time incentives given to small growers.

f. Devising a foolproof and effective tax collection system.

Strengthening of National Institutions. Institutions play a very important role in creating a stable domestic environment and ensuring steady progress/development. Strengthening of all these
institutions for achieving national cohesion is of vital importance. Government must also initiate effective measures to eradicate the menace of corruption. Following is suggested in this regard:-

a. Uniform Education Policy. To lessen illiteracy a comprehensive education policy is required, which should be in harmony with our national objectives.

b. Flourishing Nationalism. Since independence no practical steps have been taken to improve nationalism among the masses and the situation is getting worse day by day. Following measures are suggested:-

   (a) All out efforts be made to bring all factors of society in the main stream.
   (b) Workable package be offered to dissident factions, however if they remain adamant than their designs be exposed to the masses.
   (c) All programmes/plays on national TV should work on a common national theme.

c. Promoting Islamic Brotherhood. Following measures are suggested:-

   (1) Promotion of sectarian harmony by National Council at National level and establishing provincial and district levels sectarian peace committees, which should comprise prominent citizens and scientists. Scientists belonging to different sects should be encouraged to interact freely and meetings should be given wide media coverage.
   (2) Formulation of laws and initiating administrative measures to ruthlessly control culture of violence.
   (3) Banning of militant factions of all political/religious parties may also be considered.

   Psychological Operations and Media Control. Psychological operations are effective instruments to combat SCW as these are meant to effect favourable change in their opinions, attitudes and emotions of the target audience. Propaganda, selective threat for use of force, economic development, civic actions and other welfare activities are required to be made known through electronic and print media therefore psychological operations and media control be organized under a directorate general of information ministry and be articulated to JS HQ.

   Foreign Policy. SCW is invariably foreign sponsored and international pressure is required to be brought on the sponsoring country. Therefore, there is a need to have SCW friendly foreign policy, which would facilitate global collaboration and regional collaboration to muster up political,
intelligence and material support to combat SCW. Pressure groups be also created with the help of friendly governments to sound concerns effectively at national and international forums.

Good Governance. Creation of a stable domestic environment through good governance and economic development is essential. Therefore there is a need to undertake measures to improve upon rehabilitation living conditions educational facilities and job opportunities leading to the development of nationalistic feeling amongst the masses. Eliminate corruption by institutionalizing transparent system of accountability.

Law and Order. In order to improve law and order situation, following measures are recommended:

a. Provision of speedy justice to all.
b. Introducing reforms in Police, to increase the efficiency by:
   1) Better training.
   2) Hi tech weapons.
   3) Increased pay scales.
   4) Strict disciplinary actions.
   5) Psychological analysis on ISSB pattern prior to induction.

c. Intelligence. Acquisition and processing of intelligence must be coordinated and synchronized at the highest possible level. Careful management of information and coordination among various agencies is vital in any Low Intensity Conflict.

Regional Languages. Language is sacred to people. The consequences of forcing a language on Bengalis are not hidden, therefore following are recommended to bring the people of different provinces together:

a. In all the provinces primary medium of instruction should be in regional languages if they desire.
b. Urdu should be the language for all inter-provincial and national matters.
c. No compulsion should be imposed on provinces for tackling their internal affairs in a particular language. This will help saving the rich cultural identities of the provinces and no group will be able to exploit it for their vested interests.
Curbing Sectarianism. Formulation of laws and initiating administrative measures ruthlessly controls the militant wings of politico-religious parties. Addressing the genuine concerns of people from various sects will promote harmony and curb violence.

Revitalization of Police and Para Military Forces. To avoid commitment of regular force to combat SCW situations, police and para military forces should be trained and adequately equipped to deal with such situations. The existing corruption and high headedness of police adds to discontent and lack of trust in the law enforcing agencies. Therefore following steps are recommended:

a. Selection of inspectors be based on the ISSB type system.
b. Police academy should be organized on lines of Military Academy so as to develop quality leadership.
c. Enhanced pay scales will reduce bribery.
d. Existing weapons and riot control equipment should be up graded to meet the demanding situations.
e. Elite squads to be trained by SSG to form the nucleus element in combating SCW.

Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS). Formulation of CDNS be considered once again. As the supreme national body it should regularly review national defence policy and strategy against SCW situations so that necessary measures are undertaken both at the internal and external front.

Debt Servicing. The main objects of external debt management should be:

a. Ensure that the growth of external debt does not outstrip the capacity to service it and ensure fiscal discipline.
b. Minimise the cost of debt servicing and integrate debt service management with macro economic management.
c. Curb on domestic extravagant spending in public and private sectors.

Inflation. Government must try to control the rate of inflation through:

a. Controlling money supply by not printing excess cash through legislation.
b. Revision of Government expenditure not to exceed the revenues collected by the budget. Strict control on imports, particularly on consumer goods.
c. Keeping a strict check on the inflationary trends and announcing the inflation rate daily on television.

Energy Crises. It is suggested that multi pronged energy plan involving all sources of energy i.e, hydral, thermal and nuclear energy be evolved to include:-

a. If found technically feasible then irrespective of political implications work must start on it immediately.
b. Use of coal and gas for power generation and existing projects must be expanded to its optimum utility.
c. All the major cities to be provided with nuclear energy facilities. Similar facilities to be installed at major industrial units, hospitals etc.
d. Prevention of loss by effective management system and recovery of outstanding bills.

Population Control. To control this growing menace, following is recommended:-

a. Integration of religious scholars into the population control programme.
b. Population control programme should be associated with social development programme.
c. Elevation of status of women by providing more education and health facilities.
d. Family planning to be part of education syllabus.

Human Resources Management. This should be declared as number one priority. Following is suggested in this regard:-

a. Creation of ‘National Employment Council’ to under take employment service, guidance and matching operations.
b. Creation of ‘Self Employment Generation Schemes’ by encouraging the establishment of cottage/small industries, providing soft term loans, raw material and marketing facilities.
c. The redundant education system should be replaced by specialized education with maximum emphasis on technical education.

SCW Doctrine. A comprehensive SCW doctrine should be formulated by Doctrine & Evaluation/Military Operations Directorates to combat SCW. The doctrine should state mechanics for conduct of SCW operations. Basing on the doctrine, training publications should be prepared which provide guidelines for SCW operations. To evolve the doctrine following measures are recommended:-
a. Evolve a national plan to combat conflicts other than war by merging all the relevant civil and military factors.

b. Operational doctrine to combat conflicts other than conventional war be prepared by General Headquarters in cooperation with concerned agencies.

c. The responsibility of coordinating and implementing above should be entrusted to a single agency. Resource permitting the creation of a SCW Directorate in the General Staff Branch at General Headquarters be earnestly analyzed. If not, then Military Operations Directorate be entrusted with the responsibility to establish a SCW Branch with the onus to coordinate various aspects of military strategy with the concerned civil agencies.

Threat and Response. SCW prone areas/situations should be studied in detail to perceive the threat correctly, identify the precise causes and the center of gravity of the SCW. However the response must keep the involvement of Army to the bare minimum. Police and Civil Armed Forces should best deal recognizable symptoms. It is suggested that the scope of existing counter insurgency and internal security cell in Military Operations Directorate should be enlarged to undertake this task. Input from Military Intelligence Directorate should be obtained to perceive the threat correctly. The SCW instructions should be revised from time to time to keep pace with the changing situations.

SCW Training Philosophy. As identified earlier in the analysis there are three cardinal aspects on which our training philosophy should be based and these are:

a. Establishment of credibility by the military whenever incorporated in SCW operations.

b. Alienate masses from insurgents and terrorists.

c. Facilitate masses of the affected area to join the national main stream.

3. SCW Training Methodology. It should flow from SCW Training Philosophy. It is recommended that SCW training should be institutionalized at all levels as follows:

a. Training Directive. A general training directive should be issued encompassing SCW threat and response thereto. Based on the training, schools of instructions should prepare a comprehensive syllabus to impart training to officers, Junior Commissioned Officers and Non Commissioned Officers.
b. Schools of Instructions. Officers should be trained to understand the complex SCW environments and employed of their troops under those circumstances. The training should be progressive starting from special to arm schools and culminate at National Defence College. Following aspects are recommended:-

1) Training at School of Infantry and Tactics. Besides basic military skills and minor operations following subjects/training may be considered for inclusion in syllabus:-
   a) Hostage rescue.
   b) Cordon and search.
   c) Counter mobility.
   d) Checking of various documents.
   e) Background of the conflict in detail.
   f) Small combat team training capable of independent, rapid and decisive engagements and adapting quickly to the prevalent conditions.

2) Training at School of Military Intelligence. Following subjects are suggested: -
   a) Psychological operations and public relations.
   b) Art of negotiations and persuasion.
   c) Interrogation.
   d) Manipulation of military measures including civic actions.
   e) Handling of information.
   f) Media handling.

3) Specialized Training at Formation/Unit Levels. Physically fit and mentally alert troops are the basic need. Preemption and swift reaction are vital ingredients. To attain this standard following is recommended for formation and unit level training:-
   a) Conduct and Behavior of Soldiers. A civilized and respectful behavior is the first step towards victory in this kind of battle.
   b) Handling of Media/NGOs. The officers must be trained to handle media and NGOs. The policy to avoid them may not be very beneficial, rather an interaction with them at various levels by the trained personnel is the need of the time.
   c) Training in Specialized Aspects
      (1) Cordon/Search.
(2) Survey.
(3) Security and personal safety.
(4) Handling of processions.
(5) Establishment of Pickets/Blocking Positions.
(6) Unarmed Combat.
4) Officers Training.Officers must be fully trained in following areas: -

a) Complete understanding of the nature of conflict.
b) Art of negotiation.
c) Legal matters.
d) Psychological Operations and public relations.
e) Interrogation/handling of information.
f) Organization/conduct of relief and rehabilitation operations.
g) Local language.
h) Thorough grip on impact of information warfare.

5) Seminars and Discussions.Periodic seminars and discussion be organized at formation level, which should be attended by civil, and police officials who are likely to be employed on SCW operations.

6) Assistance from Special Services Group (SSG).Selected officers/Men should be trained through SSG or SSG expert be attached with each Corps Headquarters Special operation school may be used to impart such training to selected individuals thus developing a pool of highly trained officers and other ranks. Their expertise can thus be utilized in Division Battle Schools to train a large portion of officers and men.

Force Structure.Necessary modifications in existing organizations to undertake the SCW Challenges with operational effectiveness are as follows:

a. Force structures designed for diverse United Nations Missions are excellent examples; there is no need to raise ‘Special Forces’ for SCW. The tasks can be performed with the existing force structures with suitable modification of selected reserve infantry formations. The suggested organization of an infantry battalion capable of reacting to a SCW situation is at Annex C.

b. Expansion of existing force structure of Special Service Group to undertake special SCW operations.
c. The second line forces be equipped with necessary communication means and riot control equipment to handle SCW situations.
d. Additional Elements:

1) Intelligence set up to monitor and collects intelligence pertaining to area of operation.
2) Legal cell to deal with the legal aspects of the operations.
3) Psychological operation/media cell.

e. Specialized Troops. In each unit, carefully selected and well-trained group of persons must be maintained to react swiftly and correctly. Initially it may be a section/platoon size force which should be periodically relieved. This will have following advantages: 
1) Allow high quality training of maximum persons of the unit required for SCW operations.
2) Create environment in a unit to combat SCW.
3) Create small unit teams capable of independent raid and decisive engagements.
4) Create a very potent force to combat SCW situations when employed together with other teams.

f. Trackers and Dog Section. This section could be attached from the Army Dog Training Center to the units earmarked for operational commitments two to three month in advance.
g. Specialist Section. To be headed by an Engineer officer to carry out the coordination of pacification programme on the local population within the area of control.
h. Additional Medical Support. To cater for both military and civilians.
j. Provision/attachment of officers/personnel trained in interrogation, media handling, psychological operations and public relationing. Weapons and Equipment. Weapon systems designed for high intensity war are by no means suitable for use under LIC environments. The earmarked formations and second line forces, be equipped with following special weapons/equipment in addition to their existing inventory: 

a. Armoured Personnel Carriers.
b. Medium size pick up trucks
c. CQB weapons Sniper Rifles, modern handguns.
d. Bullet Proof Jackets.
e. Night Vision Goggles.
f. Megaphone down to section level.
g. Counter mobility stores including explosive ordnance.
h. Long range handy communication means down to section level like Motorola sets held by the Police.

i. Special ammunition, tear gas, water guns etceteras for riot control.

j. Self defence equipment.

Intelligence. For SCW, the Army would need a cohesive intelligence setup designed, organized, equipped and especially trained to operate in an extremely complex conflict environment. An integrated approach ensuring unity of effort will be of vital importance for success in SCW. To address the gray area following is suggested:

a. Creation of a special intelligence cell in SCW Directorate or designated Branch of Military Operations, to synchronize intelligence effort at Army and National Level.

b. Coordination of intelligence work at Provincial/Corps Headquarters level by incorporating civil agencies and identification of the likely trouble spots/conditions conducive for SCWs.

c. Induction of special and sophisticated intelligence gathering equipment like monitoring Set ‘R-7000/8000’.

d. Use of computers and Internet etceteras for gathering intelligence.

e. Effective use of information warfare and deny same to insurgents.

Civil-Military Coordination. Civilmilitarycoordination committees should be established down to the brigade level. This should include the elements of Army, Civil Armed Force, Police and Civil Administration. The committee headed by Commander 5 Corps was very effective while handling the insurgency. The committee should meet regularly to:

a. Study the threat in their areas.

b. Develop a combined strategy to operate, incorporating all the elements to achieve a common objective.

c. Exchange information.

d. Establish the assistance required from each other

CONCLUSION

Conventional wars have become too expensive; the trend towards SCW is on the increase. In a country like where conditions favour SCWs all elements of national power must be employed to counter this threat. SCW has to combat both on political and military fronts. There is a
need to create SCW awareness at the national level, so that adequate measures are undertaken at every level. Role of the Army is only to suppress the level of militancy and thus create a situation wherein the political process can commence. the Army has had a favourable track record in dealing with such situations in the past. However, it may not be able to deal effectively with such impediments in future due to the multi faceted nature of threat. It is essential therefore, that the Army must enhance its ability to undertake these challenges.

Some major conclusions drawn may be summarized as under:

- Keeping in view the modern day international environment the SCW is the most likely form of conflict in the World.

- SCW includes a wide spectrum of activities ranging from non-violent to violent acts. Thus an army accustomed to making adjustments in its doctrine, organization and technique will be more likely to adapt effectively to the challenges of SCW.

- The basic difference between military operation in SCW and mid to high intensity levels is the nature of military objectives. At the mid to high intensity level the military objective is in terms of winning campaigns and battles, while in SCW it is achieving national interests without recourse to the protracted combat.

- To deal with such conflicts effectively, the root cause will have to be addressed. It is basically a political struggle and needs political approach to eliminate it. The use of force or military means alone will not solve the problem.

- An extensive intelligence network must be emphasized in SCW at two levels. At the low level, effective counter intelligence techniques must be adopted to provide tactical intelligence, and at the higher level effective and comprehensive intelligence must focus on requirement to provide early information of growing SCW.

- Military involvement in SCW should be restricted to containment operations in order to create environments conducive to resolving of the issue by non-military means.

- The scope of SCW is likely to increase in the future due to availability of lighter, accurate and highly lethal weapons to the insurgents, as in Kashmir.

- In existing economic environments it is not possible for us to raise a special/separate SCW structure. The reliance has to be placed on existing military–civil resources / force structure.
- Planning for SCW operations will have to be deliberate as is done by modern armies to complete knowledge of the environments in which they had to operate. In absence of such preparation our Army is likely to face casualties.

- The training institutions will have to play a major role in training the officers / men for preparing them to meet the challenges of this future threat.

- ISPR will have to be more open and act wisely and intelligently to win the minds and heats of the people.

- To contain an SCW situation a dedicated doctrine, plans, organisational structure and training is necessary. This would involve:-

  - Identification of potential area of SCW
  - Integration of civil and military agencies.
  - Creation of an integrated intelligence network.
  - Evolution of techniques and drills.
  - Adjustments in force structure.
  - Creation of special cell at General Headquarters.
  - Training at military institutions.
  - Specialized training like bomb handling/disposal.
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